Excellent Sheep or Wild Ducks? Reclaiming the Humanities for Beautiful Knowledge

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INTRODUCTION: WHAT IS USEFUL KNOWLEDGE IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY?

In “The American Scholar,” first published in 1837, Ralph Waldo Emerson presents the significance of “Man Thinking” as the condition of human being,¹ of the person who thinks for life and in life. The Scholar must be, Emerson says, “strong to live, as well as strong to think.”² This is the primordial form of American philosophy, what Emerson calls the “philosophy of life.”³ Echoing Emerson’s call for the “Philosopher of Democracy,”⁴ Dewey developed the idea of democracy as “a way of life,”⁵ of philosophy for the common man, and most importantly, of philosophy as education. From the American transcendentalism of Emerson and Thoreau to Dewey’s pragmatism, the central task was taken to be the reconstruction of philosophy in service of life; as Thoreau says in Walden, the task of the philosopher is to solve the problems of life not only theoretically but practically.⁶ To this end, knowledge is, as Hilary Putnam says, to be used in service of “the problems of men.”⁷

What is useful knowledge for human beings? What is the task of philosophy in service of life? These questions have gained a new impetus today. In the context of the worldwide trend in STEM⁸ funding in higher education, the humanities are perceived to be “useless.” Problem-solving is taken to be the task of education in the terms of a global economy. The call to bring philosophy back to life and to return knowledge to practical use is emphasized all the more, yet with a distinctive sense: the ideas of use, practicality, activity, and life are subordinated to economic need. Though this apparently humane language of education echoes Deweyan ideas of ever-continuing growth and self-realization, the ideal of the human being is envisioned in terms of human resources for economic growth. A deeper threat lies in the fact that the currency of the
language makes it difficult to think beyond its surface value, as if language itself blocked the liberating power of thought, circumscribing its own possibilities of circulation. To bring our thinking back to life and to reconsider the meaning of practicality, usefulness, and the functionality of knowledge, we need an alternative mode of thinking – *thinking beyond problem-solving*. In response, this article aims to reevaluate the use of American philosophy today for reclaiming the humanities in higher education, especially in defiance of the way that lip-service to this is sometimes paid in the rhetoric of this new, alleged practicality.

In what follows, I shall, first, re-examine the nature of the current crisis of humanities in the light of William Deresiewicz’s 2014 book *Excellent Sheep*. Second, in extending his argument and compensating for the philosophical deficit in his response to the situation, I shall explore the possibility of a more robust way of living through the crisis of humanities that is offered by American philosophy – from John Dewey’s pragmatism to Henry D. Thoreau’s transcendentalism. In tune with Derewieszic’s wake-up call, and in response to the lament of the excellent sheep, American philosophy can open another channel in our thinking about useful knowledge and, more generally, about humanities. Here, Dewey’s hostility to the dualism of useful and useless knowledge offers an initial pointer, and I shall re-evaluate his *Democracy and Education* from this perspective. Beyond the limit of his discourse of “anti-”, his idea of *thinking in the twilight* introduces a further dimension into his thought that leads beyond problem-solving. It is Thoreau’s idea of “beautiful knowledge” that will release thinking further in this respect. This is shown to involve an integration of the aesthetic and the functional, the spiritual and the common, a kind of knowledge that is made possible in the experience of transcendence in the ordinary. Finally, on the strength of this, and in reclaiming the humanities for higher education, I shall draw together the implications of my account of education with reference to the figure of Thoreau’s *wild duck*. This will be seen to be in service to the cultivation of the robust power of Man Thinking – a call to excellent sheep to stir from their state of slumber, and to wake up to the possibilities of their powers of thinking.
THE CRISIS OF THE “EXCELLENT SHEEP”;
THE CRISIS OF HUMANITIES

“So are you saying that we’re all just, like, really excellent sheep?”

Today, twenty years after Bill Readings’ *Universities in Ruins* disclosed the surreptitious power of performativity and obsessive transparency, the threat posed by the “University of Excellence” has become more complicated. While Readings elucidates the problem from the side of the university, Deresiewicz does this from the perspective of young students, disclosing how contemporary practice in higher education erodes the mind. Elite universities in America have stopped being places for a liberal arts education and have become places for training “the analytic and rhetorical skills that are necessary for success in business and the professions.” In the credentialism of immediate utility, “the purpose of life becomes the accumulation of gold stars.” The meritocratic system driven by a commercialized mind-set corrupts ideas of academic excellence, scholarship, and liberal learning. The book reveals the degenerate state of American elite universities through an evocation of the unhappy psyche of students – through a glimpse of the “inner life of excellent sheep.” Within a corrupted notion of excellence, the elite has become a “herd of sheep,” “heading meekly in the same direction,” and teachers have become “excellent black sheep.” The metaphor of the sheep symbolizes the mentality of timidity and “violent aversion to risk,” yearning for security and, most importantly, closed-mindedness, as they flock together among “the same kind of people.” At the bottom of this tendency lies fear and anxiety, the sense of loss and isolation. They realize a wrong-headed perfectionism; “panicked perfectionism” as a form of “infantilization.” Society as a whole does not “take a chance.” At this nadir in the crisis of the humanities, and more generally this crisis of democracy as a way of life, critical thinking dwindles or becomes a parody of itself.

The alternative vision of higher education Deresiewicz proposes is education in the name of “true excellence” for “higher purposes,” through which each student regains the self-reliant power of thinking, regains an inner freedom, and rediscovers the meaning of learning and life as
a whole. In this line of argument Deresiewicz echoes the voices of Thoreau and Emerson from time to time: Emerson’s self-reliant individuals with “resistant minds” and the “dissident impulse” of which Thoreau speaks.

Deresiewicz’s book invokes some philosophical questions concerning the meaning of “useful knowledge” and, more broadly, the task of philosophy in relation to the plight of the humanities. His call for radical change – his demand for “a different kind of brain” and for “a different society,” and his desire to retrieve “excellence” from the torpor of excellent sheep – requires thinking that takes risks. Worthy as all this is, his radical spirit defeats itself because his schema remains caught in dichotomous frameworks of thinking. On the one hand, he explicitly calls for overcoming the dualism of “action versus contemplation.” On the other, the vision of the individual he presents is that of the “inner self,” with “separate space, a private space.” It retains the dichotomy of the inner and the outer, the private and the public. Other interrelated chains of contrast and dichotomization permeate the text: of pure liberal arts education exclusive of any “practical utility” or “any vocational utility”; of a nostalgic return to the Platonic-style face-to-face dialogue against the contemporary distance education exemplified by MOOCs; of the ideal of teacher as a spiritual guide against the practically goal-oriented researcher; of liberal arts education and “general studies” versus professional, skill-oriented vocational education; of science as objective versus the humanities as characterized by a subjective quest for truth. Caught between these dichotomies, it is not clear how far his apparently radical proposal for change can destabilize the surreptitious power of the knowledge economy that would itself engulf us in dichotomy. Neither simple evasion of the global economy nor a nostalgic return to the supposed pure intellectual joy afforded by liberal arts education will suffice in the face of what constitutes the reality of our lives today: we cannot live without the currency of the language of the global economy and useful knowledge. The real challenge is how to transcend this very dichotomy between the useful and the useless, and how to present an alternative way of thinking. What could the kind of knowledge that lies beyond the dichotomy of the useful and the useless be?
DEWEY AND THINKING BEYOND PROBLEM-SOLVING

American philosophy helps us to reorient our thinking and more robustly respond to the bleating of the excellent sheep in their plight—the state from which they need to be released. While in Dewey’s pragmatism, the idea of useful knowledge is inseparable from problem-solving, it points us to the development of “courageous intelligence,” a kind of intelligence that is “practical and executive.”

Concerning our main question, “What is useful knowledge?,” Dewey’s *Democracy and Education* gives us some helpful points of departure. First and foremost, Dewey does not negate or avoid the idea of use, which he takes it to be an essential ingredient of human experience. Against the opposition of “experience and true knowledge,” he reclaims the sense of “knowledge of how to do”: pragmatism is the philosophy of the how, in service to the “problems of men.” Informational knowledge should be used as a means of inquiry. Such knowledge is a medium through which the mind goes along a “passage from doubt to discovery,” and knowledge is “experimental.” Second, such experimentalism is crucially related to Dewey’s overcoming of mind-body dualism, which is reflected in his idea of labor: “The laboratory is a discovery of the conditions under which labor may become intellectually fruitful and not merely externally productive.” Such a notion of labor is incorporated into Dewey’s well-known advocacy of the idea of “occupations” in schools. In opposition to the dichotomies of play and work, and of practical activities and intellectual studies, Dewey says that education, in the true sense of the word, should not exclude usefulness and, vice versa, that the latter should have humane purpose in service to human growth. In particular, he is critical of the idea of “literary callings” as “non-vocational,” as highbrow studies. In its focus on experiment, on use, and on practical ends, Dewey’s antidualistic idea points us to a kind of integrated notion of vocational education and studies in the liberal arts. Third, this guides us to Dewey’s view on the humanities in the curriculum. He presents an idea of the humanities that is plainly interdisciplinary, “cross-fertilizing both the natural sciences and the various human disciplines such as history, literature, economics, and politics.” Humanistic studies should not be taught as “isolated subjects,” but should be connected with the pupils’ experience.
Rather than some aristocratic ideal of liberal arts, the humanities should be seen as involving study that is more down-to-earth, reflective of the daily experiences of human beings. *Democracy and Education* can be reread today as a book that enables us to rethink the humanities as human science. Fourth, such an integrated notion of liberal arts education reveals the humanities to be inseparable from Dewey’s idea of creative democracy. Democracy is in service to the liberty and liberation of the human mind. It calls for the kind of freedom that is different from freedom in neoliberalism. Though he does not avoid the idea of “cash value” and usefulness, Dewey reminds us that democracy as a way of life is a moral ideal that precedes neoliberal notions of economy.

In relation to the threats of a globalized economy and its stifling effect on the humanities, the aforementioned four features of *Democracy and Education* remind us that human growth cannot be separated from the question of economy, nor can it simply be equated with economic growth, understood in monetary or utilitarian terms. Human beings are educated within and by economy, while at the same time education functions as its critical force, without being assimilated into the existing currency of economy.

Thinking beyond dualisms, thinking in life as a whole – as fusions of mind/body, means/ends, and fact/value – is at the heart of the philosophy of *praxis*. It bridges “culture and utility.” American philosophy entails the possibility of opening a third way of thinking beyond such dichotomies: thinking in “middle terms,” as Dewey puts this. It requires an adventure into “genuine uncertainty.” Dewey takes chance to be the crucial element. Thinking is adventurous. His experimentalism is risk-taking by nature, with the existential commitment to transcend borders beyond existing knowledge. It involves an awakening to what has not been thought before, an adventure into the realm of the unknown. Here, Dewey’s idea of thinking cannot be simply contained in the stereotypical notion of problem-solving. He says that a key to creative activity is criticism. Dewey’s idea of the “criticism of criticisms” is, on Putnam’s account, a matter of “higher-level criticism,” involving “standing back’ and criticizing even the ways in which we are accustomed to criticize ideas, the criticism of our ways of criticism.” Such criticism is distinguished
from the kind of analytical thinking whose main commitment is to clarity.

Thinking beyond dichotomies, however, is difficult. On the verge of being assimilated into the discourse of the globalized economy, the anti-dualism of pragmatism can easily lose its purchase. In order to make a fuller and more positive alternative response to the bleating of the sheep, we need critically to reexamine how, in resistance to the narrow and superficial senses of use and utility, and to debased senses of problem-solving, the real use of Dewey’s pragmatism might be realized. Dewey’s pragmatism is to be tested in terms of how it can sustain the radical power of courageous intelligence – to release his own language beyond its “anti-” orientation.

WALKING IN THE TWILIGHT

“At twilight, dusk is a delightful quality of the whole world.”

Towards a more positive vision of alternative knowledge, beyond the “anti-” orientation, we should learn how to think in the middle. An initial clue can be found in Dewey’s own language. Dewey points to a realm of thinking beyond clarity and transparency: “the twilight zone of inquiry, of thinking, exists.” He expresses the sense of the obscure as the background of human intelligence – “the sense of our slight inability even in our best intelligence and efforts.” In Art as Experience, he recognizes the significance of “obscurity” in Shakespeare and Coleridge, and “half-knowledge” in Keats. The reality of the obscure requires us to exercise, in Keats’ phrase, “Negative Capability” – a kind of poetic insight after reason. American philosophy recaptures the idea of light beyond the dichotomy between the clarity of enlightenment and darkness as a lack of knowledge, and between transparency and obscurity. It is different both from Plato’s light, which enlightens people as they emerge from the Cave, drawing them upwards towards the sun; and it is different from the notion of clarity in analytical philosophy. The light that is flickering on an obscure border represents the transition from darkness to light, and the movement of evanescence and renewal. In English, “twilight” usually connotes the half-light of the
evening. To be in twilight means to be on the border, between light and dark. A stimulus towards the opening of a horizon beyond the “anti-” orientation seems to lie in this territory of the twilight of inquiry – so that Dewey’s antidualism can more robustly and thoroughly resist the tide of the global economy.

How can we practice this antifoundationalist, transitive mode of thinking and knowing? How can the twilight of American philosophy shed its more subtle light on useful knowledge? It is Thoreau who moves us more radically into the realm of this twilight. Thoreau expresses the precarious sense of being on the edge, taking a risk, of standing on tip-toe, in a state of “onward thinking.” To practice this antifoundationalist mode of thinking, one must venture into the precarious borderland between the known and the unknown, on the threshold of “a residuum unknown, unanalyzable.”

Thoreau’s small book, *Walking*, illustrates how we think in twilight through the metonym of walking. As a book on the “art of walking,” Thoreau indicates that this is a book on how to sojourn in a place by sauntering. He encourages us to “walk like a camel” as this is the only beast that “ruminates when walking.” To walk is to move our body, to live by being exposed to sun and air, and to think – “in the proportion which the night bears to the day,” in the good balance between light and darkness. We begin to walk without knowing absolutely surely where to go. This is the gradual process of allowing the way to unfold – of continually finding criteria where there is no single or ready-made answer. In this ongoing mode of walking and thinking, it is fluctuations of light that play a crucial role. There are multiple descriptions of light in Thoreau’s *Walden* and in *Walking*. While the light in *Walden* is mainly the light of the morning, the light in *Walking* is a late sunlight, the light of the evening, epitomized in the description of sunset. It is noteworthy, however, that *Walden* ends with an allusion to Venus, the evening star – as if the morning sun and the evening star together indicate the border between light and darkness – a visual and realistic description of twilight: “There is more day to dawn. The sun is but a morning star.” The state in which the light permeates the evening darkness evokes ending but is also an expectation of morning, of a new dawn. The light that ends *Walden* and the evening light in *Walking* together capture the dynamic
movement and transition of light from morning to night, and from night to morning. The crucial moment is the stage of transition and the moment of conversion on threshold. In the end of Walking, Thoreau conveys to the reader his experience of transcendence in a “great awakenings light,” his whole body being bathed in the golden light of the sunset, where the horizon “gleamed like the boundary of Elysium.”

Transcendence here is not directed upward, but towards our experience of being drawn to the earth, living high in the ordinary.

BEAUTIFUL KNOWLEDGE:
RECLAIMING THE HUMANITIES FOR WILD DUCKS

We have heard of a Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge. It is said that knowledge is power; and the like. Methinks there is equal need of a Society for the Diffusion of Useful Ignorance, what we will call Beautiful Knowledge, a knowledge useful in a higher sense.

In the image of walking in twilight Thoreau presents us with a positive vision of knowledge – what he calls “higher knowledge.” Without negating the concept of use, knowledge is, more than anything, aesthetic. Thoreau calls this “Beautiful Knowledge” – knowledge in the fuller integration of the functional and the aesthetic. While being beautiful, it is not something that Thoreau romanticizes: it is tough and robust, being grounded on the earth – being surrounded by daily objects, instruments, animals, plants, air, light, sound, etc. It is only through such down-to-earth practice that the moment of rebirth, what may be called transcendence in the ordinary, recurs – a radical moment of conversion in which our thinking exceeds the limit of the “anti-” orientation. As beautiful knowledge cannot be obtained in the glare of direct sunlight, it cautions us against the expectation of direct, immediate knowledge – “an excess even of informing light.” This involves our realizing what our need needs, and this is not a matter of applying but of receiving intelligence.

There are some aspects to beautiful knowledge in Thoreau’s transcendentalism that can help us reconsider the meaning of useful knowledge in a
way that enhances the line of thinking in Dewey’s pragmatism. First, beautiful knowledge points us neither to experiential education nor to a quasi-mystical realignment with nature. The beautiful, Thoreau says, is inseparable from the wild – the apparently unbeautiful – as expressed in the metaphor of the “most dismal swamp” in the darkest wood, the sacred, “sanctum sanctorum.”\(^79\) Beyond the dichotomy of the natural (the wild) and the human (the civilized), however, and far from anti-intellectualism, Thoreau proposes that we regain the untamed, self-reliant power of thinking as a distinctive capacity of the human. This is not the familiar Romantic turn to nature: beyond anthropocentrism, it intimates posthuman possibilities. But these are not well conceived in terms of a more-than-human world: they suggest instead a world realized through transcending prevailing notions of the human. Second, Thoreau associates beautiful knowledge with ignorance. He reminds us of the necessity of a “Society for the Diffusion of Useful Ignorance” – a necessity for the recognition that knowledge is “positive ignorance,” that ignorance is “negative knowledge.”\(^78\) To know is not to know, and yet this is anything but the praise of ignorance in itself or the mystification of the unknown. Beautiful knowledge involves the recognition that “the light which puts out our eyes is darkness to us,” “a sudden revelation of the insufficiency of all that we called Knowledge before.”\(^78\) Such experience of imperfection is a drive towards further perfection in continuing education. This reminds us of Socratic ways of thinking, and yet, in Thoreau’s case, and, more generally, in American philosophy, an emphasis is put more on praxis and on common, and daily experience – as exemplified by Thoreau’s labor in the bean-field at Walden.

Third and finally, beautiful knowledge, which is a matter of reception rather than acquisition, involves the experience of human transformation through phases of crisis, continual rebirth.\(^8\) Beautiful knowledge visits us at the moment of awakening under the “light of common day.”\(^78\) It is this secular sense of transcendence that is missing from our obsession with the wrong-headed notion of excellence and from the goal-driven mentality of excellent sheep.

Beautiful knowledge regains the wildness of thinking, its extravagant power to destabilize prevalent dichotomous modes of thought and to resist the surreptitious power of ideologies of utility and practicality. It is a more positive
way of reclaiming the humanities, against the tide of the global economy and towards what Paul Standish has called a better “economy of higher education.” The idea of the “higher” here implies anything but abstract or highbrow knowledge. Rather it is the experience of “transcendence down.” As Thoreau says:

> It is the uncivilized free and wild thinking in “Hamlet” and the “Iliad,” in all the Scriptures and Mythologies, not learned in the schools, that delights us. As the wild duck is more swift and beautiful than the tame, so is the wild – the mallard – thought, which “mid falling dews wings its way above the fens,” …

Consider the wild duck as a contender for the role of the new leader that Dersiewicz envisions. Thoreau’s wild duck is a metonym for the beauty found in the swamp, the robustness of thinking in the wild, and the innovating power that, flying above the ground, breaks free from the herd. It exercises the power of thinking in “extra-vagance” – that is, of thinking and speaking “beyond the narrow limits of my daily experience, so as to be adequate to the truth of which I have been convinced.” In *Walden*, Thoreau uses also the metaphor of the wild goose – “the wild goose is more of a cosmopolite than we.” This is a vision of liberal education, releasing the exceeding power of thinking for the “adventurous student.”

The work of humanization in this sense should come simultaneously from liberal learning (conceived as inside) and from daily occupations (conceived as outside), transgressing the boundary between the two. Transcendence in the ordinary is a kind of experience that can be realized in the curriculum of higher education, both in scientific inquiry infused with human values, and in the cultivation of the aesthetic imagination in art, literature, and music. Crossing borders, the humanities and the sciences should interpenetrate. Higher education should open its boundaries to a larger society including industry, yet without subjugating itself to the global economy. The humanities must be the site for the cultivation of Man Thinking, for cultivating the art of the criticism of criticisms.

2 Emerson, *The Essential Writings*, 51.

3 Ibid., 58.


7 Hilary Putnam, “The Founders of Pragmatism on Philosophy and Life” (Skype lecture at Kyoto University, July 6, 2014).

8 The acronym for “Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics.”


13 Deresiewicz, *Excellent Sheep*, 63.

14 Ibid., 16.

15 Ibid., 40.

16 Ibid., 15.

17 Ibid., 3.

18 Ibid., 48.

19 Ibid., 22.

20 Ibid., 210.

21 Ibid., 47.

22 Ibid., 43.

23 Ibid., 232.
24 Ibid., 109.
25 Ibid., 200.
26 Ibid., 100.
27 Ibid., 136.
28 Ibid., 138.
29 Ibid., 237.
30 Ibid., 235.
31 Ibid., 110, 236.
32 Ibid., 169.
33 Ibid., 56.
34 Ibid., 86.
35 Ibid., 155.
36 Ibid., 150.
37 Ibid., 168.
38 Ibid., 160.
40 Ibid., 329.
41 Ibid., 271.
42 Ibid., 192, my italics.
43 Ibid., 196.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid., 197.
46 Ibid., 284.
47 Ibid., 317.
48 Ibid., 269.
49 Ibid., 294.
50 Ibid., 295.
51 Ibid., 208.
52 Ibid., 327.
53 Ibid., 325.
54 Ibid., 269.
55 Ibid.


64 Ibid.


70 Ibid., 77.

71 Ibid., 78.

72 Ibid., 88.

73 Thoreau, *Walden*, 222.

75 Ibid., 112.

76 Ibid., 113.

77 Ibid., 111.


80 Ibid., 112.

81 Ibid., 113.

82 Ibid., 114.

83 Ibid., 103.


87 Thoreau, *Walden*, 216.

88 Ibid., 213.

89 Ibid., 68.