Capability and the Obligation of Effective Power: The Global Promotion of Democratic Education for All

Tony DeCesare

St. Louis University

INTRODUCTION

It can hardly be doubted that the world is in the midst of a unique and rapidly increasing process of globalization, one that is continually reducing the boundaries between nations, cultures, and people, and increasing our global interconnectedness and interdependence across social, political, and economic spaces. Anthony Giddens describes this process as an “intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa.”

Peter Singer similarly describes it in terms of increasing interconnectedness:

For most of the eons of human existence, people living only short distances apart might as well, for all the difference they made to each other’s lives, have been living in separate worlds … Over the past few centuries, the isolation has dwindled, slowly at first, then with increasing rapidity. Now, people living on opposite sides of the world are linked in ways previously unimaginable.

Consequently, what happens in one nation — politically, culturally, economically, socially — affects all other nations to a greater degree than even fifty years ago. Quite simply, we increasingly live in “one world,” the development, issues, and problems of which are often beyond the reach and responsibility of any one nation acting in isolation. Indeed, many of the world’s problems today have global causes and far-reaching effects and so require global solutions. As Martha Nussbaum puts it, the “problems we need to solve — economic, environmental, religious, and political — are global in their scope. They have no hope of being solved unless people once distant come together and cooperate in ways they have not before.”
Such cooperation demands, for Nussbaum and many others, a more globally-oriented approach to education. Indeed, in many ways, education in the twenty-first century is a “global concern.”5 And so it is not surprising that these broad processes of globalization have influenced educational thought and practice and gained prevalence in education-related conversations over the last twenty years.6 I wish to add to that emerging conversation by exploring questions related to the obligations that wealthier and otherwise more advantaged nations have to assist other, less wealthy and less advantaged nations in their efforts to provide sufficient education to all their citizens. More specifically — perhaps more controversially — I explore the possibility that such assistance should be focused on the provision of a kind of democratic education and, thus, that it be couched in a broader global democracy promotion effort.

To do so, I draw from three aspects of Amartya Sen’s idea of justice: 1) his emphasis on remediating injustices in the distribution of basic capabilities; 2), the connection he draws between his approach to justice and his emerging theory of democracy; and 3) the demands of what he calls the “obligation of effective power.”7 These aspects of Sen’s thinking help to ground the essay’s primary argument, namely, that advantaged nations do, in fact, have an obligation to assist other, less advantaged nations in providing their citizens with an education that promotes what I call “democratic capability.” On the strength of this argument, I offer a Senian-inspired call for a global “democratic education for all” movement.

SEN’S IDEA OF JUSTICE:
CAPABILITY, GLOBAL DEMOCRACY, AND OBLIGATION

As an approach to social justice, Amartya Sen’s “capability approach” (CA) marks a “substantial departure” from prevailing theories of justice, particularly those in the dominant liberal-contractarian tradition.8 According to Sen, such theories are problematic for two main reasons. First, they focus too narrowly on theoretical questions concerning the nature of perfect justice at the expense of practical attention to how to reduce the amount and severity
of injustice in the world. Second, they focus primarily on the identification of perfectly just institutions and social arrangements without giving proper attention to the actual outcomes that such institutions and arrangements produce. In contrast to these “arrangement-focused” and “transcendental” theories of justice, Sen advances an approach that is both “realization-focused” (i.e., concerns itself with whether social arrangements and institutions actually increase justice and reduce injustice in the world) and “comparative” (i.e., focuses on ranking alternative social arrangements as “more” or “less” just, irrespective of any “perfectly” just arrangement). According to Sen, a theory of justice must concern itself, at least at first, with reducing manifest injustice in the world.

He argues for evaluating the justice of social arrangements in terms of “capabilities.” These are the real freedoms people have to be and do the things they have reason to value being and doing. Sen’s development of the concept of “capabilities” marks another important departure from traditional theories of justice, specifically in regard to “the type of good subject to demands of distributive justice.” As Sen puts it, the capability approach:

differs from other approaches using other informational focuses, for example, personal utility (focusing on pleasures, happiness, or desire fulfillment), absolute or relative opulence (focusing on commodity bundles, real income, or real wealth), assessments of negative freedoms (focusing on procedural fulfillment of libertarian rights and rules of non-interference), comparisons of means of freedom (e.g. focusing on the holdings of “primary goods”, as in the Rawlsian theory of justice), and comparisons of resource holdings as a basis of just equality (e.g. as in Dworkin’s criterion of “equality of resources”).

The primary advantage of the capabilities approach relative to these other measures is that it demands a more extensive informational basis for judgments of justice. It requires that judgments pertaining to justice be based on people’s “freedoms” (i.e., capabilities) rather than merely focusing on any of
the various “means” to those freedoms. According to the CA, we cannot judge human welfare or the justice of social arrangements based only on what people have. What matters most is what they are free to do and be as a result of what they have. Furthermore, Sen’s CA places particular importance on what he calls “basic capabilities” — those capabilities that all people have reason to value and that will likely “demand attention in any theory of justice.”

Given these aspects of Sen’s thinking — his focus on the remediation of injustice rather than the establishment of some perfectly just society, and his emphasis on (basic) capabilities as the essential substance of distributive justice — we might state Sen’s first principle of justice as follows: RemEDIATE INJUSTICE IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF BASIC CAPABILITIES.

Importantly, although Sen is committed to capabilities as the proper metric of justice, he is adamant that the specification of this metric must be the responsibility of each society, exercising its political freedom through the employment of democratic processes informed by public reason. For Sen, it is not possible for any philosopher or expert to determine which capabilities societies in general must guarantee to its citizens if they are to be just societies. Such work can surely benefit from some philosophical work; but, it must be philosophical work that takes place on the ground — in a context. As Sen puts it: “pure theory cannot ‘freeze’ a list of capabilities for all societies for all time to come, irrespective of what the citizens come to understand and value. That would be not only a denial of the reach of democracy, but also a misunderstanding of what pure theory can do, completely divorced from the particular social reality that any particular society faces.” Though Sen seems to take freedom (as capability expansion) as something that we all have reason to value, decisions regarding which specific capabilities and how much of each people have reason to value must be left to each society, and those decisions must reflect the society’s use of public reason through democratic processes.

This points clearly to the second key aspect of Sen’s thinking that is relevant here, namely, his emerging conception of democracy and the connection he draws between this conception and his approach to justice. What Sen leaves “incomplete” in his theory of justice is to be filled in through de-
mocracy, characterized primarily by “public discussion” — that is, in terms of “political participation, dialogue and public interaction.” This conception of democracy is essential to Sen’s project, and it is grounded in three related “values” that he ascribes to democracy. First, democracy has intrinsic value for human life. This claim is based on the idea that the freedom and opportunities to engage in public discussion, to criticize and express dissent, and generally to enjoy social and political participation, make our lives better. In other words, to be “prevented from participation in the political life of the community is a major deprivation” because, quite simply, “our lives go less well when we are prevented from political activity even if we would not choose it.” This intrinsic value of democracy is connected to and justified, in part, by Sen’s thinking about justice: For the sake of social justice, he says, “there is a real need … for people to be able to take part in … social decisions, if they so choose.” In other words, social justice demands that persons have the freedom (the capability) to participate as agents in political decision-making and processes, particularly those related to the conceptualization of valued capabilities and, related, an idea of justice. A just society, in part, therefore, is one in which fair and equitable procedures for such democratic participation are effectively open to all.

Democracy also has instrumental value in “enhancing the hearing that people get in expressing and supporting their claims to political attention.” In this sense, democracy is particularly valuable relative to the identification and reduction of manifest injustice. For instance, Sen has famously argued that famines are avoided in democracies primarily because democracies enable famine victims to engage in public discussion and criticism that help “to draw attention forcefully to [their] general needs and to demand appropriate public action.” Thus, what democracy, in its instrumental role, can do relative to the pursuit of justice is give victims of injustice a chance to publicize/politicize their plight and so move and energize the larger population. Doing so may well instigate action on behalf of the victims and lead to collective, reasoned public discussion about the causes of and treatments for injustice.

Finally, democracy as public discussion has “constructive value” in
that it gives “citizens an opportunity to learn from one another, and [help] society form its values and priorities.” Or, as Sen puts it elsewhere, democracy is necessary to “the formation of values and priorities, and we cannot, in general, take preferences as given independently of public discussion, that is, irrespective of whether open debates and interchanges are permitted or not.” It is through such broad and inclusive public discussion that we get clearer about the kind of lives we have reason to value and begin to plan for the achievement of such lives and for the general improvement of social welfare.

It is also in the context of this constructive role of democracy — and surely in its instrumental role, too — that we see more clearly the value of Sen’s insistence that social choice and deliberation are not only “impartial” procedures, but also “open” procedures. Sen does, of course, argue that our decision-making procedures must avoid “exclusionary neglect” — that is, it must not exclude anyone who will be affected by the decisions to be made. But, beyond this degree of openness (what Sen calls “membership entitlement”), he insists that we expand our social choice and decision-making processes to include input from anyone — near or far — who may have what he calls “enlightenment relevance.” In other words, there is good reason to open our democratic and social choice processes to include all those whose knowledge and perspective “may help us to achieve a fuller — and fairer — understanding” of “the ethics and justice of a problem.” We should note that Sen is careful to use the terms “fuller” and “fairer” rather than “complete.” Even if we were to expand the openness of our democratic and social choice procedures as far as possible, our understanding of justice is never complete; we may always find another perspective that pushes us to a fuller and fairer understanding of justice and injustice and of the needs and values of our society. In this way, democratic dialogue and communication contribute to the development of the “nature, robustness, and reach of theories” of justice themselves. We are indeed wise to be “sceptical of the possibility of ‘discussionless justice,’” that is, of the possibility that justice can be advanced — or that ideas of justice can even be conceived — without democracy.

It is especially important to note that Sen does not insist on the es-
tablishment of particular democratic institutions. He is concerned, instead, with the effective use to which democratic processes — marked by public discussion — can be put by individuals and communities. In other words, he is concerned with what we can call people’s “democratic capability,” that is, their substantive freedom — inclusive of the knowledge, skills, and general abilities — to participate meaningfully and consequentially in the decision-making and other political processes that affect their lives and the various communities of which they are members. The possibility of conceiving of and advancing an idea of justice turns, to a large degree, on the distribution of this capability to people the world over. And the argument here is that it is rightly considered a “basic” capability in the sense that all persons have reason to value participation in public discussion around questions of human welfare and social justice — regardless of what else they might value and, indeed, as a means to securing whatever else they value. The remediation of injustice in the distribution of this capability, then, would seem to demand special attention — as a matter of justice — in Sen’s thinking.

How, then, might we understand the obligation that various actors have to secure this and other basic capabilities in the global context? Again, a contrast to contractarian reasoning is instructive. Sen criticizes the idea — taken as a given by social contract theorists — that social cooperation meets the standard of “political reasonableness” only in so far as it is grounded in mutual benefit and reciprocity. According to contractarians, social cooperation involves an agreement “between parties who are roughly equal in power and resources” and it is undertaken for the “mutual advantage” of those parties. Against such thinking, Sen argues that we should understand social cooperation in terms of our shared obligation to provide basic capabilities for all. Such thinking follows from an emphasis on what Sen calls “obligations of power.”

Indeed, despite the broad attention to Sen’s concept of capability as freedom, there is another aspect to this concept that has received less attention, namely, capability as obligation. Sen’s argument is straightforward:

If someone has the power to make a difference that he or
she can see will reduce injustice in the world, then there is a strong and reasoned argument for doing just that (without having to dress all this up in terms of some imagined prudential advantage in a hypothetical exercise of cooperation) … Freedom in general and agency freedom in particular are parts of an effective power that a person has, and it would be a mistake to see capability, linked with these ideas of freedom, only as a notion of human advantage: it is also a central concern in understanding our obligations.35

Obligation can just as easily and reasonably be derived from “asymmetry” of power between persons or nations as from “any symmetry that takes us to the need for cooperation.”36 What the obligation of effective power demands, according to Sen, is that we “consider seriously” what we ought to do in such situations, assuming two criteria are met. First, there is, in fact, some action that we can freely undertake; this is Sen’s “feasibility” criterion. Second, our decided course of action will likely create a more just situation in the world; this is Sen’s “justice-enhancing” criterion.37

Importantly, Sen is clear that even when these criteria are met, the argument is simply “for acknowledging the obligation to consider the case for action.”38 Any action that would follow from such consideration is, again, a matter of public reasoning; for instance, about the nature and severity of the injustice in question and about which agents — individuals, nations, non-governmental organizations, etc. — are best positioned to act in ways that are justice-enhancing. The point is that, in regard to matters of patent injustice — among which, I have argued, we must count the deprivation of democratic capability alongside other “basic” capabilities — those nation states that are more capable have an obligation to consider potential action on behalf of the less capable. One obvious kind of action or assistance is the promotion of democratic capability-enhancing education. Thus, in the next section I consider briefly some relevant globally-oriented educational initiatives that help point toward the possibility of a Senian “democratic education for all.”
DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION FOR ALL

The foregoing discussion points to this problem: some nations are unable to develop and sustain for all their citizens the kind of education that promotes democratic capability. Some nations lack, to varying degrees and for various reasons, the resources (e.g., money, infrastructure, know-how, personnel, etc.) and other social-political conditions to do so. The citizens of such nations are, therefore, more likely to be deprived of sufficient democratic capability than are citizens in those nations that are wealthier or in other ways better positioned to provide the necessary education. Individuals composing the former group of citizens are also likely, therefore, to find themselves on the wrong side of a global democratic capability gap — that is, a gap between those who are and those who are not capable (in the Senian sense) of participating influentially in the political life of their communities, including the global community. Indeed, inequalities between nations’ abilities to provide their citizens with an education adequate to promoting democratic capability are likely to result in the perpetuation (if not widening) of this gap at the global level.

Given the importance of democratic capability to human welfare and social justice — an argument that has been made throughout — it is important to consider how individual nations working alone or in cooperation might meet their potential obligation to assist those nations that are unable to provide their citizens with an education that promotes democratic capability. Toward this end, it is instructive to consider various global initiatives for improving educational equity and quality world-wide. One of the most recognized of these initiatives emerged from the World Education Forum in Dakar, Senegal in 2000. The Dakar Framework for Action pledged “to expand learning opportunities for every child, youth and adult, and to meet targets in six areas by 2015.” Importantly, the parties to the framework recognized that the achievement of these EFA goals “is a responsibility that will be met most effectively through broad-based partnerships within countries, supported by co-operation with regional and international agencies and institutions.” Thus, despite its commitment to encouraging and supporting nation-states’ efforts to secure a high
quality basic education for all, the Dakar Framework also emphasized global responsibility for improving the quality of education world-wide: “Education for All implies the involvement and commitment of all to education.”

The EFA movement has much to recommend it. Particularly valuable to the present discussion are: 1) its recognition of some broad educational goals that are applicable to “every citizen in every society”; 2) its recognition that promoting these educational goals for all is a global concern and responsibility that requires a truly global effort; and 3) its emphasis on global interests and priorities — that is, its delivery of education aid to those places where educational (and related) deprivation is at its worst, rather than only to those places that serve donor nations’ interests and priorities.

However, the six EFA target areas are basic education objectives, focusing on literacy and numeracy along with life skills. There is no doubt that such things are essential to achieving greater equity in global education and that they have significant and positive effects on one’s ability to “participate in societies and influence decisions that affect their lives.” Indeed, in this sense, basic education initiatives in the global context are likely to help remediate deprivations of democratic capability. But a basic and life-skills education is not enough to ensure a sufficient level of democratic capability and, thus, to enable all persons to pursue valued lives and to advance social welfare and justice. We seem to need, therefore, a richer conception of “Education for All,” namely, one that recognizes that educational goals related to democracy — and, more specifically, to the capability to function as a democratic person — are also essential to “every citizen in every society.”

One potentially promising place to look is to “democratic civic education” programs that have been run as part of broader democracy promotion efforts through organizations like USAID. These aim, in general, to “teach citizens of democratizing countries basic values, knowledge, and skills relating to democracy, with the objective of those citizens understanding how democracy works, embracing democracy as a political ideal, and becoming participatory citizens.”
More empirical work needs to be done to evaluate, draw lessons from, and improve upon these and other civic education programs. But, overall, the direction in which such programs have moved over the last ten to fifteen years seems promising relative to the present discussion. Indeed, several important “lessons” were outlined in a 2002 USAID report on the civic education programs included in democracy assistance efforts in Poland, the Dominican Republic, and Zambia, and these have helped to inform (and reform) subsequent civic education programs. For instance, the report recommended that civic education programs: 1) employ participatory methods such as “role-plays, dramatizations, small group exercises, and group discussion” rather than “more passive methods” of teaching and learning; 2) build “opportunities for direct political engagement into the program”; 3) “focus on themes that are immediately relevant to people’s daily lives” and the ways in which “participatory decision-making” can help them to define their priorities more clearly and to address their concerns more effectively; and 4) recognize and address the “powerful influences on the democratic orientation of children and young adults” — for instance, the “school environment and family beliefs and practices” (and, I might add, the general influence of the social and political environment).

These recommendations are generally consistent with the spirit of a potential Senian approach to democratic education for all. For instance, the Senian approach would surely also emphasize the importance of developing democratic civic education programs that are relevant to people’s daily lives — their priorities, concerns, values, and needs — and that enable people actually to make democracy work for them. Furthermore, it would also emphasize the importance of democratic education across both formal and informal contexts, the educational benefits of increasing the (effective) opportunities people have for political engagement and participation, and the importance of democratizing school environments and addressing non-school factors that affect children’s and adults’ democratic development. Indeed, on the whole, the kinds of civic education programs more recently used as democracy assistance seem to hold the most promise for how we might meet the obligation to
promote the democratic capability of citizens in nations that are unable to do so without education-related assistance.

CONCLUSION

The argument here has been that the equitable distribution of democratic capability is essential to the advancement of global justice. All persons are entitled to this capability and, in those circumstances where nations cannot provide this capability for all its citizens, global actors — including other, more democratically capable nations — have an obligation at least to consider what actions they can take to promote this capability for the citizens of other nations. I have suggested that education is one particularly important and potentially effective means for doing so and have pointed to some recent global education initiatives that might be instructive as we flesh out and work to implement a Senian-inspired conception of “democratic education for all.”

Several issues demand further attention, but space permits attention only to one theoretical and one practical concern. The theoretical concern is whether the CA’s sufficientarianism — its emphasis on promoting basic capabilities up to a sufficient rather than equal level — is itself sufficient when it comes to democratic capability specifically. The more practical concern is to determine through what kinds of national, multi-national, and global organizations the work of developing and implementing “democratic education for all” can and should proceed. And, related, how can this work proceed in ways that are sensitive to socio-cultural and political contexts? These are, to be sure, pressing questions. But they do not lessen our global obligation — as a matter of justice — to work toward an equitable distribution of democratic capability for persons the world over.

1 Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990), 64.

3 Ibid., 10.


5 Colin Brock, Education as Global Concern (New York: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2011).


8 Ibid., 27.

9 Ibid.


16 Sen, *The Idea of Justice*.

17 Ibid., 326.

18 For a similar rehearsal of Sen’s discussion of these three values, see Crocker, *Ethics of Global Development*, 298-308.


20 Ibid.


24 Ibid., 7.

25 Ibid., 10.


28 Ibid., 131.

29 Ibid., 89.

30 Ibid.


35 Ibid., 271.

36 Ibid., 205.

37 Ibid., 206.
38 Ibid.

39 Some, of course, lack the willingness to do so. This presents a special kind of problem that is beyond the scope of this essay.


41 Ibid.

42 Ibid., 12.


