

Politics Under Erasure: A post-Foucauldian Reconsideration of Neoliberalism in Higher Education

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In this article, I offer a post-Foucauldian interpretation of current neoliberal practices in higher education. In doing so, I argue that Foucault can take us only so far in making sense of these practices, as higher education's current neoliberal ethos takes on new totalizing, disempowering forms that require updating, revising, and challenging Foucault's prescient analyses. As educational philosophical critiques of neoliberalism have been largely based on Foucault's illuminating exposure of liberalism's transformation into neoliberalism, I will suggest how this philosophical critical literature merits further consideration. In my argument, I draw on the recent work of political critical theorist, Wendy Brown,¹ and political sociologist, William Walters.²

PREVIOUS DISCUSSION ON NEOLIBERALISM

Neoliberalism, of course, is a well-traveled term across multiple disciplines, though, to be sure, research on neoliberalism is alive and well. Justifiably, Foucault's *Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978-1979: The Birth of Biopolitics* serve as this critical literature's urtext, as it provides an original conceptual lens that exposes economic and sociopolitical transformations in a neoliberal order of reason.³ Foucault's ideational paternity, then, is evident in the literature on neoliberalism in higher education theory and philosophy. We see, for example, Bronwyn Davies and Peter Bansel showing how Foucault informs an understanding of how institutional "assurances of quality" often mask what are simply "audit procedures" that preempt or foreclose critique, thus "produc[ing] a compliant subject."⁴ Gert Biesta has argued compellingly that an overemphasis on the technical question, "What works?," with its dubious assumptions on evidential efficacy, occludes the democratic function of educational research and teaching.⁵

Gaile Cannella and Mirka Koro-Ljungberg point out higher education's increasingly dominant market focus in constructing students and faculty as consumers, service providers, human capital, and entrepreneurial selves.⁶ And, John Levin and Aida Aliyeva note what they consider to be faculties' unwitting complicity with neoliberal principles.⁷ It is also noteworthy, for the purposes of this article, that these examples allude to a certain neoliberal indirection and concealment within our quotidian professional and institutional practices.

I maintain, however, that others depart from or misinterpret Foucault's explanations of neoliberalism, particularly when they characterize it as an ideology, a dogma, a philosophy, or a conscious utilitarianism that advocates for market values.⁸ These characterizations are inconsistent with Foucault's argument that neoliberalism is an "order of reason," a "political rationality," and an "economic rationality," that transforms the human into a *homo oeconomicus* who pursues its own interests. Foucault's attributions suggest pervasive, meta-cognitive, or meta-behavioral qualities, and, at times, indirection – a "conduct of conduct," to use Foucault's well-known phrase.

BEYOND FOUCAULT'S *HOMO OECOMICUS* AND MARKETIZATION: UNDERMINING THE POLITICAL

In Wendy Brown's recent book, *Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism's Stealth Revolution*, there are three aspects of Foucault's claims and assumptions with which she takes issue: His assertion that the neoliberal subject, i.e., *homo oeconomicus*, primarily pursues its own interests, his very *limited* attention to *homo politicus* as the human being's political nature (with its implications for governance), and his conception of human capital as an *acquisition or possession* of the subject. Each of Brown's objections has significant implications for how we recognize and respond to neoliberalism in higher education.

For Foucault, the neoliberal *homo oeconomicus's* principal motivation is pursuing its own interests: "[A] subject of interest within a totality which eludes him and which nevertheless founds the rationality of his egoistic choices."⁹ Much of the discourse on neoliberalism in higher education relies on this assertion that interest plays a central role in the decisions and conduct of the neoliberal

homo oeconomicus. For example, writing in the journal *Educational Philosophy and Theory*, Natasha Jankowski and Staci Provezis characterize *homo oeconomicus* as a “self-interested market subject.”¹⁰ Paraphrasing Foucault and Adam Smith, David Meens writes in the journal *Educational Theory* that “individual agents act in pursuit of their individual self-interest, as they understand it ... optimiz[ing] their self-interests in order to optimize overall efficiency.”¹¹ Michael Peters offers a keynote to this discourse on neoliberal self-interest in describing the “entrepreneurial self that ‘responsibilizes’ the self to make welfare choices ... that insures the individual against risk ... in making consumer choices concerning education as a service” and who “must calculate the risks of their own self-investments.”¹² Extending this characterization of the neoliberal entrepreneurial self, Maarten Simons writes that “learning as investment” involves an “entrepreneurial relation to the self” that assumes “who we are and who we will become is always the result of the informed choices we make and of the goods we produce in order to meet our own needs.”¹³ Indeed, precisely this kind of motivation and conduct is a central feature of Foucault’s notion of *homo oeconomicus*: The neoliberal subject acts according to self-interest, the perceived merits of which iterate and increasingly magnify interest as a driving force.¹⁴

Brown, however, contests Foucault’s claim that “interest” is the driving force of neoliberal subjectivity.¹⁵ Her objection rests on her argument that the neoliberal subject is so conjoined with the perceived greater good of economic expansion, that it can readily be sacrificed to it.¹⁶ In the neoliberal demand for self-investing and self-providing, it would seem that that the subject is pursuing its own interests. However, on closer examination, this self-reliant investing and providing must cohere with overall economic health to which that individual could be, and often is, sacrificed. As Brown puts it, “forcing the subject to become a responsible self-investor and self-provider – reconfigures the correct comportment of the subject from one naturally driven by satisfying interests to one forced to engage in a particular form of self-sustenance that meshes with the morality of the state and the health of the economy.”¹⁷

Thus, as Brown demonstrates, “reconciling individual with national or other collective interests is no longer the contemporary problem understood to be solved by markets.”¹⁸ Rather, self-interested conduct and pursuit are sup-

planted in the “production through governance of responsabilized citizens who appropriately self-invest in a context of macroeconomic vicissitudes and needs that make all of these investments into practices of speculation.”¹⁹ The subject, then, is *subjected* to this kind of responsabilization. Understanding how and why self-interest is pursued requires exposing this context of habitual subjectification. In fact, the liberal ideal of pursuing one’s interests has been replaced with new management practices of “teamwork,” and “stakeholder consensus”²⁰ in pursuit of economic growth. These latter practices emerge as functions of what the critical literature on neoliberalism and governance refers to as devolution and responsabilization, which I will turn to below.

The neoliberal subject is speculative as it is vulnerable to market vicissitudes: “When individuals, firms, or industries constitute a drag on this good, rather than a contribution to it, they may be legitimately cast off or reconfigured—through downsizing, furloughs, outsourcing, benefits cuts, mandatory job shares, or offshore production relocation.”²¹ Indeed, sacrifice and subjectification, are no strangers to higher education. Consider, for example, the vulnerable, self-investing faculty member subject to reorganization, repositioning, mission shifts, and program dismantling. Similarly, self-investing student, responding to shifting market forces, acting out of self-interest – could have their education rendered irrelevant, obsolete.

HUMAN CAPITAL

I suggest, here, that this distinction—between Foucault’s characterization of the neoliberal subject as the subject of interest and Brown’s description of the speculative contemporary *homo oeconomicus* who is produced, responsabilized, and subjected to market shifts—emerges from their different understandings of “human capital.” Human capital is a ubiquitous term in the discourse on neoliberalism; but it is polysemic. Foucault tends to view human capital as something human beings acquire or inherit, such as education or health.²² To be sure, Foucault explains how acquired human capital is practically “inseparable from the person who possesses it.”²³ Nevertheless, human capital is “made of” “innate” and “acquired elements.”²⁴ “Acquiring human capital” is “voluntary” as

it develops “in the course of individuals’ lives.”²⁵ Whether inherited or acquired, Foucault’s conception of human capital is something that a person “has,”²⁶ is “of individuals,”²⁷ “possessed.”²⁸

Brown argues, however, that, in contemporary neoliberal practice and rationality, human beings do not simply *have* human capital. Rather, they are formed *as* and *become* human capital, and *only* human capital: “[N]eoliberal rationality recognizes and interpellates the subject only as human capital, making incoherent the idea of an engaged and educated citizen.”²⁹ Contemporary neoliberal subjects “*become* capital for themselves, but also for others, for a firm or a state, their investment value, rather than their productivity, becomes paramount.”³⁰ And, in becoming human capital, neoliberal subjects are not merely pursuing their interests; they are becoming capital of institutions, firms, organizations and states. Thus, their capital value and “investment value,” rather than their competence, performance, and productivity, tend to determine their enduring worth.³¹

And, just here, in Brown’s conception of the neoliberal subject *as* human capital, we can see significant moral and political implications. The capitalization of *homo oeconomicus* jettisons moral agency and individuality, dissolving political space,³² leaving a residual, ghostly negative space, rendering invisible the idea of the common, the public, the social.³³

HOMO POLITICUS

Brown’s critique of Foucault centers precisely on this “vanquishing” of the political, to which, she maintains, he gives but limited explicit attention. Indeed, she asserts the need to recognize an agonistic relationship between *homo politicus* and *homo oeconomicus* today.³⁴ To be sure, Foucault is concerned with the function of rule, power, limits of power, freedom, and juridical rights in neoliberal society.³⁵ Yet his argument lacks explicit attention to *homo politicus*, to Aristotle’s human being who “is by nature a political animal,” “by nature an animal intended to live in a polis.”³⁶ For Aristotle, politics is not simply association, as that of “bees” or an “animal herd.” Politics emerges in uniquely human perception and discourse that “serve to reveal the advantageous and the

harmful and hence also the just and unjust.”³⁷ It is in being *homo politicus* that one exercises moral and practical reason and courage, freely striving for just decisions, expressing and debating convictions in community.³⁸

Drawing on Aristotle’s *Politics*, Brown highlights his interrelatedness of “moral reflection, deliberation, and expression,” on the one hand, and “generating multiple forms of association,” on the other.³⁹ Moral dispositions, judgments, and deliberation inform how we associate with others on all levels, from the personal to the national to the global.⁴⁰ “What is missing in this picture” is the human being as *homo politicus*. Where, indeed, is Aristotle’s human being who “is by nature a political animal,” “by nature an animal intended to live in a polis.”⁴¹ It is in being *homo politicus* that we “develop our distinctive capacities for association, speech, law, action, moral judgment, and ethics.”⁴² In Brown’s reading, Aristotle maintains a “naturalistic ontology” in which the “the economic” and “the political” coexist and enhance each other.⁴³ But it is the *political* quality of the human, rather than the economic, which facilitates “quests for political emancipation, enfranchisement, equality, and, in more radical moments, substantive popular sovereignty.”⁴⁴ Political yearnings and strivings cannot be explained by the neoliberal language of *homo oeconomicus*. Exclusively recognizing market-based responses and actions, in all aspects of life, preempts *homo politicus*’s free expression and conduct and has far-reaching consequences, including foreclosing political organization and dissent.⁴⁵ This eclipse of the political is historical unprecedented.⁴⁶ Stripped of the political, the human being becomes simply an investment or divestment, in accordance with market standards and criteria. Consequently, the distinctively human *homo politicus*, striving toward a vision of the polis, is jettisoned.⁴⁷

This tendency to dissolve the political explains, in part, what has come to be called the new governance, or, to use Foucault’s term, “governmentality.” A number of themes characterize neoliberal governance. One is its emphasis on process rather than institutions, viewpoints, or structures. A fluid, often Janus-faced, process, governance is what William Walters calls “a broad, dynamic, complex process of interactive decision-making that is constantly evolving and responding to changing circumstances.”⁴⁸

A second theme is “self-governing networks” and “self-regulating

systems.”²⁴⁹ The role of governance, then, is to manage these networks that are “presumed to have their own autonomy and materiality.”²⁵⁰ Similar to Brown’s observation of the “vanquishing of the political,” Walters, in his critique, stresses governance’s “antipolitical,” self-regulating quality, its “containing and displacing politics,”²⁵¹ and its “displacing political conflict.”²⁵² The theme of inclusive, “collective problem-solving” masks governance’s “narrow, instrumental conception of democracy which functions as little more than an institutional support for market-oriented reforms.”²⁵³ No political struggles are necessary or relevant, as politics becomes “a game of multilevel collective self-management.”²⁵⁴ Thus, governance avoids political discussion, flattens hierarchical relations of power and authority, and extolls networks, partnerships, and shared responsibility.

The semantic affinity of the terms “governance” and “governing” belies governance’s paradoxical, distinctively apolitical or anti-political quality and its conception of the political as “a domain of strategies, techniques, and procedures through which different forces and groups attempt to render their programs operable.”²⁵⁵ Political agency, then, is alien to governance’s reduction of politics to managing and solving problems. The consequences are grave. In Brown’s words: “As problem solving replaces deliberation about social conditions and possible political futures, as consensus replaces contestation among diverse perspectives, political life is emptied of . . . robust expressions of different political positions and desires.”²⁵⁶

Governance’s marketization and evacuation of the political also can be seen in the ways faculty curricular responsibility is displaced by consumer standards and investor speculation.⁵⁷ And, the very titles of much recent scholarship suggest deep concerns with neoliberalism’s diminution of politics in faculty governance: “Disenchanted Professionals: The Politics of Faculty Governance in the Neoliberal Academy,”⁵⁸ “The Rise and Decline of Faculty Governance: Professionalization and the Modern American University,”⁵⁹ “Ideas of a University, Faculty Governance, and Governmentality in Higher Education,”⁶⁰ and “Neoliberal Ideologies, Governmentality and the Academy.”⁶¹ Indeed, today, it is worth considering just how much of our academic shared governance is becoming a responsibilized anti-politics.

RESPONSIBILIZATION AND DEVOLUTION

Responsibilization refers to the process or technique wherein we become responsible for an activity, problem, or task that previously had been the responsibility of individuals or entities with broader authority and resources. While this term originally was used in neoliberal challenges to the welfare state, it has now become part of the discourse on neoliberal governance and governmentality in general. The process of shifting responsibility from sources of broader, more resourced authority to those with narrow, less resourced authority is referred to as devolution. Authority and responsibility, then, are devolved to the point that a far less powerful entity, group, or individual becomes responsabilized. To become responsabilized is not to be confused with being given autonomy, however. In fact, moral freedom, the freedom to choose our means and ends, is jettisoned when we become managed through responsabilization.

A common example of devolution and responsabilization is the now widely used budget management system referred to as “responsibility-centered management” (RCM). In this system, a given academic unit—such as a department, program, school, center, or college—bears the costs as well as the revenue for its operation, leaving a portion of that revenue for central administration costs. But without the sufficient resources—financial and otherwise—being made available to it, that unit is now responsabilized to live within its specific revenue limits. While this may be efficient budgeting, it has consequences, such as excessive reliance on less expensive adjunct faculty, perpetuating the phenomenon of an underpaid, overworked, job-security-less, and benefits-poor labor force.

Another example of the eclipse of *homo politicus* and of its being supplanted by a responsabilized *homo oeconomicus*, are certain practices of funding faculty scholarship and professional development. In some cases, there is a fund, governed by a committee of faculty, that makes decisions on professional conference funding. Requests are carefully evaluated as to how they will serve the institution. There is no assumption or premise that academic freedom and scholarship are the primary criteria, nor that, as part the professorate, one should have an annual allocation for this purpose. This governance by a faculty committee is an example of dissolution of a hierarchical or collective relationship that asserts the importance of faculty’s academically free decisions for attend-

ing and participation in conferences in their academic fields. There is, then, no structure of faculty advocacy, in this regard. Having a devolved authority, this committee is responsabilized to make its own decisions on the efficacy of a faculty proposal, but only within the limits of its mandate and resources.⁶²

“BEST” PRACTICES AND BENCHMARKS

The dissolution of the political can be found in the ubiquitous, profess-edly impartial terms, “best practices” and “benchmarks,” informed by a neoliberal market concern for “what works,” in that they exclude politics and ethics from policy conversations, privileging, instead, a kind of technical problem solving. Thus, in higher education today, we witness, frequent appeals to the notion of “best practices” as justifying program elimination, administrative reconfigurations, mandated teaching, required assessment practices, budget reductions, and implementing new information technologies. Taken as *best* practices they are presumed to have a generic value across professions and fields, thus masking the norms and values that inform them. Rather than appealing to the values, assumptions, and purposes behind the practices, arguing against a *best* practice can only appeal to other practices that are considered even *better*. Purely means to unspecified ends, best practices are just that—*practices* which are considered “exemplary behaviors modeled into processes.”⁶³

“Benchmarking” of best practices, then, becomes a key vehicle for those practices’ implementation. Distinctively neoliberal, benchmarking is decidedly ahistorical, as it “dispenses with history as a form of knowledge—how an organization or firm has traditionally or recently done things is irrelevant to how it should do them and must be the first things jettisoned in a benchmarking process.”⁶⁴ Moreover, these ahistorical, seemingly impartial, dispositions toward best practices and benchmarking presume that there are no modes of conduct necessarily specific to particular academic areas and professions: “A key premise of benchmarking is that best practices can be exported from one industry or sector to another and that some of the most valuable reforms will happen by creatively adapting practices in one field to another.”⁶⁵ We now hear of universities that describe their structural transformations into a matrix of

“knowledge networks,” organized around broad, practical “domains,” rather than disciplines, in order to readily offer “stackable,” modules that are easily re-used for different contexts and learners.⁶⁶ Almost palpable, here, are the moral, political, agentive vacuum and the absence of a pluralist disciplinarity.

In addition to ignoring institutional histories and purposes, the neoliberal character of benchmarking gives scant attention to what is actually produced or provided through the practices being benchmarked. Instead, the content-less norms of efficiency, investment value, cost-effectiveness, productivity, and consumer satisfaction subsist within their correlative practices. The practices, then, constitute mere means to unstated ends. As Brown shows: “This permits private-sector practices to move readily into the public sector; it allows, for example, educational or health care institutions to be transformed by practices developed in the airline or computer industries.”⁶⁷ Equally significant, this purported transferability of practices, without regard for or reflection on what they produce or achieve, is driven by an ostensibly universal goal of market competitiveness.⁶⁸ These practices are consistent with and further underscore, the anti-political character of neoliberal governance: The universal criteria of the marketplace dissolve debate over purposes and desirable outcomes, reducing deliberation and advocacy to collaborative implementation of generic processes.

Value-neutral rhetoric abounds in higher education today, emphasizing the themes of collective networking, competition, market metrics, and generic references to growth. We read and hear of faculty being invited to be part of “collective journeys” to unspecified “places” and “heights,” expanding “brand recognition,” innovation on the “cutting edge,” and breaking new “paths.” Just what does it mean that these journeys are collective? What are the new heights that we are reaching? How are brand recognition, innovation, going further, and networking virtues, in and of themselves, without reference to their destinations, purposes, consequences, and, equally important, to what they may be sacrificing? Similarly, value-neutral and process-focused language are evident in references to growth and success, without explaining just what kinds of growth and success these are. Even when making a moral or social value statement, we often hear its justification rooted in market values, as when cultural competency is presented as a prerequisite for career agility and professional thriving. Similarly, seeming

appeals to social values are often cast in content-less references to unspecified larger causes and a greater good.⁶⁹

As I review these kinds of university statements, I wonder what the place would be for what Hannah Arendt describes as “reason’s need to think beyond the limits of what can be known” and the importance of one’s ability “to think beyond the limitations of knowledge, to do more with his intellectual abilities, his brain power, than to use them as an instrument for knowing and doing.”⁷⁰ In recognizing how the political has become shrouded or even dissolved in the contemporary neoliberal academy, we are presented with the opportunity to change the language and rationality which cast us in the mold of *homo oeconomicus*. The question before us is: How can our recovery of *homo politicus* and of thought help avoid a student, professor, or governance body being reduced to a pure *homo oeconomicus* in a neoliberal order of reason? Answering this question requires recognizing when responsabilization parades as responsibility, devolved authority as autonomy, governance as governing, consumerism as student-centeredness, and marketization as mission.

1 Wendy Brown, *Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism’s Stealth Revolution* (New York: Zone Books, 2016).

2 William Walters, *Governmentality: Critical Encounters* (New York: Routledge, 2012).

3 Michel Foucault, *The Birth of Biopolitics* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).

4 Bronwyn Davies and Peter Bansel, “Governmentality and Academic Work: Shaping the Hearts and Minds of Academic Workers,” *Journal of Curriculum Theorizing* 26, no. 3 (2010).

5 Gert Biesta, “Evidence Based Practice in Education: Between Science and Democracy,” in *A Companion to Research in Education*, eds. Alan Reid, Paul Hart, and Michael Peters (Dordrecht: Springer, 2014), 391–400; Gert J. J. Biesta, “Why ‘What Works’ Won’t Work: Evidence-Based Practice and the Democratic Deficit of Educational Research,” *Educational Theory* 57, no. 1 (2007): 1–22.

6 Gaile S. Cannella and Mirka Koro-Ljungberg, “Neoliberalism in Higher Education: Can We Understand? Can We Resist and Survive? Can We Become Without Neoliberalism?,” *Cultural Studies ↔ Critical Methodologies* 17, no. 3 (2017), 155.

7 John S. Levin and Aida Aliyeva, “Embedded Neoliberalism within Faculty Behaviors,” *The Review of Higher Education* 38, no. 4 (2015): 537–563.

8 For example, see: B. Pusser, K. Kempner, S. Marginson, and I. Ordorika, *Universities and the Public Sphere: Knowledge Creation and State Building in the Era of Globalization* (New York: Routledge, 2011); David Meens, “Democratic Education versus Smithian Efficiency Prospects for a Deweyan Ideal in the ‘Neoliberal Age,’” *Educational Theory* 66, no. 1/2 (2016).

- 9 Foucault, *The Birth of Biopolitics*, 278. See Brown, *Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism's Stealth Revolution*, 83.
- 10 Natasha Jankowski and Staci Provezis, "Neoliberal Ideologies, Governmentality, and the Academy," *Educational Philosophy and Theory* 46, no. 5 (2014), 481.
- 11 Meens, "Democratic Education versus Smithian Efficiency."
- 12 Michael Peters, "The New Prudentialism in Education: Actuarial Rationality and the Entrepreneurial Self," *Educational Theory* 55, no. 2 (2005): 123–137.
- 13 Maarten Simons, "Learning as Investment: Notes on Governmentality and Biopolitics," *Educational Philosophy and Theory* 38, no. 4 (2006): 523–540.
- 14 Foucault, *The Birth of Biopolitics*, 276.
- 15 Brown, *Undoing the Demos*, 19.
- 16 *Ibid.*, 83.
- 17 *Ibid.*, 84.
- 18 *Ibid.*
- 19 *Ibid.*
- 20 *Ibid.*, 71.
- 21 *Ibid.*
- 22 Foucault, *Birth of Biopolitics*, 215.
- 23 *Ibid.*, 224.
- 24 *Ibid.*, 227.
- 25 *Ibid.*, 229.
- 26 *Ibid.*, 228.
- 27 *Ibid.*
- 28 *Ibid.*, 244.
- 29 *Ibid.*, 183.
- 30 Brown, *Undoing the Demos*, 78.
- 31 *Ibid.*
- 32 *Ibid.*
- 33 *Ibid.*
- 34 Brown, *Undoing the Demos*. Foucault does speak of the irreducibility of the "subject of interest" to the "subject of right" (*homo juridicus*) and of the incommensurate logic of *homo oeconomicus* and *homo juridicus*. Yet, Brown shows the inequivalence of Foucault's "*homo juridicus*" and her characterization of *homo politicus*. For Foucault, Brown argues, "*homo juridicus* is a creature derived or deduced from state sovereignty, not from imagined primary drives or capacities in the human being — it bears no parallel with the primary drives of *homo oeconomicus*" (85).
- 35 Brown, *Undoing the Demos*, 85–6.
- 36 Aristotle, *The Politics*, trans. Ernest Barker (Oxford: Clarendon, 1946).
- 37 Aristotle, *The Politics*, 1253a8.
- 38 See Malte Faber, Reiner Manstetten, and Thomas Petersen, "Homo Oeconomicus and Homo Politicus: Political Economy, Constitutional Interest and Ecological Interest," *KYKLOS* 50, 1997, 473.
- 39 Aristotle, *Politics*, 1.2.13; Brown, *Undoing the Demos*, 88.
- 40 Brown, *Undoing the Demos*, 88.
- 41 Aristotle, *The Politics*; Brown, *Undoing the Demos*, 87.

- 42 Brown, *Undoing the Demos*, 88.
- 43 Ibid., 89.
- 44 Ibid., 94.
- 45 Ibid., 99.
- 46 Ibid.
- 47 Ibid., 110.
- 48 William Walters, "Some Critical Notes on 'Governance,'" *Studies in Political Economy* 73 (Spring–Summer 2004); Commission for Global Governance, *Our Global Neighbourhood: the Report of the Commission on Global Governance* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).
- 49 Walters, "Some Critical Notes on 'Governance,'" 29.
- 50 Walters, "Some Critical Notes on 'Governance,'" 30.
- 51 William Walters, *Governmentality: Critical Encounters* (New York: Taylor and Francis, 2012), 80.
- 52 Walters, *Governmentality*, 33.
- 53 Walters, *Governmentality*, 33–4.
- 54 Walters, *Governmentality*, 35.
- 55 Nikolas Rose and Peter Miller, "Political Power beyond the State: Problematics of Government," *The British Journal of Sociology* 43, no. 2 (1992): 173–205. Also see Elizabeth Meehan, "From Government to Governance, Civic Participation and 'New Politics': The Context of Potential Opportunities for the Better Representation of Women," Center for Advancement of Women in Politics, School of Politics and International Studies, Queen's University, Belfast, Occasional Paper no. 5 (October 2003). Meehan refers to governance as "a specific mode of governing that is evacuated of agents and institutionalized in processes, norms, and practices ... that bear no reference to agents."
- 56 Brown, *Undoing the Demos*, 127.
- 57 Ibid., 183.
- 58 Timothy Kaufman-Osborn, "Disenchanted Professionals: The Politics of Faculty Governance in the Neoliberal Academy," *Perspectives on Politics* 15, no. 1 (2017): 100–115.
- 59 Larry Gerber, *The Rise and Decline of Faculty Governance: Professionalization and the Modern American University* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014).
- 60 Susan Talburt, "Ideas of a University, Faculty Governance, and Governmentality in Higher Education," in *Handbook of Theory and Research* Volume XX, ed. John C. Smart (Dordrecht: Springer, 2005), 459–505.
- 61 Jankowski and Provezis, "Neoliberal Ideologies, Governmentality and the Academy," 475–487.
- 62 The universities' names and specific documents are withheld.
- 63 T. C. Shivakumar and S. Prabhu, "Best Practices in a Modern Library and Information Center," in *National Conference on Management of Modern Libraries*, eds. K. Shivananda Bhat, Mahabaleshwara Rao, and Rekha D. Pai (New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 2014), 179.
- 64 Brown, *Undoing the Demos*, 136.
- 65 Ibid., 136–7.

66 The universities' names and specific documents are withheld.

67 Brown, *Undoing the Demos*, 137.

68 Ibid.

69 The universities' names and specific documents are withheld.

70 Hannah Arendt, "Thinking and Moral Considerations: A Lecture," *Social Research* 38 (Autumn 1971), 421–22. I am indebted to Victor Kestenbaum for this reference.

In arguing for the importance of philosophy in the professions, Kestenbaum urges us to seek an alternative to creating, simply, "a world of professionalized knowers." Victor Kestenbaum, "The Professions, the Humanities, and Transfiguration," in *Calvin O. Schrag and the Task of Philosophy After Postmodernity*, eds. Martin Matuszák and William McBride (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2002), 210.