Philosophy of Education and Philosophizing about Education in the Gap Between Past and Future

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The theme of the 2016 annual meeting of the Philosophy of Education Society—“Philosophy of Education in the gap between past and future”—was inspired by Hannah Arendt’s reflections on the gaps that become apparent when the traditions we have inherited are inadequate to the task of helping us make sense of the world we inhabit. In the face of these disconcerting moments, we are prompted to look anew at these traditions, not only to get to grips with their shortcomings, but also to attempt to redirect them in light of our recognition that the world “is or is becoming out of joint.” The point of these return engagements, then, is not to seek solace in past traditions nor to reject them out of hand, but rather to retrieve from them those elements that might cast the predicament of the present in a new light. This approach to scholarly traditions is captured by Arendt’s analogy of the pearl diver “who descends to the bottom of the sea, not to excavate the bottom and bring it to light but to pry loose the rich and the strange, the pearls and the coral in the depths and to carry them to the surface … up into the world of the living … as ‘thought fragments,’ as something ‘rich and strange,’ and perhaps even as everlasting Urphanomene.” In this spirit, the call for essays invited submissions to sift through the intellectual inheritances of our field with a view to prying loose the “lost treasures” and examining the “sea-changes” that render them particularly helpful for understanding education in the present moment. The call also invited submissions to engage the task of thinking about the field of philosophy of education in relation to education’s future, and in particular to open up new spaces for doing philosophy of education. Finally, the call encouraged submissions to attend to theoretical perspectives and educational experiences that have been absent(ed) from the purview of philosophy of education, either altogether or more recently, and to reflect on the ways in which attending to these gaps within the field might reorient our understanding of the field’s past, rethink its present, and redirect its future. A fourth, and fittingly unexpected, theme emerged in the response to the call for essays. These are essays that explore how and where philosophy of education happens by attending to the temporality of education. I will explore each of these themes below.

This introductory essay does not attempt to do justice to the richness of each contribution to this volume. Instead, I have selected a few essays with a view to focusing attention on the parameters of each theme. Many of the essays cross thematic categories, and I’ve tried to point this out when I could, although I ask forgiveness for reducing their philosophical depth and complexity to a short summary that, at best, captures only one small part of the whole. I also want to encourage readers who are new to the structure of this volume to read each contribution alongside the response essay that immediately follows it. Respondents to each essay were selected on a range of criteria, all of which are rooted in the respondent’s philosophical expertise and
acumen. Some respondents were selected to respond to an essay because it engages directly with their work (e.g. Gert Biesta’s response to Stefano Oliverio’s essay because of its critique of Biesta’s distinction between educational and philosophical questions, and Cris Mayo’s response to Liz Jackson’s essay on the numbing potential of political satire in light of her own work on humor in anti-racist pedagogy). Others were selected because of their location in a different philosophical tradition but dealing with similar questions (e.g. Deborah Kerdeman responding to Amanda Fulford on the nature of the student experience, and Christopher Martin responding to Claudia Ruitenberg’s essay on the “double challenge” of hospitality in medical education). Still others were invited to respond to essays because of their different perspective within a shared philosophical tradition (for example, Megan Laverty’s response to Norm Friesen’s essay on Wittgenstein’s tragic philosophy of education, and Gregory Bourrasa’s response to Douglas Yacek’s essay on the possibilities for Bildung in a consumer society). And some were selected for their expertise within the same philosophical tradition or set of questions (e.g. Sarah Stitzlein’s response to Quentin Wheeler-Bell’s essay on the eclipse of the state in recent work on citizen responsibility in relation to schooling, and Katarina Holma’s response to Kunimasa Sato’s careful consideration of “Surprise in the Fostering of Rationality,” an essay that posits surprise as a cognitive emotion that warrants careful pedagogical attention). The fact that each response essay has a distinct title reminds us that they are not simply critiques of the essay to which they respond. Respondents are encouraged to find openings for further thinking in these essays. In other words, they are asked to see the gaps in the argument not simply as shortcomings that need corrective redress, but as an invitation to take the essay in an unexpected direction, opening up new trajectories for thinking.

Before I move on to explore the themes that thread through the various essays in this volume, I’d like to commend everyone who submitted an essay for consideration for taking the initiative of writing an essay and for having the intellectual courage to submit their work to the rigorous peer review that is the hallmark of the Philosophy of Education Society. I’d especially like to thank the contributing editors, whose names are listed below and at the front of this volume, for their service to the society in reviewing a record number of submissions with such care. Special thanks to Ryan Ozar for his expert administrative assistance, technological acumen and gracious service to the society beyond the term of his graduate assistantship.

**Originary Questions and the Clash of Traditions**

When PES President, Barbara Applebaum, invited me to be the Program Chair, she gave me full rein over the theme and shape of the program, with one proviso: she had already invited Linda Alcoff to give the George Kneller lecture. The two were colleagues at Syracuse University, and Alcoff’s work on epistemologies of identity has been a longstanding influence on Applebaum’s thinking about “white complicity pedagogy,” the subject of her 2010 book *Being White, Being Good*. Although Alcoff wasn’t tasked with addressing the conference theme, her lecture, included in this volume, engages all three dimensions of it. By introducing the work
of Argentinian-Mexican philosopher, Enrique Dussel, to the Society, Alcoff addresses a notable gap in the philosophy of education, namely the lack of engagement, until very recently, with Latin American philosophical traditions. She frames Dussel’s approach to philosophy of education in an urgent problem: the transmission and embodiment of a sense of failure to the children of colonized cultures, in Latin America as well as the Global North. Neatly picking up the theme of the 2014 conference, which took up Kenneth Howe’s call for “ambitious non-Ideal theory,” Alcoff traces Dussel’s search for an approach to education that is attentive to sociological realities while searching within the philosophical tradition for liberatory possibilities.

Dussel’s naturalized and material philosophy of education is offered as an engagement with the underside of the European philosophical tradition in which he was trained, particularly the work of Hegel and Rousseau. In place of Rousseau’s “commandist pedagogy,” with its vigilant mistrust of parents, child, and community, and its desire to create a new kind of person for an unforeseen future, Dussel forwards a “mutualist” account of the pedagogical relation, which recognizes the embeddedness of an actual person in a community, rather than figuratively wrenching them away from the people feel connected with and love. The teacher, writes Dussel, must begin with the “existential situation of the student” rather than with some past or future Ideal. Alcoff notes that this initial embrace is just the start of an “analectical” movement out of existing dogmas, whether of the colonizing or decolonizing sort. The next step would be the reconstructive step of thinking outside existing paradigms with a view to generating “ontological novelty.” In a nod to Dussel’s life in exile from his native Argentina, Alcoff concludes her essay tragically, noting the likelihood that the teacher who attempts to create a different educational paradigm will face opposition, and perhaps even persecution, for doing so.

Dussel’s shift to the analectic as a way out of the theoretical enclosure of the dialectic brings to mind Arendt’s interpretation of Kafka’s parable “Er,” with its figure of a man trying to stand his ground and carve out space for himself between the press of the past and the force of the future. Kafka’s protagonist is left with two options: to give in to the rectilinear flow of time, which would subsume his agency to the flood of history, or to invoke the “old dream which Western metaphysics has dreamed from Parmenides to Hegel of a timeless, spaceless, suprasensuous realm as the proper region of thought.” Arendt posits a spatial overlay that Kafka’s conception of “rectilinear time” didn’t consider. On Arendt’s retelling, Kafka’s generic person (who today we would call “they,” rather than Arendt’s “he,” albeit at the risk of losing the force of singularity) does not simply stave off the forces of time; the effort involved in this would simply be too exhausting to sustain. Instead, he deflects them, “however lightly, from their original direction,” thereby disrupting the seemingly automatic flow of events. Perhaps this is what Dussel’s notion of the analectic signifies: the antagonism of conflicting traditions – European and Indigenous – need not occasion a clash of culture through which each is negated. Instead, Dussel is digging within each tradition with a view to opening up vantage points for thinking anew about the nature of the educational encounter in light of both the recent (post-colonial) and more ancient (pre-colonial) past.
Stefano Oliverio’s essay, “The Educational and Philosophical Big Bang,” also draws on Kafka’s parable to make an argument about the origins of philosophy of education. In his retelling of Kafka’s story, he rethinks the conventional way in which philosophy of education is positioned, as standing between the antagonistic forces of “pure” academic philosophy and the seemingly more pressing science of educational research. I am at risk of reducing a poetic and very learned essay to a straightforward argument that doesn’t do justice to its richness, here, but Oliverio urges philosophers of education to jump out of the fighting line altogether by returning to the Urphanomene of education, which he traces back, via Agamben, to Dewey’s assertion that “[s]o far as European history is concerned, philosophy originated at Athens from the direct pressure of educational questions.” Oliverio explains that “education emerges as a question (and, then, also as a philosophical question), when it is no longer the mere re-production of a community ruled by custom … but it is the domain where the challenge obtains as to how to come to terms with the radical discontinuity represented by the irruption of new generations and to manage their novelty and their potential of change of custom by re-establishing forms of continuity, which should not amount, however, to a sheer replication.” This “birth of the question,” at once educational and philosophical, gives philosophy of education a distinctive charge and an ongoing urgency, particularly in today’s “liquid times,” characterized as they are, by a state of perpetual discontinuity.

Avi Mintz’s “The Use and Abuse of History of Educational Philosophy” ponders the state of philosophy of education as a field, and draws a similar conclusion to Oliverio. Instead of conceding to the pressure of making philosophical work “relevant” to contemporary educational problems – a pressure that is acutely felt in the context of university schools of education – he suggests that initiating students into “a venerable (though problematic) historical conversation about education’s most important questions would better entice students and young scholars to remain in the field than the contemporary anxiety over our relevance.” In the process, Mintz argues, we might also better secure the field’s disciplinary identity. Mintz’s play on Nietzsche’s “use and abuse of history” is aptly in keeping with Arendt’s thinking about our relationship to tradition: to engage with the history of educational philosophy is to be reminded of the animating questions about education that are often lost sight of in the push to solve the institutional problems of the day. Mintz suggests that the questions asked by philosophers of education in the past are just the sort of questions with which students and scholars want to engage. Identifying and addressing this existential need of educational practitioners within schools of education might have the salutary effect of shoring up the field for the future.

Mintz’s argument calls to mind the “stratigraphic” way in which philosophy proceeds – a term that Walter Kohan invokes from Deleuze in his contribution to this volume, “Time, thinking, and the Experience of Philosophy in School.” Kohan explains that in the history of philosophy, time “is neither historical nor linear; philosophers of different chronological times might overlap or share the same philosophical time while creating concepts about the particular problems they pose.” Hence, “in one stratum or plateau we find Plato, Kant, and Hegel around the concept of justice; on
another Empedocles, Montaigne, and Foucault on friendship, and so on.” The study of philosophy of education thus knocks time, conceived of as chronology, off its course, and gives rise to a sense of time that Kohan, following Arendt, suggests we might think of as aionic. Aionic time takes shape within and beyond chronological time. Kohan’s essay is concerned with the programmatic study of philosophy in schools, which is valued because of its applicability, i.e. for what it enables students to do rather than for what it does to students. Gad Marcus’s exploration of the Jewish tradition of study known as Torah Lishmah – study for its own sake – offers a way of thinking outside of the binary of instrumental versus inherent value. Marcus helps us see how the activity of Torah Lishmah is bound up in instrumental reasoning almost all the way, from its initial motivation to its ultimate aim of reaping rewards in the afterlife and/or shaping the world. Yet, for all of this, there are moments when the act of studying moves from the realm of she’lo Lishmah (not for its own sake) to Lishmah (for its own sake). The imbrication of these two approaches, and the difficulties of untangling them, captures something essential about what it means to do a thing “for its own sake,” whether we are studying Torah or thinking philosophically about education.

Frances Schrag’s “Philosophy For Policy Makers? A Critique and a Proposal” considers more specifically the uses of philosophy of education. Schrag takes issue with the idea that ever more fine-grained conceptual analyses of key educational principles will give policy makers sufficient guidance “in the real world.” Instead, he proposes an approach based on a revitalization of Aristotelean phronesis, which is attentive to the particular ethos of a school, the particularities of the political milieu in which educational policy makers at various levels operate, and the person of the policy maker. On this view, the questions philosophers need to ask if they want to influence policy making “in the real world” hinge not only on parsing matters of philosophical principle along the lines of Ideal philosophical theory, but also on our capacity to contribute to the moral formation of policy makers, school administrators, and others concerned with big picture thinking under non-Ideal conditions. This shift in focus from educational Ideals to the persons making and enacting policy is echoed in Rachel Wahl’s essay, “Fieldwork as Philosophy.” Wahl’s approach invites a rethinking of conventional understandings of the relationship between the philosophical and the empirical by attending to the ways in which interview subjects, in this case, teachers and police officers, “discover what they think” in the course of an interview. Wahl’s essay makes a case for the humanizing potential of philosophically inflected dialogue that focuses on drawing out conceptions of the good. This is not an instance of philosophy of education “applied to” fieldwork, but rather of demonstrating how deep philosophical reflection can emerge out of fieldwork.

What the contributions above have in common is an attempt to steer clear of the two horns of Kenneth Howe’s “relevancy dilemma,” explained carefully in David Meens’ contribution to this volume, “Even Philosophers of Education Get the Blues.” Instead of either siding with philosophy “proper” or putting ourselves in the service of the science of educational research, it seems to me that these contributions want to claim space for educational philosophy Lishmah, i.e. for its own sake, with
the added complexities that Marcus has brought to bear on this notion, as it is not always clear what it means to do philosophy of education for its own sake. We are either teaching it or writing it or working on ways to see our work “implemented” in the world of educational policy and practice for reasons that are both lishmah and she’lo lishma (not for its own sake). Nonetheless, as Marcus suggests, there are revelatory moments within she’lo lishmah – not for its own sake – when philosophy of education lishmah happens. I turn now to a series of contributions that help us think about the conditions under which this occurs.

**Teaching Between Past and Future**

The essays discussed in this section speak to the question of educational time and space as the sort of time out of time that Arendt calls the “non-time-space” of educational relationships and dynamics. Much of what happens in this space occasions a looking backward with a view to thinking differently about the future in light of our contemporary situation. Sarah DesRoches, for example, complicates Sigal Ben-Porath’s conception of “shared fate” civic education by noting that which might not be shared in the historical memories of students in postcolonial societies such as Canada. In such circumstances, the practices of historical memory – which always occur in the present and are constantly being reinterpreted – do not have the hoped for “consolidating identificatory effects.” DesRoches proposes instead a practice of “remembering otherwise,” which attends to the “highly complex cultural negotiations” of citizens in the past and the present in order to come to a sufficiently pluralistic sense of shared fates. In “Discerning a Temporal Philosophy of Education: Understanding the gap between past and future through Augustine, Heidegger, and Huebner.” Yu-Ling Lee looks at authentic learning in school as a phenomenological experience that breaks through the restrictiveness of linear conceptions of time in schools. Like DesRoches, Lee is interested in the way educational communities consciously select aspects of the tradition in their curriculum decisions to create the conditions for a different future.

In “‘One Day is a Whole World’: On the Role of the Present in Education between Plan and Play,” Oded Zipory speaks to the devaluation of the present in education and calls for a “more radical break” from the idea that the main purpose of school is to prepare young people for the future. Zipory turns to Walter Benjamin’s “Program for a Proletarian Theater,” which outlines Benjamin’s plan for a school organized around the “labor of theater” rather than focusing on the play construed as end product. Zipory finds in this example an approach to schooling that focuses on the “here and now” of children’s engagements in the present. Instead of valuing these moments as “preparatory and a passageway” to the future, he sees the future erupting in those moments when something unexpected occurs in the present. Zipory urges teachers to notice and value those moments that seemingly spring from nowhere, and can neither be planned for nor repeated. Zipory finds a contemporary example of this approach in teacher and author Vivien Paley’s approach to her students. Importantly, the teacher is not entirely sidelined in all of this. They are the ones who create the conditions for these occurrences, and their attention is essential to noticing what is new and unexpected about them. If they are to make space for
these kinds of engagements, they will need to be freed from the pressure to subject every teaching moment to plans and predictions. Although Zipory doesn’t take the essay in this direction, the policy implications around the control of teacher work and the conditions for good teaching are clear.

Trent Davis explores this theme of attentiveness and reticence in encounters between teachers and students in his essay “Between the Teacher’s Past and the Student’s Future: A Psychoanalytic Interpretation of Pedagogical Presence.” Davis’s essay picks up on Gert Biesta’s important idea of “weakness” and “risk” in education, fleshing them out through the work of Anna Freud, who worries about the tendency for educators to impose themselves on children rather than letting them become who they are. Writing about the psychoanalytic desire to “limit education,” Davis suggests an approach to teaching that lays out a middle course between the interfering demands of a “strong” teacher and a teacher who does nothing to allay the child’s very real anxieties about the world. Aparna Mishra Tarc’s “Authoring Teacher Authority in the Lives of Children” has much in common with Davis’s concerns. Tarc explores the relational dimensions of teacher authority through an Arendtian and Derridean lens that she regards as properly pre-political in the sense that it takes into account the responsibilities that teachers, as adults, have to protect, care for, and nurture children in the bewildering world, which includes, in this case, a distressing event that happens at a school depicted in the Canadian film, Monsieur Lazhar.

Nassim Noroozi’s “Pedagogy of Time and a Decolonial ‘Present’” suggests something stronger than “mere” presence, although Noroozi shares Davis’s commitment to “unstrengthening.” In this case, what is being weakened is “the politics of speed” in the classroom, exemplified in the conventions of “haste” in the manner of making and presenting arguments. Noroozi calls for a “different regulation of economies of knowledge in the classroom” that seeks to slow students down. She walks readers through a purposefully unhurried lecture on Robinson Crusoe by Jacques Derrida to illustrate her point that a pedagogy of time has the capacity to “invite in concepts and people who have been refused admittance in texts,” and to surface the underside of Defoe’s colonial story. Noroozi links her notion of a pedagogy of time to the process of decolonization – the steady unlearning and reconstruction of identity addressed by Franz Fanon in his critique of Sartre’s anticolonial certainties.

“Towards Deep Liberation: A Gadamerian Correction to Critical Pedagogy” by Seamus Mulryan raises questions about critical pedagogy’s overreliance on the teacher as harbinger of liberation through a fine-tuned analysis of the concept of authority. Mulryan turns to Gadamer’s conception of the authority of tradition as a way to loosen the teacher’s ideological hold on the student, opening “a space of freedom … from the very dialectic of oppressor and oppressed.” The teacher returns to the scenario in the figure of Socrates in the Meno as one who perplexes rather than directs, making it possible to think on the diagonal, beyond the dialectical logic of the critical pedagogue. The force of Mulryan’s essay, however, lies less in the question of what the teacher does – or undoes, in this case – and more in the careful way that Mulryan parses the distinction between authority and ideology, thereby opening space for the teacher to return.
The figure of the teacher as the one who opens up the “small non-time-space[s] in the very heart of time” features centrally in the above discussions, but so too does the figure of the student. Marcus suggests that students be invited into more nuanced conversations about the phenomenon of study for its own sake, including a consideration of the virtues that make this kind of suspension of thinking possible. Kunimaso Sato’s “Fostering the Element of Surprise in Rationality” takes a similar tack. Sato posits surprise as a cognitive emotion that requires careful pedagogical preparation that attends both to the epistemic conditions of surprise and its characterological dimensions. A skilled teacher can lay the groundwork for these encounters, in part by posing the kinds of questions that induce the element of surprise; but students often need help to recognize what is surprising about an experiment or intellectual encounter. Like the students in Vivien Paley’s classroom, they are not always aware of the novelty they have generated, either because they themselves are new to the world and thus don’t know exactly what constitutes a surprising finding, or because they are under the impression that the point of learning is to confirm a pre-established plan.

Amanda Fulford’s “Mis-understanding the Student Experience” also considers the element of surprise as a way of critiquing the contemporary university’s obsession with planning, directing, and measuring “the student experience.” Fulford makes the case that a genuinely educational experience often happens unbidden. Far from confirming our expectations, this sort of surprise “troubles and disquiets.” She draws on Emerson as a corrective to Dewey’s conception of the continuity of experience, noting that genuinely educational experiences are discontinuous, disconcerting, and decidedly untimely. Like Sato, Fulford gestures toward the need to bring the teacher back in to these discussions of the student experience, not as directors and planners but rather as generators of the “‘environing conditions’ for learning.”

**Opening Space for Philosophy of Education**

Although I have presented the essays above largely through a temporal lens, they all have a corresponding spatial dimension that is very much in keeping with Arendt’s conception of teaching as an activity that doesn’t simply occur in time and space but has the capacity to open up time and space. The final grouping of essays that I will briefly consider are ones that open up new spaces for thinking philosophically about education, although they also connect powerfully with temporal dimensions of the educational experience explored above.

“Receiving Students and Patients: Professional Education and the Double Challenge of Hospitality” extends Claudia Ruitenbergs’s work on the ethic of hospitality into the world of professional medical education to consider the double challenge that medical educators have toward their students as well as to patients. In part because of the clinical setting of medical education, medical educators cannot defer the question of hospitality, and must enact it in the present. John Covaleskies’s “Tolerance Meets the Intolerable: Bounded Tolerance and a Pedagogy of Welcome” similarly considers hospitality as simultaneously aspirational and enacted in the present. Covaleskie reads the statement given by the President of the University of Oklahoma to the university community about his decision to shut down a fraternity because
of the racist actions of some of its members as an act of constituting ethical space. The President was not simply making a statement about an unfortunate occurrence. In telling the students: “this is the kind of community we wish to be, and you are welcome provided that you share this aspiration,” he was setting the university on course to a different future.

Mario Di Paolantonio’s “Remembering, Forgetting, and Learning Amidst A Time of Extraordinary Rendition: The Guantánamo Camp as a Museum of Forgetting” takes on critiques of the current “mania for memorial museums” and its antithesis, which he construes as the art of learning to forget. Di Paolantonio wants us to “grapple with a self-serving calculus that tends to accompany our desire to pedagogically manage memory.” Di Paolantonio notes the difference between denying history, and learning that we might need to limit what we know so that we are not too burdened by the weight of history to move forward. Through Blanchot, however, he also draws attention to the ways in which forgetting and remembering are not simply a matter of will. Blanchot urges an “ethics of forgetting” that starts not from the point of learning what we need to forget, but of recognizing how much we do not know to begin with. This originary forgetting offers a new starting point for the “Museum of Forgetting” that Adam Phillips has proposed in lieu of our obsession with the memorializing of trauma. Di Paolantonio offers an interpretation of Catalan artist Alicia Framis’s work, “Welcome to Guantánamo Museum: Things to Forget,” that “attunes us to what we are presently forgetting” through the depiction of a “fictive-future Guantánamo museum project” that “calls up an ‘anachrony’ in our present, provoking a sense of untimeliness and dis-adjustment amid the contemporary.”

Staying with the present, this time in relation to film, Stefan Ramaekers and Naomi Hodgson write about the experience of showing Michael Haneke’s The Seventh Continent in a biannual graduate seminar that is organized around the idea that watching films can be catalysts for educational philosophizing in and of itself. Two aspects of the essay stand out in light of the themes of this introductory essay: first, Ramaekers and Hodgson upend the idea, put forward by critical pedagogues, that the point of education through film is largely a matter of “breaking into” film to expose power relations, the trappings of consumerism, and other dimensions of cultural critique. Instead, they see the educational potential of film in its capacity to disrupt the subjectivity of the viewer, releasing them from the hold of their identities and expectations. This breakthrough is not necessarily dramatic but can occasion small shifts in understanding that occur through the film’s heightening of attention to details of everyday life. Ramaekers and Hodgson are not claiming that film necessarily has this effect. Entering into the suspended space of film requires a willingness to submit to the film, which means, in part, the viewer’s letting go of her expectations and interpretive demands. Second, the teacher’s role in this process is limited to selecting the film, creating the space of “suspension” for non-didactic discussion, and attending to the “interest” generated in this space construed as the “education of grown-ups.” In keeping with Mulryan’s call for a shift in focus from the teacher to the tradition, in this essay, the film and not the teacher is the conduit for “disarming subjectivity.”
The theme of examining new spaces for doing philosophy of education is also present in “Reconsidering the ‘Ped’ in Pedagogy: A Walking Education” by LeAnn M. Holland, who looks at the conditions under which walking can be construed as an educational experience. Holland explores the various ways in which walking has been explored philosophically but makes it clear that her focus is the question of what puts walking into an “educative mode.” The educational potential of walking traverses quite a lot of terrain, from considering the “environing conditions” of an educative walk, to thinking about the transformative effects of these walks on the person in relationship to the social world and thereby, on the social world itself (which includes the natural world). Holland’s essay calls to mind Gad Marcus’s attention to the distinction between study she’lo lishmah and study lishmah. For the most part, walking is not deliberately educational. Its educative dimensions emerge when walking has the effects that Holland describes, breaking into our subjectivity in ways that generate and deepen our attunement to and interest in the social world.

Holland’s essay was the final General Session of the conference, because I liked the idea of people thinking about their walking as an educational activity as they left the conference and resumed their lives outside of the “gap” in time and space of the academic conference. Increasingly, these sorts of gatherings are criticized for their distance from the “real world” of education and/or politics, not to mention their expense and extensive carbon footprint. The essays in this volume might strike some as similarly abstracted from the pressure of time, and the urgent claims of the world on our time, including impending environmental disaster, which threatens to end time altogether. Looking at the quality of thinking in these essays, and considering the conference not only as a space that serves instrumental purposes of garnering a publication in this volume and recognition for individuals and institutions, but also as a gathering space for listening, in depth discussion, and further working through of these ideas, I am increasingly grateful for the annual opportunity to carve out a small “non-time-space” for these encounters in the midst of our too busy professional and personal lives. Thanks again to all the contributors to this volume, including the many fine essays that aren’t mentioned in this introductory essay. Perhaps those essays have the benefit of allowing for an open reading that is freed from the thematic constraints outlined above. Special thanks to Barbara Applebaum for inviting me to chair the conference, and to the associate editors of this volume for their work reviewing submissions. And many thanks to Naomi Hodgson for her painstaking work as Managing Editor, and also to Joyce Atkinson for her help in making the volume available to readers.

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6. The formation of LAPES, the Latin American Philosophy of Education Society, in 2012, along with its journal LAPIZ, has already done much to change the contours of this conversation.


