Even Philosophers of Education Get the Blues:  
A “Relevancy Dilemma” in the Gap Between Past and Future

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I believe in political solutions to political problems. But man’s primary problems aren’t political; they’re philosophical. Until humans can solve their philosophical problems, they’re condemned to solve their political problems over and over and over again. It’s a cruel, repetitious bore.

—Tom Robbins, Even Cowgirls Get the Blues

When the thread of tradition finally broke, the gap between past and future ceased to be a condition peculiar only to the activity of thought and restricted as an experience to those few who made thinking their primary business. It became a tangible reality and perplexity for all; that is, it became a fact of political relevance.

—Hannah Arendt, Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought

INTRODUCTION

Even philosophers of education get the blues — or, to hear some tell it, especially philosophers of education get the blues. The blues refers first of all, according to Merriam-Webster’s online dictionary, to “a feeling of sadness or depression; low spirits; melancholy.” The blues in this sense is an affect or mood, one that signals personal encounter with the tragic elements of life: limitation and contingency; circumstances that hem one in, or in which one’s world falls apart; frustration, anxiety, or trauma. Misfortune and failure are central to the blues. It may involve the sense that one’s path is blocked ahead, or that one is carried forward, inexorably and against one’s own will and wishes, on the wave of the past. The blues may have ultimately to do with man’s position sui generis between conflicting forces of remembrance and anticipation, described by Hannah Arendt as a space between past and future, a “gap in time which, as long as he lives, is the ground on which he must stand, though it seems to be a battlefield and not a home.”

In Arendt’s vision, a version of what I am here calling “the blues” is not the unique possession of philosophers; rather, it is endemic to the world of critical or reflective thought, and so likely “coeval with the existence of man on earth.” Her words in the second epigraph above suggest, however, that philosophers and others whose “primary business” is thinking should have an advantage when it comes to the blues, having an historic and vocational bent towards (tempo)realities that have “finally” in modern times, become “politically salient.” Not least, one might add, within the world of educational concerns. As such, one would think philosophers (of education, in particular) would have much to contribute to the understanding and resolution of the educational blues that presently permeate our private and public discourses. On the contrary, I argue that while philosophers indeed have long contemplated many existential and analytic issues that may give rise to (some of) our blues, in responding to these we have a great deal to learn from cultural resources and traditions not typically considered philosophical.

As Victor Frankl demonstrates powerfully, the bare facts of sickness, old age, and death are not in themselves tragic — which is to say: they do not in and of them-
selves give rise to the blues. “The key,” in Cornel West’s words, “is not simply the circumstances under which one lives, but how one interprets those circumstances.” This last point provides a bridge between our first definition of the blues and a second: “a style of music that was created by African-Americans in the southern U.S. and that often expresses feelings of sadness; a song often of lamentation … jazz or popular music using harmonic and phrase structures of the blues.” The blues in this sense represents a creative, often artistic, response to suffering, oppression, and marginalization, experiences that constitute much of the experience of black Americans throughout U.S. history. West invites his readers to join a number of intellectuals and artists who understand blues music as a paradigmatic instance of a wide-ranging cultural form that, through interpretive engagement, has the power to transform experience in the face of traumatic suffering and apparent helplessness. It provides, perhaps more than any other cultural expression available, a model for a response to overwhelming tyranny and abuse of power that avoids both Pollyanna-ish illusions and Ecclesiastical despair. “That is the essence of the blues” according to West: “to stare painful truths in the face and persevere without cynicism or pessimism.”

In this article, I develop a descriptive claim and a related normative one. First, I suggest that, when confronting professional and political realities of the gap between our educational past and future, philosophers of education have reason indeed to get the blues – in the sense of melancholy or sadness. This can be understood in terms of the two horns of what I call, following Kenneth Howe, a relevancy dilemma. My second claim is normative and prescriptive: philosophers of education who hope to respond productively to this dilemma should learn from and draw upon the blues as an intellectual and cultural tradition. In particular, we can learn what it means to cultivate the virtue of tragicomic hope, which West argues is exemplified in the work of blues-influenced artists and intellectuals. Understanding this often overlooked aspect of the “Deep Democratic Tradition” in America provides much needed soul-nourishment for those of us committed to advancing democracy and social justice through philosophical work. If we are to sustain this commitment – and it is my view that we should and must sustain it – we ought to seek ways to transform our blues, and the blues of our profession, into the blues – that is, into creative and courageous expressions of love in the face of despair.

The Relevancy Dilemma

The contemporary philosopher of education’s reasons for lamentation include, but are not limited to, a daunting set of occupational as well as vocational challenges. Over the past decade-and-a-half or so, changes to teacher licensure requirements have eliminated the need for stand-alone courses in philosophy of education or social foundations in many schools of education and teacher training programs. As compared with those working in other areas of education research and scholarship, philosophers of education today face a relative dearth of external funding opportunities. With fewer courses to teach and without external grants to secure, a shrinking number of faculty jobs are available, which “raises questions about whether … philosophy of education will remain an attractive career choice for new researchers.” These challenges reflect larger dynamics facing the humanities and, to a somewhat lesser extent, the social sciences.

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Concern among philosophers of education about the marginalization of their discipline surely arises, to some extent, from professional and personal self-interest, narrowly construed. For those who believe good philosophical work is desperately needed to deepen current debates over education policy and practice, however, such marginalizing forces are disturbing for broader, more public, reasons. Many of us hope that our efforts might influence educational and policy outcomes for the better. In a chapter on “Philosophical Inquiry” in the American Education Research Association’s (AERA) Handbook of Complementary Methods in Education Research, Nicholas Burbules and Bryan Warnick define philosophy as a branch of knowledge dealing with “commitments of value and belief that provide answers to the ‘why’ questions underlying any complex area of human practice.” After acknowledging widespread impatience with “critical reflection on educational aims,” Burbules and Warnick defend the importance of philosophy:

[In our view, the people on the front lines of education need more than anything a sense of value and purpose for what they are doing … The crisis confronting education today is not a lack of “how to” directives, but a lack of meaning and satisfaction attracting new teachers into the profession and keeping them for reasons beyond a paycheck. Philosophy has something to say about this.]

Certainly, questions of value and meaning are fundamental to educational policy and practice and, on virtually all conceptions, philosophy concerns itself centrally with such questions. Burbules and Warnick miss the mark, however, when they claim that present discourse concerning education is “valueless,” as if teachers and policymakers do their work without any more meaningful aim than collecting their paycheck. On the contrary, values of social efficiency and social mobility, historically important in schooling but only recently united within the neoliberal logic of Smithian efficiency, have edged out other humanistic and democratic values in education.

Surfacing such values and rationally deliberating about them – rather than reasoning from them and in terms of them – is a key task in much contemporary work in philosophy of education. As Tom Robbins puts it concisely (albeit a bit simplistically) in the first epigraph to this article: unless we get properly philosophical, in the sense of openly debating normative issues and assumptions, political problems in education are likely to be “solved” over and over again, without any progress necessarily being made toward worthy educational aims. Philosophers of education appear to have just the right skills and knowledge to deliver us from this “cruel, repetitious bore.” This hope of bringing skills and knowledge productively to bear, of helping to foreground basic issues of educational values and aims, becomes increasingly difficult to maintain in the face of powerful institutional signals that such work is widely considered dispensable, even irrelevant. As Grover J. Whitehurst puts it: “The people on the front lines of education do not want research minutia, or post-modern musings, or philosophy, or theory, or advocacy, or opinions from educators.”

Some, including Burbules and Warnick, entertain the notion that the problem here lies with the philosopher’s “audience” rather than with the philosopher; that these “people on the front lines” simply do not know what is good for them. Others suggest that the main problem facing philosophy of education lies not in its relationship to the broader field of education studies but in its relationship to philosophy.
practical effort to address this concern can be found in the *Handbook of Philosophy of Education*, in which editor Harvey Siegel adopts increased participation from “general philosophers” – meaning, presumably, scholars rostered in departments of philosophy rather than schools of education or elsewhere – as one of the volume’s key aims.\(^{19}\)

If successful, such a strategy would surely benefit philosophy of education in many respects. Even then, however, it is extremely unlikely that it would improve philosophy’s standing in the eyes of the broader community of education researchers, policymakers, and practitioners. This is due, at least in large part, to the fact that today’s most important educational debates are dominated by a crude positivist outlook that defines “relevance” in terms of technical knowledge – “what works” – to achieve goals associated with growing the national economy and facilitating individual economic mobility. And although “general philosophy” may enjoy greater legitimacy due to a more established and autonomous institutional base, it is marginalized as non- or unscientific alongside other humanities disciplines by “the new scientific orthodoxy,”\(^{20}\) which increasingly dominates education research, policy, and practice. This option thus constitutes, according to Kenneth Howe, the first horn of our contemporary *relevancy dilemma*: philosophers of education may seek to better approximate “general philosophy,” “to then be excluded as irrelevant” by the broader education community.\(^{21}\)

This broader context seems lost on those who embrace this option. Stefaan Cuypers, for example, advocates “the analytic paradigm” as the proper (normative) core of philosophical inquiry in education, as well as its best hope for contributing (admittedly in a modest way) to education. The analytic conception, according to Cuypers, is defined as the “disinterested study of some complex field for its own sake ... namely, the conceptual analysis of concrete problems emerging from the world of education.”\(^{22}\) Cuypers asserts that it was the embrace of the analytic paradigm that “did much to establish the philosophy of education not only as a respectable branch of philosophy but also as a foundational component of educational theory,”\(^{23}\) enabling it to transcend and break free form “the ‘old ‘mushy’ educational studies.’”\(^{24}\) Even if this historical claim were correct (and Cuypers provides no compelling evidence or argumentation), educational policymakers, practitioners, and researchers are hardly clamoring for “good work in conceptual analysis.” This is to be expected, given the dominance of Smithian efficiency and its associated forms of technocratic rationality already mentioned.

In Howe’s view, which I take to be representative of a growing chorus of voices that includes Phillip Kitcher,\(^{25}\) John White,\(^{26}\) myself,\(^{27}\) and many others, falling on the first horn of the relevancy dilemma is a mistake not simply because “turning inward” and approximating general philosophy is unlikely to make philosophy of education more influential in the wider world of education. The more basic problem with this approach is that it aspires to a closer association with practices that do not represent “philosophy as it ought to be.”\(^{28}\) Like many “pragmatists and near pragmatists” in philosophy of education and in philosophy more generally, Howe adopts the position that the practice of philosophy may most defensibly be characterized in terms of
the Deweyan conception. John Dewey conceived of philosophy as a social practice that arises from a specific socio-historical context and that, at its best, is oriented to ameliorating pressing social problems through the application of critical intelligence. Philosophy, as such, is necessarily engaged with politics and public life, as well as research in other disciplines in the natural and social sciences, and the humanities. Recognition of the profoundly contingent, historical nature of the exercise of critical intelligence, and the role that substantive values play in all forms of inquiry, implies that we ought to embrace, in Randall Curren’s phrase, “the empirical, the normative, and the contextual (especially the socio-cultural) within the analytic method.”

Deweyan pragmatism articulates basic connections between philosophical methodology, epistemology, and the larger context of an evolving democratic cultural project. Contrary to the claim made by Cuypers that “the philosophy of education tends, on this conception, to reduce to ideology and even dogmatism,” even “overturning the theoretical,” Deweyan pragmatism resists reification of conceptual distinctions and dogma through an insistence that the projects of philosophy and democracy are related, interpenetrating, and continuous with one another. In this perspective - to the extent that philosophy of education has embraced, historically, an “outward looking” orientation of engagement with the worlds of education policy, practice, and research - productive engagement with “general philosophy” might more justifiably seek to educate than to emulate.

Cuypers’ critical characterization of philosophy of education in a Deweyan-pragmatic frame as a “radically practical” – read: ideological/dogmatic and activist – conception is important, as it is emblematic of assumptions that, although intellectually discredited, exert powerful influence on and in education. The “new scientific orthodoxy” is indeed dominant in education policy and research, driven by a resurgent (but often implicit) positivist epistemology that separates facts from values and analytic from synthetic claims. Similar to the way that “colorblind” racist discourse identifies those who pose critical questions concerning racial inequality as the source of racism (reasoning that if everyone would just stop talking about race, then there would be no racism), those who seek to expose and critique dominant values driving research and policy are cast as inappropriately introducing values into education. Whereas philosophers of education who embrace a narrower, more specialized, conception of philosophy are dismissed as irrelevant, those who “concern themselves with critically engaging the contemporary world of education policy and practice, well informed of its features and the vocabularies used to characterize it – [are] then … excluded as activist ‘zealots’.”

At their core, Dewey’s democratic and educational visions express an optimistic belief in the power of critical intelligence to help ameliorate pressing social problems, primarily through dialogue and deliberation. The dominance of Smithian efficiency in contemporary education policy, paired with the rise of the new scientific orthodoxy in education research based on intellectually discredited by still virile positivist dogmas, relegates critical intelligence to the sidelines in all but its most crudely instrumental forms. Normative claims and value commitments essential to genuine critical inquiry are excluded as biases. Those who seek to expose, let alone contest,
the aims presumed in prevailing neoliberal policy regimes are branded “unscientific” advocates of partisan ideological agendas. White speculates that, if unchecked, these dynamics may very well “spell the end for hopes pinned on a Deweyan education,” and Howe concludes that, “However discomfiting it is to philosophers of education these days to be so stymied … it may well be an inevitable fact of their vocation.” So it seems that even, and perhaps especially, Deweyan-pragmatist philosophers of education have reason to get the blues.

AMERICA’S “DEEP DEMOCRATIC TRADITION”

How should philosophers of education – and critically oriented education scholars in other disciplines that are more or less in the same boat – respond to our contemporary relevancy dilemma? How might we go about making the most of our situation? In responding to these questions I am not so much interested in strategic or tactical considerations, vital as these are. Instead, I offer an exploratory presentation of one viable source of motivation and meaning that might sustain our commitment to democratic struggle in the face of what are, at least in the short term, insurmountable obstacles. The question is: When optimism is no longer warranted, is there still a basis for hope?

Situating the implications of the Deweyan conception of philosophy of education as part of a broader effort to develop democratic culture opens up a number of sources for insight, inspiration, and self-criticism. Philosophy of education has long been associated with the broader democratic political and cultural tradition, especially in the U.S., due in no small part to Dewey’s ongoing influence. One hundred years after its publication, his book *Democracy and Education* continues to be the most cited work in educational studies. Dewey emphasized that democracy should be understood as more than a set of political institutions or decision-making procedures; indeed, such institutions and procedures depend upon the cultivation of a culture of democratic individuality and community. This puts him at odds with the formal minimalism of definitions that have become standard in political science and some corners of political philosophy, in which “democracy” is identified with a particular set of formal institutions and decision-making procedures, including frequent, free, and fair elections and constitutionally guaranteed rights for individual citizens. Such minimalism marks liberal democracy, and has proven quite compatible with the neoliberal transformation of formerly public sectors on the model of the market— in short, with the imperatives of Smithian efficiency that threaten Deweyan democracy and education.

West embraces Dewey’s view of democracy as a more general concept, fundamentally dependent upon culture, and suggests that committed democrats struggling against neoliberalism (with its “free market fundamentalism”) must draw upon democratic traditions “deeper” than liberalism. He identifies three of these: Socratic questioning; prophetic witness; and tragicomic hope. All three are valuable for understanding the task of a Deweyan-pragmatic philosophy of education in our present context. This is perhaps most obvious in the case of the Greek commitment to courageous Socratic questioning, which instigates and advances dialogue and deliberation in the service of transcending merely personal opinion and prejudice.
As the identification of this tradition with Socrates already makes plain, this is very close to the heart of most philosopher’s self-understanding. The Hebrew prophetic tradition has also exerted powerful influence on Western culture, primarily through the vehicle of the major Judeo-Christian religious traditions. Prophetic witness speaks forcefully to issues of social justice and holds powerful elites to account. The notion that democratic inquiry must attend to the needs of the most vulnerable and empower the marginalized is rooted in this tradition, and many philosophers of education understand their vocation to include prophetic witness through, within, or alongside their commitment to Socratic questioning.

The third source of “deep democratic energies” is probably less familiar. Tragicomic hope, in West’s characterization, “is a profound attitude toward life reflected in the work of artistic geniuses as diverse as Lucian in the Roman Empire, Cervantes in the Spanish empire, and Chekhov in the Russian empire.”35 In each case, artists and intellectuals draw upon the tragicomic in order to express “righteous indignation with a smile and deep inner pain without bitterness or revenge.”36 In the U.S., tragicomic hope “has been most powerfully expressed in the black invention of the blues in the face of white supremacist powers.”37 The blues emerges out of a three centuries-long experience of enslavement and marginalization, and explicitly engages this history of profound suffering and apparent powerlessness. Making this connection to the blues is in no way to frame tragicomic hope in America as an exclusively black phenomenon; it is not a racially- or ethnically-specific way of being. West writes that: “This powerful blues sensibility” is “a black interpretation of tragicomic hope open to people of all colors ... One finds it in the works of Mark Twain, Tennessee Williams, Eudora Welty, and Thomas Pynchon as well as Bessie Smith, Ma Rainey, Robert Johnson, and Leroy Carr.”38

West’s lyrical characterizations of tragicomic hope are peppered with the names of literary and musical artists, as well as occasional activists, organizers, and ordinary citizens. This is partly because the blues represents not only a musical style, but also, and more fundamentally, “a hard-fought way of living.”39 As with dispositional or affective learning in general, methods of conceptual analysis and formal argumentation are likely to be of little use in conveying or cultivating a blues sensibility. West therefore provides a kind of reader’s guide to democratic intellectuals who embody tragicomic hope in their work, and attempts to convey the power of the blues sensibility in their words. For example, he writes that:

The high point of the black response to American terrorism ... is found in the compassionate and courageous voice of Emmett Till’s mother, who stepped up to the lectern at Pilgrim Baptist Church in Chicago in 1955 at the funeral of her fourteen-year-old son, after his murder by American terrorists, and said: “I don’t have a moment to hate. I’ll pursue justice for the rest of my life.” And this is precisely what Mamie Till Mobley did until her death in 2003.40

The blues is not simply about the pursuit of justice; the prophetic tradition does that powerfully, but often in a mode of self-righteous anger and condemnation. What distinguishes the blues sensibility is that prophetic witness and courageous truth-telling are grounded in a refusal of bitterness, resentment, and hate; it is grounded, as the literary blues-master Toni Morrison puts her view of the matter in the second epigraph at the opening of this paper, in love. The tragicomic attitude overcomes
the association of love and naïveté and truth-telling with anger. As West interprets the actions and words of Mamie Till Mobley:

Her commitment to justice had nothing whatever to do with naïveté. When Mississippi officials tried to keep any images of Emmett’s brutalized body out of the press – his head had swollen to five times its normal size – Mamie Till Mobley held an open-casket service for all the world to see. That is the essence of the blues: to stare painful truths in the face and persevere without cynicism or pessimism.\(^{31}\)

The American democratic project is in crisis (and perhaps always has been). Naming this crisis, diagnosing its causes, requires courage. Democratic intellectuals desperately need the “spiritual” resources that West and the artists and activists he lionizes provide through their creative work and the example of their lives. Such resources provide a deep motivational basis for continued insistence on Socratic questioning and prophetic witness. Cultivating the democratic virtue of tragicomic hope, in our selves, in our scholarly production, and in our disciplinary institutions and culture, represents the best chance that we will be able to transform our blues-inducing circumstances into soulful, creative, and - ultimately, in the long-term - effective action.

**WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? EMBRACING IRRELEVANCY VS. TRAGICOMIC HOPE**

What are the prospects for connecting work in the philosophy of education with a soul-nourishing dose of tragicomic hope? Some may balk at West’s rhetoric concerning the role of the blues in our “Deep Democratic Tradition” as “mushy” or imprecise, unworthy of consideration by serious philosophers. In order to appreciate the possibilities of the tragicomic, we need to bracket this reaction, and at least entertain a recommendation from Eduardo Duarte: “more poetry, less prose,”\(^{42}\) if not in our style of writing and discussion then in our own personal lives, in the non-academic practices that provide the often hidden ground for our professional work. We can, as human beings if not as philosophers, become appreciators and admirers of the blues and the irrepressible spirit to which it gives voice.

Here, however, lies another danger. West writes: “There are a number of white lovers of the blues who have a tragicomic sensibility, but for too many in white America the blues remains an exotic source of amusement, a kind of primitivistic occasion for entertainment only.”\(^{43}\) This exploitative relationship to the blues is perhaps especially tempting to those comfortably positioned in the contemporary neoliberal global order. Appreciation and cultivation of tragicomic hope may be more difficult for those who enjoy relatively greater social, political, and economic power. Ironically, such privileged individuals may also more readily experience despair in the face of persistent injustice, inequality, and violence. Such despair can itself be understood as a luxury, a mode of comportment more available to those whose privileged position insulates them from the direct consequences of injustice.

I do not wish to minimize the angst that accompanies experiences of helplessness for even the most privileged in the face of injustice. We should, however, exercise a self-critical attitude and recognize the fact that self-interested contentment with the status quo often lurks beneath the surface of despair. Given the relatively privileged social and economic position that many of us in philosophy of education
occupy, we must acknowledge that the temptation to despair is with us as a feature of our distinctive social position. Arendt suggested that the clash between past and future can, at least in a certain sense, be transcended through an emergent “third force,” a “diagonal which would lead ... out of the fighting-line.”

Philosophers will likely be tempted to read in her description a positive recommendation, for she characterizes this “diagonal” with reference to the activity of thought itself. I have argued that thinking is only part of the solution, that for philosophy of education to represent a viable form of and contribution to life, we must undertake the hard affective, “spiritual” work incumbent upon all committed democratic citizens: we must courageously confront our own past, our complicity, and our temptation to despair. We have first got to get the blues if we are going to get the blues. When we do, we may find our love – of education, of our vocation – renewed. And we may find that it is also transformed, more resilient, more mature, and closely related to the blues.

3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., 14.
5. Viktor E. Frankl, Man’s Search for Meaning (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 2006).
7. Merriam-Webster, “Blues.”
15. Ibid.
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24. Ibid.


32. Howe, “Philosophy of Education and Other Education Sciences,” 11.


36. Ibid.

37. Ibid.


39. Ibid.


41. Ibid. (emphasis added).


44. Arendt, 13.