The Philosophical and Educational Big Bang: 
An Aristophanic-Deweyan Archaeology 

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**INTRODUCTION**

In the present article, by drawing upon the Kafka parable *Er*, I am interested in elaborating especially on the notion of “origin” and in investigating the question of the *emergence* - as opposed to the *origin* - of philosophy and education.

The article will follow a possibly circuitous path: first, I will propose a cursory interpretation of the Kafka parable as a way of framing current reflections on the “use” and “role” of philosophy of education, in order to situate the question of this emergence within these debates; second, I will attempt to explore it through a reading of some texts by Dewey (in relation to a constellation of themes and issues revolving around a dialogue between the ideas of Plato and Aristophanes); and finally, I will retie the threads of the reflection by discussing what Gert Biesta has referred to as Dewey’s “imperialistic” claims in relation to philosophy and education.

**ORIGIN vs. EMERGENCE OF PHILOSOPHY AND EDUCATION**

As a review of the articles, special issues, and books published over the last decade reveals, the contemporary significance of philosophy of education is presented, on the one hand, as threatened by the dominance of the discourses of empirical educational research and, on the other, as positively challenged to revisit some aspects of its heritage by accepting this confrontation and seeking to reposition itself both within the encyclopaedia of the educational “sciences” and in reference to educational practices.

My starting point is the suggestion that philosophy of education occupies the same position as Kafka’s character, Er, who “has two antagonists. The first presses him from behind, from the origin [vom Ursprung her]. The other blocks the road ahead. He gives battle to both.” Focusing on only one possible path of interpretation, I will suggest that we consider the tradition of general philosophy as the first antagonist. It is still a matter of debate as to what the relationships between general philosophy and philosophy of education are, and I think that it is profitable to inhabit this ambiguity. In his introduction to *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Education*, Harvey Siegel speaks of a (partial) dependence of questions of philosophy of education upon “investigations of the more familiar core areas of philosophy.” As has been finely remarked by Stanton Wortham, the metaphor of “dependence” and the idea of general philosophy as “core” “appear to set up a hierarchical relation between general philosophy and philosophy of education.” As Wortham argues, there is a difference in the tone of the articles of the *Handbook*: while some take explicitly the stand of the “dependence” view, many come to reverse the hierarchy and suggest that philosophy of education can contribute to answering questions of general philosophy by engaging with deep issues typical of education.
While moving towards a specific interest in matters of education, philosophy of education encounters the resistance of the second antagonist, empirical research, which “blocks the road ahead” because it contests that the kind of inquiry promoted by philosophy can be of any use in engaging - in a scientifically competent way - with educational issues. This act of blocking means also driving it back and “handing it over” to the other antagonist but in a specific form, that of “incompetence.”

Denouncing the uselessness of philosophy in matters of education means making philosophy of education experience that Abnahme der Kompetenz [reduction of its competence], which Odo Marquard\(^9\) diagnosed for general philosophy. I would even venture the idea that the field of education has been the latest and possibly last step in this process of Kompetenzverlust [loss of competence]. And this character of “latestness” and “lastness” is not by chance but it is rooted in the very emergence of philosophy and education, as I will suggest below.

However, Kafka adds one more element: “To be sure, the first [antagonist] supports him in his fight with the second, … and in the same way the second supports him in his fight with the first.”\(^{10}\) This dynamics of the “antagonistic support,” which is specific of the condition of philosophy of education, could be construed through an idiosyncratic revisitation of the Marquardian\(^{11}\) notion of Inkompetenzkompen-sationskompetenz [competence in compensating for incompetence]. In its battling position, philosophy of education compensates for its incompetence (denounced by empirical research) by invoking its competence in using the tools that philosophical tradition provides and that help elucidate dimensions of educational research, which would otherwise remain hidden and unexplored.

On the other hand, by exploiting the thrust from the second antagonist, philosophy of education aims not to lapse into the loss of competence, to which general philosophy has fallen victim. In this perspective, facing the challenge of educational research can result in a different approach to philosophy, namely in “pursuing philosophy through empirical research.”\(^{12}\)

The move from which philosophy of education should recoil is to yield to its “dream … that … [it] will jump out of the fighting line and be promoted, on account of [its] experience in fighting [Kampfeserfahrung], to the position of umpire.”\(^{13}\) Hannah Arendt relates this attempt to jump outside to the movement towards a metaphysical realm. I would like to complement this reading by arguing that this movement has much to do with the question of the origin. Indeed, the mention of the origin is meaningful within the Kafka parable. While, in Kafka’s text, the action of the second antagonist is spelled out in spatial terms (nach vorn),\(^{14}\) the action of the first antagonist has an additional temporal indication: “from the origin” (von hinten, vom Ursprung her).

What does the reference to the Ursprung entail? Does the jump out of the fighting line enable us to take leave of the question of the origin or, rather, is this kind of jump precisely an instantiation of the movement vom Ursprung her, insofar as it is a jump outside the fighting line and not a jump into the gap of the present? I would intimate that the jump into the present is connected with an endeavour to escape the
discourse of the origin. In Nietzsche, as Michel Foucault remarked, the notion of *Ursprung* is connected to a metaphysical stance, which believes that it is possible to grasp “a timeless and essential secret”\textsuperscript{15} of things. In opposition to this search for the very essence of the phenomena, the emphasis on the provenance (*Herkunft*) not only allows us to think of the historicity of our enterprise but, as the *Herkunft* is precisely what is concealed by tradition, also encourages us to undertake the search for what Heidegger calls the sources.\textsuperscript{16} We should not think of the sources in a metaphysical way, but rather within the horizon of the notion of *Entstehung*, the “emergence, the moment of arising. … Emergence is always produced through a particular stage of forces. The analysis of *Entstehung* must delineate the interaction, the struggle these forces wage against each other or against adverse circumstances … .”\textsuperscript{17} I will state here in a fairly dogmatic way a point I am going to discuss later: in this inquiry into the emergence of philosophy of education, we are seeking that disclosure in which education, philosophy, and second-order thinking (science) emerged as distinct but inter-related “forces” that have organized the field of what will become later the Western tradition.\textsuperscript{18}

Investigating this emergence is something intimately linked with the present. Indeed, to adapt a wonderful analogy of Agamben, the *archē* is “a force operating in history,” something like the Big Bang, “which is supposed to have given rise to the universe but which continues to send toward us its fossil radiation. … [and] which is supposed to have taken place but which cannot be hypostatized in a chronological event —, the *archē* alone is able to guarantee the intelligibility of the historical phenomena…”\textsuperscript{19}

The analogy is particularly forceful and could help us to think of an original explosion that leads to the emergence of separate elements: on the one hand, it would be illegitimate to read them into the condition before the Big Bang, as they emerge through it, and, on the other, the analogy refers to a common emergence, which “explains” their conflicting co-belonging.\textsuperscript{20} As I will hint at in the final section, the *Kampfeserfahrung* of philosophy of education is a derivative phenomenon of a more primordial one, namely what I would like to call the “polemic commonality” of philosophy and education.

Despite Agamben’s appropriate warning not to misunderstand the *archē* as a chronological event, we could attempt to narrate the “events” immediately after the philosophical and educational Big Bang, in order to investigate this “polemic commonality,” much as scientists endeavour to chronicle the first seconds after the Big Bang.

**BEyond thE Nomos Basileus: Plato’s Paideia and thE EducatIon of Pheidippides**

On many occasions, Gert Biesta has insisted on the need to ask educational - and not merely philosophical (or historical, sociological, psychological for that matter) - questions about education.\textsuperscript{21} What is the domain of an educational questioning not always already inflected by philosophical and scientific discourses? It is interesting that, in raising the question, “Who asks the educational questions?,” Biesta immediately specifies that we should not “believe John Dewey who simply (and
imperialistically) claimed that educational questions are by definition philosophical questions and *vice versa.***22

I find the charge of (philosophical) imperialism against Dewey a little far-fetched, but I think that Biesta, as I idiosyncratically understand him, drives a good point home, namely that the Deweyan theoretical device would benefit from thinking in more depth about the difference between educational and philosophical questions.

In the entry “Philosophy of Education” for the *Cyclopedia of Education*, Dewey insists on the vital and intimate relation between philosophy and education also from a genuinely historical point of view: “So far as European history is concerned, philosophy originated at Athens from the direct pressure of educational questions.”23 This claim could be interpreted in the light of Yehuda Elkana’s ideas on the emergence of second-order thinking in ancient Greece due to the debate in the ethical-political sphere.24 I would intimate also that Dewey is particularly insightful in construing this in educational terms. Dewey points out that:

matters which had always been left to practice, and to practice controlled by the habitudes and ideals of the local community, could be set free from their customary provincial setting and be taught on theoretical grounds, on grounds of intellect. … These questions might be multiplied almost indefinitely, but it is more profitable to note that they tended to group themselves into three main problems: (i) What is the relation of knowledge, of reason, to practice, custom, and the opinions that go with custom? (ii) What is the relation of human life, especially of social organization and its virtues and responsibilities, to the nature of the universe, of reality itself? (iii) What is the relation of change, and of the particular things that change, to the universal and permanent?25

I would suggest that the third question - that about change - should be read in reference not to scientific matters but, more fundamentally, to education. To anticipate a conclusion: education emerges as a question (and, *then*, also as a philosophical question), when it is no longer the mere re-production of a community ruled by custom (and, accordingly, the perpetuation of the latter), but is the domain where the challenge obtains as to how to come to terms with the radical discontinuity represented by the irruption of new generations and to manage their novelty and their potential of change of custom by re-establishing forms of continuity, which should not amount, however, to a sheer replication.

In this sense, education has radically to do with the question of the coming of the new into the world, while the Platonic philosophical *paideia*, understood, along Heideggerian lines, as the *stranglehold of reason over education*,26 is already a “derivative” response that re-absorbs education - as a question and a challenge - into philosophy.

If Biesta is right in his charge against Dewey’s conflation of philosophy and education, we could infer - this is my inference not Biesta’s - that Dewey would perpetuate, despite all significant modifications, the fundamental Platonic move. Although I do not think this is the case, I deem it profitable to take seriously the charge because we could gain a more articulate view on education and its vital relation to philosophy.
To attain this goal, I want to hint at how the first aforementioned question ("What is the relation of knowledge, of reason, to practice, custom, and the opinions that go with custom?") is treated by Dewey in his essay, “The Problem of Truth.” The essay falls within the scope of Dewey’s attack on the epistemological industry, that is, the way in which modernity has developed the question of knowledge. The very structure of the text is a sort of creative misreading of the Myth of the Cave, insofar as the starting point - the opinions that go with custom (first section) - corresponds to Plato’s level of eikasia [= our dealing with appearances, illusion, ] and pístis [= belief]. The overturning to dianoia [= discursive thinking] and epistēme [= science as theoretical understanding] is transformed into an experimental concept of truth (away from the epistemological tradition of modernity, which perpetuates the Platonic transformation of alētheia [= truth as unconcealment] into orthotēs [= truth as the correctness and adequacy of the gaze]). The return to the Cave becomes the idea, in which Dewey’s essay culminates, that objective truths are nothing but "interpretations of things that make these things effectively function in the liberation of human purpose and efficiency of human effort." Remembering that Plato himself presents the Myth of the Cave as a pedagogical parable, we can aver that the path depicted in “The Problem of Truth” can be illuminated through an educational reading.

I will confine myself to picking up just one thread. As is often the case in Dewey’s essays illustrating his experimental logic, “The Problem of Truth” takes its cue from what the “plain man” naively thinks about truth, in order to dispel the illusion that the primary sense of truth is a logical or an epistemological one. Remarkably, this move results in the fascinating idea of quaternary qualities of things, “meaning the qualities that custom prescribes as properly belonging to objects in virtue of their being factors in a social life that is naught but the maintenance of custom. Now these qualities interfuse the others.” The plain man’s attitude to truth is entirely construed in terms of the social custom and of the understanding as “an agreement,” a “social necessity,” and as structurally related to the idea of the nomos basileus as the Greeks formulated it.

But the analogy between the situation of the plain man and the experience of the Greeks runs even deeper. The problem of truth faced by the plain man when custom is discussed (which means, etymologically, “shaken”), rehearses that which is experienced at the very beginning of Greek philosophy and summarized in the aforementioned question: what is the relation of knowledge, of reason, to practice, custom, and the opinions that go with custom?

I stated earlier in this article that in Dewey’s view this question, together with the other two, grouped together a series of issues that he considered to be, ultimately, educational. It is time to explore what this means by examining what may be the best document of the “first three seconds” after the philosophical and educational Big Bang: Aristophanes’s comedy The Clouds. Without analyzing this masterpiece in detail, I will just highlight that it depicts the crisis of the nomos in terms of an educational conflict, and as the disruption of the ethos presiding over the intergenerational dialogue. In Aristophanes’s understanding, the new kind of philosophical
inquiry - embodied by Socrates - is not the cause of the crisis but its accelerator. In other words, the sanctity of custom is already disrupted: indeed, the son Pheidippides displays behaviours that go counter to the prescription of a simple life. At the beginning, the father even believes that philosophical inquiry could help him to avoid the calamitous consequences of his son’s dissolute life. But the radicalism of philosophical inquiry, as is staged in the dialogue between the two \textit{logoi}, results in a final dissolution of the traditional \textit{nomos}, and backfires on the father, who is beaten by his son.

For reasons I cannot illustrate here, the Platonic \textit{paideia} in \textit{The Republic} can be read as a response to Aristophanes and, moreover, a sympathetic one.\textsuperscript{33} Plato accepts many of the misgivings that Aristophanes puts forward: first, the first part of the Platonic \textit{paideia} with its emphasis on gymnastics and music, accepts part of the traditional education advocated by the stronger \textit{logos} in \textit{The Clouds}; second, he shares the fear that the Socratic elenchus, if it does not culminate in a more substantial \textit{epistēme}, risks provoking the dethronement of Zeus in favour of the Vortex (that is, the renunciation of any supreme warranty for the new ethos) and the raging of the chaos (which, in Plato’s view, should be replaced, instead, with the ideal cosmos). What William Sullivan calls Plato’s \textit{higher mimesis} (=contemplation as a kind of con-formation to the idea of Good)\textsuperscript{34} is nothing but an attempt to elaborate a kind of philosophical inquiry that can really replace the ethos as a checking power against the dissolution of custom.

Aristophanes’s genius consists in having detected where the crisis of the \textit{nomos} primarily occurred: in education. Better still: what we call education is the outcome of that Big Bang from which education and philosophy emerged as twins. What we call education should be understood in the light of the permanent risk of discontinuity that inhabits any intergenerational change. Once the \textit{nomos} is no longer \textit{basileus}, education is constitutively related to “an invasion of the future, of the unknown,”\textsuperscript{35} in the two meanings of the genitive: first, the future - embodied by the new generations - invades a community as a permanent threat of disruption, in the form of the “impulse.” The “educational” response should not, however, consist in choking the impulse but in making it the pivot of a re-adjustment of social habits: “Impulse is a source, an indispensable source, of liberation; but only as it is employed in giving habits pertinence and freshness does it liberate power.”\textsuperscript{36} Second, in education the future is invaded, in that education is constitutively pro-jection, and not merely the replication of the past.

What, then, is its relationship with philosophy? Is the kind of philosophy that flirts with Vortex and Chaos not more suitable for education understood as the human undertaking related to the invasion of the unknown and unpredictable? Is any other philosophy, as a factor of stabilization aiming at organizing and controlling education, not just a perpetuation of Plato’s gesture (sympathetic with the Aristophanic anxieties)? And is Dewey, insofar as he considers philosophy to be “the theory of which education is the corresponding art,” not trapped in Plato’s spell? Is this the (Platonic) matrix of his alleged imperialism?
CONCLUDING REMARKS

Asking educational questions means asking questions about how to preserve and valorize the potential of the new; how to allow the new to come into presence in its novelty, to use Biesta’s vocabulary. In this sense, subjectification - to continue to stick idiosyncratically to Biesta - would be the most quintessentially educational dimension in that pluridimensional undertaking that is education.

On the other hand, the invasion of the unknown would risk being immediately dissipated - this is one possible meaning of the fact that Pheidippides is a squanderer - if it is not supported by a kind of philosophy, which is neither the hymn to Vortex and Chaos (and, therefore, a factor of sheer criticism) nor a new ethos imposed from above (as in Plato’s “higher mimesis”). It is to remember that the office of philosophy in Dewey is “to effect a junction at some point of the new and the old, of deep-sunk customs and unconscious dispositions, that are brought to the light of attention by some conflict with newly emerging directions of activity.” Moreover, philosophy is not “in any sense whatever a form of knowledge [but rather] a form of desire, of effort at action - a love, namely, of wisdom … it is an intellectualized wish, an aspiration subjected to rational discriminations and tests, a social hope reduced to a working program of action, a prophecy of the future, but one disciplined by serious thought and knowledge.” Philosophy is what can help the potential of novelty, intrinsic in the irruption of new generations, not to dissolve into emptiness, by reconstructing the experience of both the new and old generations. It is in this sense that there is an intimate bond between philosophy and education. In this perspective, philosophy of education is far removed from what Jan Masschelein calls the critical tradition.

Although, as mentioned earlier, I find Biesta’s charge of imperialism towards Dewey a little exaggerated - if we work with what Dewey understood by philosophy - I think that Biesta helps us to avoid conflating philosophy and education (a risk that some Deweyan formulations also run). Dissolving education into philosophy risks perpetuating the Platonic move, dictated by the aim of realizing paideia as a stable and stabilizing regime of relationships between the youth and the adults. On the other hand, recognizing the “polemic commonality” of education and philosophy means remaining “bound to and … rooted in the present,” as in it the force of the archē continues to operate. Education and philosophy cannot but move “closer and closer apart,” if we want to be faithful to their emergence and not to dissolve it in to a narrative of the origin. And in this work, philosophy of education continues to reconstruct its Kampfeserfahrung, to the extent that the current fighting lines are the contemporary occurrences of an “archaic” provenance.


14. This does not exclude that the phrase “nach vorn” can have also temporal connotations. The point that I would like to make is, however, that in the case of the first antagonist there is an additional indication, which, according to the reading here proposed, should be construed in temporal terms.


18. I am equating second-order thinking and science. As Yehuda Elkan (see below fn. 24) has shown, second-order thinking arose principally from the interest in the ethical-political sphere and only with modernity did it extend to science. It would be important to follow this argumentative trajectory also in reference to the parable of philosophy of education I have been illustrating, but - due to restraints of space - I will confine myself to considering only the relationship between education and philosophy.


20. By the phrase “conflicting co-belonging” I would like to capture a theme from Heraclitus (see fragment B 80), namely that of the pólemos [war] as what is common [xunón] to all. For an exploration of the significance of this theme and its echoes in Dewey’s work see Stefano Oliverio, “The Most Beautiful Harmony and Education as a Moral Equivalent of War: A Deweyan-Heraclitean Perspective,” *Civitas educationis. Education, Politics and Culture* 1, no. 1 (2012): 113-132.

21. In this article I will give a peculiar and possibly idiosyncratic spin to this issue, which in Gert Biesta’s work is linked with the question of the construction of the field of educational studies: see for instance Gert J.J. Biesta, “Disciplines and theory in the academic studies of education: a comparative analysis of the Anglo-Saxon and Continental construction of the field,” *Pedagogy, Culture & Society* 12, no. 2 (2011): 175-192.


30. Ibid., 12.

31. Ibid., 21.

32. Ibid., 16.


36. Ibid., 75.


39. Ibid., 7.


42. Arendt, *Between Past and Future*, 12.


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