Dialectics of Education:
Adorno on the Possibility of Bildung in Consumer Society
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INTRODUCTION

Can the concept of Bildung still provide guidance to educational discourse in the “postmodern” world?¹ This question has been asked and answered repeatedly over the last decade in the journals of philosophy of education. Worries about the commodification of knowledge in the knowledge society, the further encroachment of “neoliberal logic” into education, the ubiquity of the mass media, and the apparent “death” of the modernist subject have led most theorists to adopt a highly skeptical, if not wholly dismissive, posture toward the all-too sanguine promises of Bildung. Jan Masschelein and Norbert Ricken’s doubts about “whether the idea of Bildung as it is invoked and used in our present situation is really able to provoke the development of an alternative to our actual dominant form of life and dominant form of subjection” are typical.² If one does indulge in hope for the concept, its formulation is seldom very assuring. For Michael Wimmer, the “ruins” of Bildung in contemporary society are at least an indication that educational discourse can resist utter economic appropriation, and for Ilan Gur-Ze’ev, a “pessimistic utopianism” seems the only fruitful critical orientation left to adopt.³ Theodor Adorno is often referred to as one of the first theorists to express serious reservations about the aptness of the Bildung ideal.

Outside the Bildung literature, Theodor Adorno is best known among critical theorists of education as a trenchant polemicist of consumer capitalism, an enthusiastic proponent of the avant-garde, and a stubborn skeptic of Enlightenment rationalism. His radical portrayals of late-capitalist society, in which a self-destructive, Enlightenment-spawned consumer ideology pervades its media, political institutions, and even jazz music, have convinced critical educational theorists of the dire need to develop a critical consciousness in students.⁴ According to these critical pedagogues, students must become critical of the social forces that propagate this ideology, as well as the philosophical traditions from which it has emerged. Radical critique, a penchant for avant-garde art, and the courage to mount a Great Refusal, are students’ only hope in the face of the Culture Industry.

Recent work on Adorno’s educational writings – in particular his essay “Theory of Halbbildung” – further supports these standard readings of his educational theory. Adorno’s theory of Halbbildung has been understood as (1) expressing an utter denial of the possibility of Bildung in advanced capitalist society, (2) offering a merely negative and aporetic conception of Bildung, or (3) proposing a positive pedagogy of social critique. Lars Løvlie and Paul Standish read Adorno’s educational theory in the first way, arguing that Adorno “abandoned the hope that education for humanity … could retain its normative power in our time.”⁵ Christiane Thompson defends the second reading, looking to Adorno’s aesthetic and metaphysical theory expounded in Aesthetic Theory and Negative Dialectics respectively. Thompson seizes upon
Adorno’s paradoxical characterization of Bildung as a “timely anachronism,” and employs it as a basis for a “negative and aporetic” reformulation of the category. Krassimir Stojanov’s interpretation challenges these two readings. Contrary to previous interpreters, Stojanov argues that Adorno’s reflections on education “articulate positive, concrete, and conceptually-founded visions of what a right pedagogical action might be, and how educational institutions should be reformed; visions that are capable of constructing profound and vital alternatives to the economistic and functionalistic educational ideologies of today.” In particular, Stojanov argues that Adorno promotes a critical pedagogy that encourages educators and students to engage in “ironic self-critique on the commercialization and the commodification of … mass culture.”

Stojanov’s contribution marks an important turn in the literature on Adorno, for it highlights the positive program embedded in Adorno’s critical conception of Bildung. Yet Adorno’s project is much more radical than this. What Stojanov and previous interpreters seem to have overlooked is Adorno’s attempt in “Theory of Halbbildung” to formulate a truly dialectical, rather than merely critical or aporetic, conception of Bildung. Indeed, in the essay, Adorno defines Bildung as a dialectical “force field” sustaining two competing moments: the Enlightenment ideal of intellectual autonomy, and the cultural necessity of assimilation. Attempting to capture this complex conceptual tension, Adorno often characterizes Bildung in negative and paradoxical terms: “Bildung is of antinomical nature. On the one hand, Bildung has as its condition autonomy and freedom, yet it refers simultaneously to structures of the given … on which alone the individual can educate [bilden] himself. Thus, in the moment in which there is Bildung, there is no Bildung anymore. In its origination lies its destruction teleologically determined.” Understandably, such perplexing formulations have greatly complicated expositions of Adorno’s educational theory.

In order to explicate Adorno’s educational dialectics, I will perform a close reading of the essay “Theory of Halbbildung,” with special focus on the dialectical tension between autonomy and assimilation – a task previous authors have not taken up. In the process, I will demonstrate that, for Adorno, the emergence of Halbbildung in late capitalist societies is the result of their failure to balance the dialectical moments inherent to Bildung. This dialectic can be restored partly through critical reflection on its current degraded form as Halbbildung, as other interpreters have pointed out. Yet Adorno’s educational theory goes beyond the mere moment of social critique and also contains an assimilative moment. Pace the standard reading, I argue that, for Adorno, students’ Bildung remains necessarily incomplete if they are not acculturated into an edifying tradition of classic art. Only “high” cultural works can serve as the assimilative vehicles of Bildung, for their own dialectical tensions admit of the type of aesthetic experience that Adorno believes can transcend the current social imaginary. Although Adorno does not provide all of the details that a dialectical educational theory would require, he provides enough of a vision, I believe, to contribute uniquely to the contemporary debate on Bildung.

In order to understand Adorno’s dialectical conception of Bildung, it is necessary to explain the more abstract dialectics of culture on which it is premised. For Adorno, culture must sustain two opposing moments: spirit [Geist] and nature. Without delving into the obscure metaphysical characteristics Adorno implicitly ascribes to spirit in “Theory of Halbbildung,” the concept can be understood for the present purposes as the totality of human intellectual striving, which can be instantiated in cultural artifacts such as classic works of art and literature. For example, a work such as Goethe’s Faust can be read as an expression of the perennial struggle to find solace in certainty, a struggle that has agonized thinkers throughout the ages. This struggle is intertwined with our human nature, for it is infused with primal fears (i.e. of the unknown) and basic desires (i.e. for power) in sublimated form. Such cultural works, while instantiating the essentially human spirit, therefore simultaneously express the natural. For this reason, Adorno describes culture as having a “double-character.”

The inchoate spontaneity and autonomy of nature are harnessed into an aesthetic form in cultural works, thereby granting the irreducible otherness of nature a human meaning. These cultural works perform an essential task for human beings. In portraying model examples of the sublimation of the natural, they remind individuals of their social responsibility and guide them in their harmonious assimilation into the community. On the other hand, the natural dimension of the works can alleviate, if only for a moment, the pressures of social responsibility and restore our lost communion with nature.

Adorno seems to believe that the dialectical connection between nature and spirit, autonomy and assimilation, has been sundered in the culture of late capitalist society. According to Adorno, culture has become mere intellectual culture (Geisteskultur), a mode of culture that remains aloof from the natural, material conditions of social life, and thus fails to mediate between nature and spirit. In other words, the products of culture no longer maintain the dialectical tension between the social and the natural. Without the mediating force of nature in culture, social institutions become rigidly rationalized, technologized, and assimilative. Nature is violently exploited by these institutions, and the natural at the core of each individual is carefully suppressed. An efficient, mechanical order becomes the sought-after ideal of human association, which progressively approaches a fully administered society.

The commodification of cultural artifacts, and the placation of the working classes by means of such artifacts, are the two central culprits in this degradation of culture that Adorno identifies. Rather than providing a window to the striving spirit of humanity and thereby to alternative social imaginaries, these commodified cultural and educational goods (for which he coins the term, Bildungsgüter) serve as a mere mirror for the existing forms of life. The images (Bilder) these goods reflect begin to replace the classic images that had hitherto harbored the power to instill in their students the inspiration to transform society. Under such conditions, Bildung must become Halbbildung, the “quintessence of a consciousness divested of self-determination.” This is the state in which Adorno finds us.
Dialectics of Halbbildung: Educative and Non-educative Aesthetic Experience

For Adorno, Halbbildung thrives in late capitalist societies because of the inhibiting influence of mass-cultural artifacts on the consciousness of individuals. Put differently, the type of aesthetic experience these artifacts permit is insufficient for these experiences to become educative (bildend). According to Adorno, an aesthetic experience becomes educative when our experience with the artifact constitutes an encounter with “true difference,” a moment in which we recognize the artifact to be separate from and resistant to our cognition, even as we attempt to incorporate it cognitively. This counts as experience in an objective mode. In objective aesthetic experience, the individual must (attempt to) understand the “inner coherence” of the artifact in its own terms and understand the artifact in relation to the historical, social, and philosophical context in which it was produced. In other words, an educative aesthetic experience involves: (1) an encounter with something truly different from ourselves; (2) an attempt to cognize that difference; and (3) an inevitable coming to terms with an “excess” in the object that eludes our cognition.

According to Adorno, such objective educative experiences have been made all but impossible in late capitalist society. The raison d’être of the culture industry is to produce mass cultural artifacts designed for immediate subjective appropriation, i.e. immediate consumption. In this mode of appropriation, individuals can directly incorporate the content of mass-cultural artifacts into their preexisting webs of belief, without having to modify these beliefs in light of the artifact’s internal content or context of production. Put another way, the artifacts that individuals consume have no internal content or context that would constitute a true difference. So, individuals gain no new perspectives in experiencing such artifacts; they receive merely a reflection of the state of contemporary society and of their own cognitive constitution. This culture of subjective appropriation breeds a degraded, fetishized form of aesthetic experience, which renders the imagination of social alternatives all but impossible.

Adorno characterizes this situation in the essay as a simultaneous personalization and depersonalization of the world. On the one hand, individuals subjectively appropriate artifacts using representations and categories that they, themselves, project upon the artifact. This is a prima facie case of personalization; however, these representations and categories have been passively received from their prior experience with mass-cultural goods rather than generated from personal understanding. Thus, on a deeper level, individuals experience the world in a depersonalized, abstract, and conformist fashion: “Halbbildung, as alienated consciousness, knows no direct relation to anything; rather it is always fixated on the representations that it brings to the object.” This type of experience thus isolates individuals from the actual, material conditions of the world around them, and prevents them from realizing the superficiality of their aesthetic experiences.

According to Adorno, in consumer society, people can nevertheless sense that their experiential capabilities have been diminished, although they paradoxically call their mode of experience “realism.” Subconsciously aware of this feeling that “one never reaches that which is,” the consumer becomes a listless participant in her own subjection: “The feeling that one never reaches that which is, that one must
capitulate before it, lames the impulses of the drives for knowledge. That which the subject portrays as unchangeable becomes fetishized, impenetrable, and not understood.”

The obviously stultifying conditions of consumer society are simply not perceived. To make matters worse, the Halbbildung that individuals call their “education” retains the hopeful categories of Enlightenment Bildung, yet cannot deliver on its potential. It “refers forward to the possibility of real autonomy in each individual’s life, the actual configuration of which denies this possibility and makes of it an ideology.”

The promises of liberal education become hackneyed cants, echoed with ever more fervor the more distant from actual conditions they become. As a result, a silent “discontent,” or ressentiment, is bred in individuals who implicitly notice the divide: “Halbbildung is itself the sphere of ressentiment par excellence, of which it [paradoxically] accuses any individual who still maintains a spark of self-awareness.” Combatting Halbbildung is thus doubly challenging, for it diminishes the capacity for objective experience, while it foments hostility toward any desire to change that which is. Critical scrutiny becomes increasingly difficult under such conditions.

DIALECTICS OF EDUCATION: ADORNO’S VISION FOR A REINVigorATED BILDUNG

Despite Adorno’s bleak characterization of the modern state of aesthetic experience, a necessary condition for the achievement of true Bildung can be determined from his portrayal. Bildung is possible only if our aesthetic consciousness is restored to a level at which the objective content of cultural works can (again) be experienced. Yet, as we have seen, pedagogical action to bring about this educational result is hindered by the very fact that the pseudo-educated consciousness struggles to realize its degraded state. How, then, might educators reverse this trend and reinstate a mode of experience that makes Bildung possible? Is there any hope at all?

Although Adorno’s cultural critique seems to back his educational project into a corner, Adorno provides crucial pedagogical direction in “Theory of Halbbildung.” To recall, Adorno believes that we can implicitly grasp the inadequacy of our current experiential capacities, but that the effort we might undertake to overcome this inadequacy is hindered by our feelings of resentment toward change. This is an important educational insight. The educator who makes a direct attempt to cultivate a different form of aesthetic experience by, for example, critically deconstructing mass media artifacts with students, as Stojanov recommends, is likely to arouse resentment in students. This may present itself in the form of evasive questions like, “When am I going to need this?,” or in knee-jerk defenses of the music and movies that the educator has put on trial.

How might the educator avoid such a predicament? Adorno’s claim at the end of the essay suggests an alternative approach. Bildung, Adorno argues, “has no possibility of survival other than as the critical self-reflection on the Halbbildung which it has necessarily become.” In other words, the education of aesthetic experience can avoid stoking student resentment by focusing critical reflection on the peculiar way that we consume cultural artifacts in consumer society, rather than on the particular artifacts themselves. Adorno reiterates this idea in his lectures and dialogues on education in Education for Maturity [Erziehung zur Mündigkeit]: “The production of the ability
to experience would consist essentially in the making-conscious and dismantling of precisely the oppressive mechanisms and reactions which cripple people’s ability to experience. It is not merely about the absence of Bildung, but rather the hostility toward it.”  

Although Adorno can be understood as offering here a positive pedagogy of social critique, his educational theory is far from complete. An educational theory based merely on criticism can provide only a starting point for pedagogical action. Left at this stage, the critical consciousness that would be developed would remain merely formal and negative, like the Skeptic in Hegel’s Phenomenology, whose desperate negations of the ways of the world result only in the emergence of the “unhappy consciousness.” In spite of this, Christiane Thompson’s recent analysis of Adorno’s conception of Bildung stops just at this point, claiming that, for Adorno, “Bildung must remain a negative and aporetic project.” Referring to Adorno’s theory of aesthetic experience, Thompson argues that Adorno’s educational theory eschews any “category of appropriation” in which the “incorporation, mastery, and accomplishment” of objective content should take place. According to Thompson, the essential characteristic of aesthetic experience for Adorno is that we realize the resistance of objective content to our attempts at conceptual understanding. This interpretation misses the mark in several ways, however. Thompson is surely right to infer that Bildung must include experiences of this sort, but it does not follow that it is exhausted by such experiences. Indeed, as we saw earlier, there are three constitutive elements to an educative aesthetic experience for Adorno—the other two being an engagement with an artifact truly different from ourselves and the attempt to understand it objectively. Adorno’s aesthetic theory does not provide any reason for thinking that the acknowledgement of cognitive resistance is more essential than cognition itself. Indeed, coming to terms with the extent to which an object has resisted our understanding is possible only in the context of comparing what we have internalized with what has remained elusive. That is, cognitive resistance and appropriation dialectically solicit one another. Eschewing all appropriation in Bildung would cultivate, following Adorno’s critique of late capitalist aesthetic consciousness, only subjective, non-educative, and reified aesthetic experience.

In addition to this, Adorno directly contravenes the idea that Bildung lacks an appropriative moment in Education for Maturity:

In truth the acquisition [of Bildung] cannot be delegated even to exertion, but rather only to openness, to the ability to allow something spiritual [geistig] to come up to oneself and productively incorporate it into one’s own consciousness [ins eigene Bewusstsein aufzunehmen], instead of, as goes the unbearable cliché, merely “grappling” with it for the sake of “learning.”

Failing to engage with cultural artifacts in a robust way ensures that our experience with them will be consumptive and educationally unproductive. The same goes for our engagement with different cultures. Thompson’s exhortation to multicultural educators to “focus on our inability to experience and understand the alien” seems to be one that promotes only social isolationism and continued misunderstanding.
The real substance of one’s otherness – one’s hopes, principles, and ideals – can only be appreciated when a serious effort is made to take them to heart. Indeed, it is precisely such communicative efforts, and the shared experiences they yield, that form the basis of community.

Adorno’s discussion of the importance of cultural images (Bilder) for education in both “Theory of Halbbildung” and Education for Maturity provides yet further evidence that Adorno’s conception of Bildung contains a second dialectical moment to counterbalance the moment of social critique (autonomy). This is most clear in his characterization of the dialectical nature of Bildung in “Theory of Halbbildung”: “On the one hand, Bildung has as its condition autonomy and freedom, yet it refers simultaneously to structures of the given … on which alone the individual can educate himself.” (TH, 104). Adorno goes on to suggest that certain traditional “structures” can resist bourgeois rationality and thereby counteract the rampant Halbbildung of consumer society. The key to this important educational insight lies in Adorno’s subsequent critique of the so-called “imagelessness” of consumer society, a cultural diagnosis that Alasdair MacIntyre’s After Virtue would echo several decades later. Adorno writes:

Among the conditions of Bildung was, necessarily, tradition. According to Sombart’s and Max Weber’s teaching, it was something pre-bourgeois, essentially incommensurable with bourgeois rationality. The loss of tradition through the disenchantment of the world terminates in a state of imagelessness [Bilderlosigkeit], a desolation of the spirit which turns now to mere means, and which is incompatible with Bildung. Nothing holds the spirit any longer to corporeal contact with ideas.

Adorno is saying that for Bildung to proceed at all, individuals require a set of images (Bilder) with which they can begin to make sense of their experience and on which they can model their lives. Bildung has been degraded not because the images it presents illicitly point the way to “future enrichment of personality,” as Thompson problematically suggests, but because these images distort social reality and vitiate students’ ability to change it. More precisely, these manufactured images are not genuine images at all. As mentioned, they are fetishized reflections of the status quo that fail to serve as truly edifying models of the human spirit. That is, mass cultural goods are mirrors of the given rather than windows to alternatives. In contrast, “classic” images, as we might call them, can inspire students to focus their attention and experience them for their objective content, that is, to seek out, as Adorno puts it, “corporeal contact with ideas.”

Classic works of art, literature and philosophy are excellent sources for such objective aesthetic experiences because, as Adorno suggests, they hold content that resists students’ attempts to consumptively appropriate it into their existing worldview. Though Adorno was indeed a defender of the value such cultural works throughout his career, he did not think that classic works were the only type of cultural artifact that can initiate educative aesthetic experiences of course. For example, in his essay, “Commitment,” Adorno endorses the avant-garde as an art form that, because it characteristically frustrates typical modes of aesthetic appropriation, can provide its patrons with moments of transcendence. While engagement with classic art aligns well with the assimilative moment of Bildung, avant-garde art elicits the moment of autonomy.
Stojanov interprets Adorno’s preoccupation with educative images as, at root, a supplement to the moment of social critique.\(^47\) While familiarity with educative images is certainly necessary for generating critical alternatives to contemporary society, they do not reduce to mere fodder for social critique. These images provide the counterbalancing dialectical moment to social critique that enables Bildung to fulfill its equally important task of assimilating students into a culture: “Education [Erziehung] would be powerless and ideological if it ignored its goal of assimilation and did not prepare people to find their way in the world.”\(^48\) Of course, assimilation into culture counts as a moment of genuine Bildung only if this culture is a dignified one, that is, one in which educated students can share in the achievements of human intellectual striving and become both aesthetically edified and critical individuals.

**Conclusion**

According to this analysis, Adorno’s vision for Bildung is a thoroughly dialectical one. For Adorno, Bildung is a force-field sustaining the moment of social critique — corresponding to ideals of autonomy and self-determination — and the moment of assimilation — corresponding to the cultural necessity of assimilation. If Bildung ossifies around either moment, then it necessarily becomes its very contradiction: Halbbildung. As Adorno puts it: “If the force field of Bildung congeals around fixed categories, be it spirit or nature, sovereignty or assimilation, then each of these isolated categories becomes the contradiction of what they intend, offers itself up to ideology and advances Rückbildung [reverse-Bildung].”\(^49\)

Although Adorno believes we live in a time of rampant pseudo-education, he suggests that the dialectical tension of Bildung can be restored by educating students to become critical of the forces that seek to suppress their imagination, and to appreciate the works of individuals and cultures that have resisted these forces. Romanticizations of the “critical” individual as well as blind apotheoses of the cultural canon destroy this tension. Adorno’s provocative proposal is for us to find our criticality in the canon, and to seek the transcendent within the iron cage of consumer culture. The plausibility of Adorno’s dialectical theory of education presented here thus turns not on whether he has successfully reconciled the old opposition between individual and the community, but whether there is an aesthetic orientation to the world that can celebrate the tensions between them.

1. Educational theorists have traditionally left the term Bildung in the German in order to differentiate it from the English, “education,” with which it is sometimes, problematically, translated. I will follow this tradition. Adorno coins the term Halbbildung in the essay I analyze here, and this roughly translates to half- or pseudo-education.

2. Jan Masschelein and Norbert Ricken, “Do We (Still) Need the Concept of Bildung?,” *Educational Philosophy and Theory* 35, no. 2 (2003): 139-154, 150. Of course there are exceptions to this. See, for example, the recent issue of *Zeitschrift für Pädagogik* 61, no. 4 (2015), which contains a “topical portion” entitled “Bildung – Renaissance of a Guiding Idea.”

4. See, for example, Henry Giroux, *Theory and Resistance in Education: A Pedagogy for the Opposition* (South Hadley, MA: Bergin & Garvey, 1993).


9. Ibid., 133.


17. Ibid.


25. Ibid.


29. Ibid.


34. Theodor Adorno, *Erziehung zur Mündigkeit [Education for Maturity]*, 115. It is important to note that Adorno changes his terminology here from *Bildung to Erziehung* in describing education for critical consciousness. Because Adorno believes the capacity to become critical is formed, and indeed stifled, at a very young age, education for critical consciousness should begin in early childhood. See, Theodor Adorno, “Erziehung zur Mündigkeit [Education for Maturity],” 90-91.


36. Ibid., 83, 85.
37. Ibid., 77.
38. Ibid., 83.
40. Ibid., 85.
42. Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (South Bend: Notre Dame University Press, 1984), 216.
43. Theodor Adorno, “Theorie der Halbbildung [Theory of Halbbildung],” 105. Adorno is clearly drawing on the etymological relationship between Bild (image) and Bildung (education, formation).
44. Thompson, “Adorno and the borders,” 83. Indeed, it seems mistaken to call a theory “educational” if the “future enrichment of personality” is not at least one of its constituent aims.
45. Ibid.
48. Theodor Adorno, “Erziehung zur Mündigkeit [Education for Maturity],” 109. Adorno uses the term Erziehung throughout these lectures and dialogues to cover much of the ground that his term Bildung does in “Theory of Halbbildung.” This is evidenced by the title of the collection Erziehung zur Mündigkeit, the latter term being one way of characterizing an achieved state of Bildung—namely, maturity in a broad sense.