Remembering, Forgetting, and Learning
Amidst a Time of Extraordinary Rendition:
The Guantánamo Camp as a Museum of Forgetting
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From the U.S. Holocaust Museum to Cambodia’s Tuol-Sleng Museum of Genocidal Crimes to the Canadian Museum for Human Rights, the imperatives “Never Forget!” and “Never Again!” frame how we are to value and deploy learning and remembering about past atrocities. Memorial museums frequently work with the belief that if we get people to remember better and harder, if we expose them to facts, artefacts, and even experiential role-playing activities that convey what happened in terrible past events, we will somehow both avert the repetition of this past and honour its memory. This premise, however, assumes a certain calculation of memory and an overconfidence that more knowledge will lead to predictable and favourable results. “Making people remember tends to assume that you can calculate their responses to their memories,” writes Adam Phillips. “It tries to engineer solutions;” he continues, “when engineered solutions are part of the problem.”¹

While our best pedagogical intentions often marshal the memory of a terrible past with hopes of inoculating people against repeating the worst, Roger Simon, asks us to be wary of the bonne conscience of the educator administering remembrance.² For Simon, as for Phillips, we need to grapple with a self-serving calculus that tends to accompany our desire to pedagogically manage memory. Appreciating the uncontrollable surplus of interpretations unleashed by memory, both Phillips and Simon urge us to consider how learning and remembering actually exceed instrumentality and manufactured outcomes, for “where memory might lead – both what we might do with it, and what it might do with us – is unpredictable.”³

However, contrary to Simon’s emphasis on the ethical-pedagogical force of memory, Phillips prioritizes the significance of forgetting amidst a time obsessed with memorializing. If we are to attune ourselves to the displacements, fantasies, and oblivions that memorial museums tend to renounce in the name of a calculated and forced form of remembrance, we need, Phillips tells us, to underscore “the time-lag, the metabolism, the deferrals of forgetting.”⁴ While not dismissive of memorials per se, Phillips provocatively asks: “After so many memorials it may be worth wondering now what a Museum of Forgetting could be a museum of?”⁵

Phillips’s question is intriguing on various levels. He asks us not only to consider how we mostly forget, re-write, and fabricate memory through our memorial endeavours, but also to wonder about the potentiality of forgetting for now (during this worldwide “memory boom”), so that the prevailing instrumental sense of memory can lessen its hold on our interpretative possibilities. Phillips’s appeal does not seek to tear down the museum, as it were. Rather, amid a time when the rhetoric of forced-remembrance has rendered the enigmatic activity of forgetting into an
anathema, he wants us to wonder about forgetting as a way of opening up another heading for our learning encounters with difficult knowledge in the memorial museum.

In what follows, I first consider the source of Phillips’s claim regarding the excess of the memorial enterprise, and draw out the significance of the art of forgetting for carving a perspective that allows us to live well with history. Second, I explore the work of forgetting through a reading of Alicia Framis’s art project, “Welcome to Guantánamo Museum: Things to Forget.” Specifically, I discuss how Framis’s hypothetical museum of the Guantánamo camp prompts us to think through the dynamics of remembering-forgetting in the memorial-pedagogical enterprise. In the last section, I draw on what Maurice Blanchot enigmatically terms the “disaster.” Through Blanchot’s term I consider how forgetting might not be a matter of will. Seeing the “disaster” as an event that exceeds our ability to willfully forget, introduces an “ethics of forgetting” that opens us to the possibility of learning from memory’s failures and lapses, in contrast to prescriptions of how memory should be utilized. Returning to a reading of Framis’s art project through this ethical turn will allow us to consider “what a Museum of Forgetting could be a museum of,” especially in light of extraordinary events not registered in a straightforward sense.

**WHY FORGETTING?**

Phillips’s attempt to give pause to our current fascination with memorializing tragic events speaks to a growing skepticism and sense of exhaustion regarding the memorial museum’s ability to foster effective approaches for living well with history. In contrast to the memorial museum’s drive for remembrance, there are those who think that this push for memory is making us sick, bogging us down, and over-burdening us with too much history and too much horror; such museums are thought to be symptomatic of a culture paralyzed by the weight of the past and rendered impotent to act amid present injustices. “This mania for memorial museums is a sign of a society with an unhealthy obsession,” writes Tiffany Jenkins. She continues, “Today’s memorializing of suffering creates a new and damaging vision.” She urges that we learn to “forget the sort of remembering that replaces tradition, Kings and Queens with a theatre of trauma.” The worry seems to be that under the strain to memorialize our horrible past, we end up with a wretched sense of humanity, revealing the inherent malady of our ideals and our impossibility to be otherwise.

The Nietzschean gesture here is undeniable and prompts us to consider Nietzsche’s thought experiment regarding remembering and forgetting. In “On the Advantage and Disadvantage of History for Life,” Nietzsche, as is well known, writes of the burdens and excesses of a historical consciousness that ruins humans. With a primordial nostalgia for a lost paradise, humans seemingly envy the herd of cattle grazing unconcerned amid the eternal now. But this undifferentiated sense of time was never meant for us. Burdened with the “increasing weight of the past,” we “cannot learn to forget, but always remain attached to the past: however far and fast we run, the chain runs with us.” While the chain, which links the past and the present together, is the precondition for sustaining a world of human significance, the surplus of historical knowledge and obligations to the past overwhelms our capacity to cope with and live well in the present. Fettered with an unfailing memory
of our debt to the past, historical consciousness not only robs us of happiness, but also makes us see too much, exposing the insignificance and becoming-and-decay of everything. Nietzsche writes: “Take as an extreme example a man who possesses no trace of the power to forget, who is condemned everywhere to see becoming: such a one no longer believes in his own existence, no longer believes in himself; he sees everything flow apart in mobile points and loses himself in the stream of becoming.”

Borges’s short story, “Funes the Memorious,” takes up Nietzsche’s thought experiment. It describes a young man who, after an accident, becomes paralyzed and loses the possibility of forgetting. The tragedy of Funes is that without the ability to forget he is forced to relive every experience from one moment to the next, down to its minutest detail. Overtaxed by his memory of everything, Funes is powerless to hold onto any meaning as the gap between past and future collapses. He is bothered and made sick by the immensity of time that just keeps pouring in. Borges writes: “it bothered him that the dog at 3:14 (seen from the side) should have the same name as the dog at 3:15 (seen from the front).” Funes’s total recall eventually reverts to nothingness: to the withdrawal of meaningful relationships to objects. He has lost the necessary separating-out and distance – the forgetting, the time lag – that could afford him a perspective on the world. Completely swept by the stream of becoming, Funes is unable to learn how to select and expunge.

And this gets us to what learning to forget is for. Forgetting allows us to limit and so to cope with our possibilities amid the flow of time. It is, as Nietzsche writes, “the art and strength of being able to…enclose oneself in a limited horizon.” As an antidote to the excess of history, which shatters our horizon by exposing us to the arbitrariness of becoming, forgetting permits us to craft a perspective: an orientation to time that, in taking a stand against the onslaught of the past and future, allows us to meaningfully inhabit the world. This is not the absolute forgetting of cattle shackled to a moment without past or future. It is, to be clear, an active forgetting crafted through, and for the sake of, something most significantly human: temporality. Forgetting is thus an art that we must learn to cultivate if we are to live well with history and so carve, as it were, a manner of bearing time.

The art of drawing limits, of selecting and expunging, is significant to consider as our present ability to store and accumulate evermore details from the past outstrips our capacity to make meaning. As Baudrillard once recognized, “the museum, instead of being circumscribed in a geometrical location, is now everywhere.” Admittedly, we seem to have acquired more information than we have time to metabolize. The contemporary memorial drive to accumulate “all that once has been,” along with the present technological capacity for storing information, are amassing a seemingly impossible repository that overwhelms our comprehension and sense of temporality. We cannot possibly take it all in, lest we end up like Funes, whom Borges describes as “not very capable of thought,” and who eventually wastes away from congestion. Nietzsche’s point is not to deny history but to learn when to forget and limit it, so that we can craft, as Phillips discusses, the right distance that “makes redescriptions possible.” Without cultivating the right distance to history we are too close to it to develop any perspective. There is an ecstasy and excess, in being too close,
that short-circuits symbolization and gives no diagonal interval for thought. As Phillips writes: “Too much closeness means too much of something – call it feeling, though it could be called various things – means too little of something else, call it meaning, or simply words.” Learning to live well with history requires drawing out words, meanings, and interpretations that can help us gauge the right proximity, “that makes the past memorable rather than spellbinding. That makes the past … into something that one can consider the advantages and disadvantages of knowing about.” Ultimately, it is a matter of getting our timing, as well as our distance, right; for the possibility of bearing historical remembrance without being wrecked by it, necessitates our learning to cultivate a perspective for judging between the right time to forget and the right time to remember.

**Things to Forget**

The Catalan artist Alicia Framis’s work, “Welcome to Guantánamo Museum: Things to Forget,” stages provocative issues around the dynamics of forgetting and the complexities of getting our timing right in the memorial museum enterprise. The first part of Framis’s project, presented in the exhibition “Extraordinary Rendition” at Galería Helga de Alvear in Madrid in June 2008, consisted of photographs of true-to-scale maquettes of a hypothetical memorial museum to be constructed at the still-operative US detention camp in Guantánamo, Cuba. The artist’s statement asks us to consider that, like other sites of horror and degradation, “the Guantánamo prison will probably be turned into a museum.”

Everything seemingly ends up, and ends, at the museum, even the most extraordinary rendition. At a certain level, Framis’s hypothetical museum gestures us to consider how horrible events often end up memorialized and drained of their political urgency. As the pervasive drive for “museification” eventually usurps the traces of bare life at Guantánamo, history appears to be more and more a lesson that repeats the Same-pain-and-degradation. Framis’s somber and minimalist maquettes of the Guantánamo museum remind us of the structure and form of other memorial museums that mark the horrors of the concentration camp. Through her hypothetical exercise, the Guantánamo camp appears as one more in a series of sites awaiting its end as a memorial site, exemplary of a “future that drives us back to the past.”

Framis’s non-descript and colorless human figurines placed around the true-to-scale-model camp leave us with an impoverished and disorienting sense of how humans will actually engage with this site. The pedagogical opportunities appear as stilted as the characterless figures encircling the grey model-camp. Framis stages something akin to what Paul Valéry observed about the museum in his 1923 essay. Namely, that sense of impoverishment that befalls visitors as they make their way through the museum, which Valéry describes as a disorienting space of accumulation, as the meeting of a mausoleum, school, and bank-casino that collects everything back. The deadening logic of the commodity, in which everything accrued enters the universal-equivalence of exchange to become the Same-in-a-series, forecloses the pedagogical promise of encountering and learning from unique objects in the museum. Something like this loss of aura is also at play in Framis’s work. For, along with the small model-camp, she also equips her exhibit with a worktable on
which artifacts from Guantánamo, like the orange jump suits worn by the inmates, will eventually end up cut-up and turned into souvenirs and merchandize bearing the label “Things to Forget.”

While Framis’s worktable projects appear to confirm Valéry’s point regarding how the museum absorbs all things and experiences into a reifying economy of sorts, where everything ends up as a commodity, there is something else at work here that I think can help us to consider “what a Museum of Forgetting could be a museum of.” Framis’s worktable projects are to be undertaken by students, who will work through the material remnants of Guantánamo by handling, cutting, re-designing, and stitching back together items to be unleashed, by being exchanged and put (symbolically) into circulation, beyond the ends of the museum. The duty to remember is purposely turned on its head, as we are encouraged, according to the artist, to use this work so that we can “learn to forget and overcome Guantánamo.”

If we follow Nietzsche, we might describe this project of “active forgetting” as an exercise that helps us live well with history; it allows us “to replace what is lost and reshape broken forms.” Or, in psychoanalytic terms, we might portray it through the art of redescriptions, as allowing for objects to be re-made again through symbolization. That is, as a re-assembling (or type of re-mending and remembering) that allows for the act of forgetting: for masticating, digesting, and metabolizing, and so turning one thing into another by tearing it apart. Re-working material fragments from Guantánamo allows us to take our time with what cannot be swallowed whole or fully and finally taken in. Rather than repetitively re-enacting in an unconscious manner what is too horrible and what operates outside of the symbolic, Framis invites her students to make things, to use symbols, that can help circumscribe a place that can never be truly redeemed.

The project can thus be described as an activity of metabolizing our disbelief, horror, and anxious resignation (that such a place exists) into symbolic work. What all this suggests is that a Museum of Forgetting could thus be a place of interpretative openings, which offers an interval or gap for putting our forgetting to use rather than a place where things end up and end. The museum is thus reconceived, to borrow Elizabeth Ellsworth’s vocabulary, as a place where things are in the making: “a zone of historical indetermination that allows room for experimentation” beyond instrumental ends. Framis’s project, of course, is an artistic-metaphoric intervention that prompts us to rethink the terms of the memorial-pedagogical enterprise. Her work stages how it might not be a matter of choosing between what we want to forget and remember, but of asking: which forms of forgetting do we want to use to creatively will a future?

Disaster

However, we have to admit that active forgetting is limited, that forgetting might not be a matter of will or of one’s making. Some events cannot be reshaped and mended; some events never enter consciousness but rather devastate it. What Blanchot calls the “disaster” points to an event of such magnitude and disturbance that it exceeds the mind’s ability to remember or willfully forget. The disaster is
such an extraordinary event that it disrupts our sense of history, and produces a temporal (trauma-like) gap in which nothing is perceived, associated, or given to memory. In this sense, “the gap” does not offer any temporal interval for thinking, rather it speaks to a radical *agnosia* in which we cannot sense and make sense of the world, especially the disaster that befalls us.\textsuperscript{26} Blanchot writes: “When the disaster comes upon us it does not come.”\textsuperscript{27} We are dealing here with an immemorial instance, a limit experience, which is “always already past” and “has always already withdrawn” from us.\textsuperscript{28}

Rather than beginning with our will to remember or to forget, Blanchot exposes the immemorial condition of having always already missed the disaster, where everything seemingly appears as it was, as though there was no disaster to begin with. The problem of learning about history is thus posed as a problem of attending to something that is properly beyond historical consciousness and that has no signification, temporality, or measurability in historical terms. The problem, in other words, involves our need to attend to a disaster that touches us while it passes us by “leaving everything intact.”\textsuperscript{29} Consequently, for Blanchot, we always begin from a point of radical, originary forgetting – a forgetting that is beyond being willed, deployed, or cultivated. He writes, “the disaster is related to forgetfulness – forgetfulness without memory, the motionless retreat of what has not been treated – the immemorial, perhaps.”\textsuperscript{30}

While Nietzsche grapples with cultivating active forgetting in order to establish a human horizon (a willed limit between past and future) that allows us to learn how to live well with history, Blanchot uncovers an originary forgetting (a trauma-like gap) that radically imposes and *subjects us* to an extreme experience, which we cannot finally register, overcome, or master.\textsuperscript{31} With Blanchot we thus move to an “ethics of forgetting,” where the point is to somehow remember, at the very least, that we inherently begin by forgetting. In this way, his ethics prompts us to be attentive to the fact that, because we cannot actively choose to forget the disaster, we are always already forgetting and leaving things out of our understanding and engagements with the world. In other words, the disaster obliges us to heed “the partial, simplifying, reductive character of comprehension itself.”\textsuperscript{32} For Blanchot, the ability to comprehend or represent something does not mean that we can fully know it. Rather, to say that we know something implies that we partially forget and remember incompletely through representation or comprehension. “[K]nowledge – because it is not knowledge of the disaster, but knowledge as disaster and knowledge disastrously – carries us, carries us off, deports us … straight to ignorance, and puts us face to face with ignorance of the unknown so that we forget, endlessly.”\textsuperscript{33} Our forgetful practices are pertinent to heed with regards to our representational-pedagogical work (like writing, theorizing, and by extension curating) whose very possibility proceeds through excluding, simplifying, and thematizing.

With this in mind, what would it mean to pose once more Phillips’s question, “what a Museum of Forgetting could be a museum of”? We are, admittedly, left wondering to what end does this radical forgetting lead us if we cannot really memorialize or learn about the past without always already forgetting? While Phillips
mobilizes forgetting as an opening of sorts that challenges the ends of memory, and does away with any prescribed meanings and implications of what memory will do or where it will go, Blanchot, for his part, subjects us to an originary forgetting that does not excuse us or release us from its effects. In other words, Blanchot also provides us with a sense of forgetting as an opening, but this opening exposes my continuing implication and complicity in forgetting. As such, this opening exposes the need for constant vigilance, for an attentive regard to how, through our learning about and pining for knowledge, representations, and comprehension, we inevitably produce remains that remain forgotten and whose implications we cannot necessarily escape. In this sense, Blanchot’s radical forgetting offers a poignant ethical supplement – gesturing towards a residual reading – that opens and exposes the immanence of our present representational practices and the limits of our will to memorialize or to forget. Blanchot thus activates an insistent reading of what remains forgotten in order to attune us to what is not sensed nor given sense in our time: to what is excluded and remains unattended to through our historical agnosia.

Returning to read Framis’s exhibit, “Welcome to Guantánamo Museum: Things to Forget,” proves productive for further consideration of “what a Museum of Forgetting could be a museum of” in light of an ethically-inflected sense of forgetting. While the photographic image always points backwards, recording a past-ness and a unique instance in time, Framis’s photographs of a future museum for a present ongoing event (the still functioning Guantánamo camp) admittedly complicates the unrepeatable lived instant of time captured by the photograph. Rather than a witness “to what was,” the photographs of this future non-present museum can be read not only as a rehearsal for where things will end up (as discussed above), but also as an evocative trace that attunes us to what we are presently forgetting: the extraordinary event of Guantánamo that is passing us by, leaving everything seemingly intact while invisibly wreaking havoc on lives and riddling what we might ever mean by democracy and justice. Framis’s photographs and props of this would-be museum thus appear to work as a type of mnemotechnic device: they provide an architectural form, as it were, for forging attention and links amid the scattered fragments and dissociations (the disaster) of our time.

The mnemotechnics at work here are not straightforward. The curious and significant point is that Framis is not sorting and storing items to be remembered within an existing architectural form. Rather, the fictive-future Guantánamo museum project works as a complex remembering-learning prop that calls up an “anachrony” in our present, provoking a sense of untimeliness and dis-adjustment amid the contemporary. By exhibiting a museum that runs counter to our time, Framis’s exhibit ends up acting on our time, opening questions around what remains presently un-thought (forgotten) and presenting afresh the complexities of what could be the role of the memorial museum today. Particularly, what could be the role of such museums with regards to a present-extraordinary event not registered in a straightforward sense, since Guantánamo exists under a “state of exception.”

To exhibit the untimely is, drawing on Blanchot’s words, “perhaps to bring to the surface something like absent meaning, to welcome [that] which is not yet what
A Museum of Forgetting could thus be a museum that stages what remains other than history in history, welcoming and giving time to something that our own present considers to be a non-event or (as an extraordinary rendition) has not yet been properly thought of as an event. A Museum of Forgetting might allow us not only to recover the factuality of Guantánamo, but also, perhaps just as vitally, (since it exhibits our forgetting, giving us something like an agnotology) to en-vision the very dissociations, the disaster, the extra-ordinary rendition that we cannot bear to see, think, or remember.

Guantánamo today is still a non-event for us, full of lapses and dissociations with our present comprehension of ourselves and the world; its very forgetting be-speaks of a broken world that fails to grasp the very brokenness and compromises of its ideals and the unsettling paradigms that have come to define us, whether we know it or not. Gathering the scattered fragments of this non-event in a Museum of Forgetting, as Framis does, is a work of curation that attends to what is presently ailing, that strives to cure and aid what cannot show itself by itself, what remains out-of-time, disconnected, and un-thought. Her work is generatively educative for our time, artfully abetting us to associate Guantánamo with the historicity of our present-peculiar agnosia – our social inability to sense the implication – of the constellation of all the “exceptional” camps that exist or that have formerly operated. She thus gives us to think how Guantánamo is less the exception and more paradigmatic of the disaster (the very forgetting) that riddles our present. Through Framis’s untimely provocations we can ponder that perhaps it is now and not tomorrow that we most urgently need to think and welcome a museum for Guantánamo, a Museum of Forgetting that invites us to learn from our disavowals of the extra-ordinary rendition that defines our time.

4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
7. See also, Mordechai Gordon, “Between Remembering and Forgetting,” Studies in Philosophy of Education 34, no. 5 (2015): 489-503. He argues that forgetting is a corrective for dwelling on past injustices that foreclose working for a better future.


15. Ibid., 143.


22. Nietzsche, History for Life, 10.


26. The word agnosia is derived from the ancient Greek term agnais, meaning ignorance, a- (without) + gnosis (knowledge). The term is usually employed in neurology to describe a condition of the brain – often resulting from traumatic injury – where, although the affected sense organ is left perfectly intact (still functioning normally), a person cannot recognize or make sense of what he or she senses. People afflicted by “visual agnosia,” for example, have eyes that still technically see; however, they are unable to associate what they see with something that is recognizable or to make sense of what their eyes are looking at. I thus use the idea of agnosia, or what I term “historical agnosia,” to consider the particular affliction of our time as our inability to forge and draw links, and our inability to sense, and to make sense of, the ways in which we are indeed implicated in a constellation of regime-made disasters that fundamentally affect our time.

27. Blanchot, Disaster, 1.

28. Ibid. 1-2. See also, Britzman, The Very Thought, 120.

29. Ibid., 1.

30. Ibid., 3.

31. Ibid., 51.

32. Ibid., 76.

33. Ibid., 3.


35. Blanchot, Disaster, 41.