On Ambiguity

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In the new millennium, liberalism continues to shape the educational discourse, process, and structure in most democratic states. Liberalism is by no means a monotonous and monolithic school of political philosophy. In recognition of cultural pluralism, contemporary liberal thinkers such as John Rawls have endeavored to delineate a naturalistic and pragmatic version of political liberalism in order to address politics of difference. However, the dominant liberal discourse on education, from Jeffersonian crusades against ignorance to the recent No Child Left Behind Act and Race to the Top, continues to encounter difficulties as it attempts to define the role of cultural pluralism in shaping educational policies. At the theoretical level, cultural pluralism is irrelevant to the cultivation of an autonomous and reasonable citizenry, the cornerstone of liberal democracy. However, modern schooling has embraced various degrees of cultural assimilation in order to sever the marginalized individuals’ ties with their affiliated cultures. Such a deliberate effort not only conflicts with the tenet of individual freedom within the liberal framework but also encounters resilient resistance. Moreover, while the presumably “progressive” cultural difference theory seeks to rectify the perceived “deficits” of marginalized groups’ cultures, the recognition of cultural differences does not necessarily entail any substantial educational and political reforms to redress imbalanced power relationships among varied cultures. In the same vein, although the resilience research recognizes marginalized groups’ agency in adversity, it understates the oppressive power of psychological, economic, cultural, and political adversity.

In spite of the aforementioned difficulties in defining the role of cultural pluralism in democratic schooling, “diversity” has emerged as a requisite accreditation standard in professionalization of educators. In essence, the incorporation of “diversity” into teacher education aims to bridge achievement gaps. To this end, professional educators must grasp the inevitable ties between students’ academic learning and cultural identities. It follows that bridging the cultural gaps between the predominantly white teaching profession and the increasingly more diverse student populations could raise the academic achievement of the marginalized and underserved students. In effect, it is not surprising that the Council for the Accreditation of Educator Preparation (CAEP) has accentuated the need to integrate diversity and technology throughout teacher education. The juxtaposition of “diversity” and “technology” especially reflects a popular perception that culture, like technology is an indispensable instrument for facilitating students’ academic achievement and cultivating an autonomous and reasonable citizenry. As an instrument for bridging achievement gaps, the institutionalization of culturally responsive pedagogy,1 to a certain degree, continues to essentialize the marginalized cultures without demanding fundamental changes within the existing social structure that perpetuates inequality. As a result, culturally responsive pedagogy appears to be reminiscent of the passé cultural assimilation.
model intended to cultivate a monolithic rather than pluralistic citizenry.

In view of the predicaments of culturally responsive pedagogy, I examine the conception of pluralistic reasonable cultures within the framework of Rawls’s political liberalism. Drawing from Simone de Beauvoir’s ethical theory, I argue that the advocates of culturally responsive pedagogy should consider embracing ambiguities surrounding rationalistic democratic ideals in order to engender reciprocal cultural interactions in democratic societies.

FROM REASONABLE PEOPLE TO REASONABLE CULTURES

Rooted in the rationalistic tradition, modern liberal democracy is based on an *a priori* assumption that people are reasonable and that reasonable people are capable of achieving a consensus on establishing a just political procedure for collective deliberation on public policies. Such an *a priori* assumption about human rationality inadvertently further leads to a recognition of the organic and reciprocal interconnections between reasonable people and reasonable cultures. To illustrate, Rawls argues that pluralistic cultures do not necessarily endanger the stability of a liberal democratic society because cultural differences are not “rooted solely in ignorance and perversity, or else in the rivalries for power, status or economic gain.” Rather, reasonable people recognize and support the flourishing of diverse yet “reasonable” religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines that in turn could foster social cooperation in democratic societies.

However, “reasonableness” can mean different things to different people, especially in a culturally diverse society. Furthermore, “reasonableness” as a regulative ideal can serve as a convenient device to exclude perceived “unreasonable” or “illiberal” people from determining public affairs. Since Rawls realizes that “free and equal citizens” in “a just and stable society” can still “remain profoundly divided by reasonable religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines,” (*PL*, xxxix) he “affirms political autonomy for all, but leaves the weight of ethical autonomy to be decided by citizens severally in light of their comprehensive doctrines” (*PL*, 78). In other words, reasonable people ought to make reasonable efforts to attain overlapping consensus on the plurality of reasonableness in the public domain while preserving their uncompromising “particularistic” ethical beliefs in their private domains. Accordingly, the pluralistic conception of “reasonableness” attained through consensus building does not necessarily entail value conflicts or result in exclusion or oppression of “unreasonable” people in the public domain.

Attaining an overlapping consensus on the plurality of reasonableness in the public domain is an arduous educational and political task. First and foremost, cultivating the pluralistic concept of reasonableness must be based on an artificial and arbitrary demarcation between the public and the private. However, the dichotomization of political autonomy and ethical autonomy is neither a universal cultural value nor a cross-cultural practice. Clifford Geertz notes that human beings are “incomplete or unfinished animals who complete or finish themselves through culture — and not through culture in general but through highly particular forms of it.” Geertz’s anthropological insights, to a certain degree, still hold true even in an age of global-
ization entailing continual cultural hybridization. Furthermore, it is noted that all reasonable cultures do not necessarily receive equal recognition from all reasonable people. Some reasonable cultures rise to be the “dominant” cultural forces, whereas other reasonable cultures have remained perpetually on the margin. While Western cultural hegemony more or less reifies the divide between the public and the private, countless reasonable people, especially women and marginalized groups, continue to resist and discredit such a dualistic cultural practice.

Likewise, the dualistic distinction between ethical and political autonomy is an arbitrary theoretical construct. In reality, just as the private domain and the public domain are indivisible, ethical autonomy and political autonomy are interrelated. Civic and citizenship education tends to focus on the political and public dimension of citizenship. It is not surprising that civic and citizenship education has been referred to as political education and the core of civic and citizenship education appears to lie in the structure and process of governance in the public rather than private domain. To a large extent, the instigation of multicultural curricula derives from a need to safeguard the democratic state by cultivating a reasonable and cooperative citizenry. Nevertheless, the scope of multicultural curricula often fails to include what liberal educators consider “exclusive” religious belief systems, such as evangelical fundamental Christianity. Consequently, multicultural educators more or less limit freedom of speech in this circumscribed public realm. In line with political liberalism, multicultural educators’ paradoxical commitment to liberty and justice mirrors the political stand of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). In defending everyone’s equal constitutional rights, the ACLU is compelled to prevent any excessive or even nominal entanglements between the state and any particular religious, political, or ethical doctrines in the public realm. The ACLU’s recent effort to exclude from biology textbooks stickers supporting creationism especially exemplifies such an exclusive approach to promote cultural pluralism. As mentioned before, the public and the private are interrelated. An artificial dualistic demarcation not only demands reasonable people to refrain from exercising their private ethical autonomy in the public domain but also casts doubt on the legitimacy of individuals’ presumably “private” belief systems. The resurgent debate over evolution versus creationism especially indicates fundamentalist Christians’ desire to “legitimate” their own belief system in the circumscribed public realm.

In view of varied waves of resistance to the multicultural education movement, it is critical to rethink the exclusive approach that excludes “exclusive” religious, moral, and philosophical doctrines. After all, exclusive doctrines are not necessarily unreasonable doctrines. Nevertheless, including exclusive doctrines into the circumscribed public realm such as public school settings can ignite heated debates on determining the reasonableness of such exclusive doctrines. But, as Stephen Macedo points out, if multicultural education is to be contentious, it is unrealistic to expect that a “conflict-free” multicultural curriculum can resolve cultural conflicts outside the circumscribed public realm. After all, the process of attaining overlapping consensus on the political conception of justice demands unlimited dialogical interactions, which may or may not lead to establishing overlapping consensus. The
Within the liberal framework, judicial review is critical to resolving conflicts resulting from reasonable citizens’ exercising their political autonomy in the public domain. In Rawls’s words, “public reason is the reason of its supreme court” (PL, 231). In the case of *Mozert v. Hawkins*, Judge Lively authorized the school board of Hawkins to promote “civic tolerance” by exposing all students to a culturally inclusive reading program. The rationale lies in the belief that a culturally inclusive program in public school settings is indispensable to foster prospective citizens’ appreciation of diverse reasonable cultures. From this vantage point, litigation by Christian fundamentalist families to exclude inclusive readings suggested that these Christian fundamentalists attempted to exercise their ethical autonomy in the public domain. However, from the standpoint of the group of Christian fundamentalists, they, like their school board members, simply exercised their political autonomy in determining what ought to be included in the formal curriculum in the public schools. While it seems to be “reasonable” to expect reasonable citizens to comply with the judges’ legal rulings, it is still questionable whether Judge Lively’s elaborate legal reasoning could convert Christian fundamentalists into supporters of multicultural curricula. In fact, the selection of the Supreme Court justices has been a political battleground. The popularity of home schooling and the increase of “autonomous” charter schools clearly show that more and more citizens are inclined to exercise their political autonomy in “circumscribing” the public realm further so they can maximize their rights to duly exercise their ethical autonomy.

As discussed previously, despite its commitment to promoting reasonable cultural pluralism, political liberalism is a double-edged sword for the multicultural education movement. Rawls argues, “[T]he basic structure of society is arranged so that it maximizes the primary goods available to the least advantaged to make use of equally basic liberties enjoyed by everyone. This defines one of the central aims of political and social justice” (PL, 326). In reality, the equal distribution of primary goods remains an unfulfilled promise. The recognition of reasonable cultural pluralism does not necessarily render a substantial support for equal distribution of primary goods and resolve interest conflicts surrounding unequal distribution of primary goods. Above all, Rawls overstates reasonable people’s ethical commitment to attaining an overlapping consensus on justice as a guiding principle for political deliberation. More specifically, Rawls believes that reasonable people embrace the following five values: “impartiality and equality, openness (no one and no relevant information is excluded) and lack of coercion, and unanimity — which in combination guide discussion to generalizable interests to the agreement of all participants” (PL, 425). Furthermore, reasonable people must embrace social cooperation that
involves two elements: “the first is a shared notion of fair terms of cooperation, which each participant may reasonably be expected to accept, provided that everyone else likewise accepts them. Fair terms of cooperation articulate an idea of reciprocity and mutuality…The other element corresponds to the ‘rational’: it refers to each participant’s rational advantage: what, as individuals, the participants are trying to advance.” (PL, 300). By embodying the aforementioned virtues, reasonable people can recognize that “‘liberty’ has a preeminent value and is the main if not the sole end of political and social justice” (PL, 291–92). To liberal thinkers such as Rawls, “reasonableness” is an all-embracing human virtue. While individuals might be born with the moral capacity to be “reasonable,” it is obvious that the cultivation of reasonableness as an all-embracing human virtue is a long-term educative task. But, who should be responsible for cultivating this all-embracing virtue of “reasonableness”? How shall we cultivate the virtue of “reasonableness”? 

From the standpoint of political liberalism, pluralistic “background culture” is not in conflict with the singular political conception of justice attained through consensus building. Rather, “background culture” can facilitate for the cultivation of “reasonableness” as a civic virtue that eventually could lead to a full-fledged recognition of “justice,” “liberty,” and “social cooperation.” Still, the public/private split and the dichotomization of political autonomy and ethical autonomy more or less justify and facilitate a parochial version of character education. Hence, Macedo argues that the heart of civic education in a liberal polity lies in a fundamental query, “How can tolerance be taught without exposing children to diversity and asking them to forbear from asserting the truth of their own particular convictions, at least for political purposes?” To political liberalists, the mandatory multicultural curriculum embedded in compulsory schooling stands for a “reasonable effort to familiarize students with diversity and teach tolerance.” Still, the political liberalists’ efforts to celebrate the circumscribed public realm also keep a tight rein on presumably reasonable people’s ethical autonomy. Consequently, it is not uncommon for reasonable people to pursue legal solutions to educational disputes. When the court as an embodied “public reason” fails to support their ethical autonomy, it seems reasonable for them to exercise their political autonomy further by electing like-minded politicians who in turn would appoint like-minded judges. Hence, one cannot but cast doubt on the impact of mandatory multicultural curricula on the appreciation of reasonable cultural pluralism. In view of the challenges facing multicultural curricular reform, it is not surprising that bridging achievement gaps appears to be a viable alternative to ensure “equal distribution of the primary good” in a credential society.

**Toward Embracing Ambiguities**

As discussed earlier, political liberalists’ recognition of reasonable cultural pluralism is based on an *a priori* assumption that an ideal liberal polity comprised of reasonable people can stand forth as “a social union of social unions” (PL, 320). However, while liberal thinkers have provided us with a venerable ideal of a just society, their moral vision seems to be detached from social reality. As noted by Charles Mill, an ideal liberal polity derives from a “state of nature” that never existed in any given human society. The “otherworldliness” of “the state of nature”
embedded in liberalism allows theorists such as John Rawls to disregard political reality and continue to sustain Western cultural hegemony when liberalism appears to be an ineffective conceptual tool to deliver its promise — equality and justice for all.\(^1\) For that reason, one can easily concur with Audre Lorde’s warning that “The master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s house.”\(^{12}\) Nevertheless, it is noted that the marginalized groups’ appropriation of the master’s tools more or less can compel the master to address and redress injustice in the house. Moreover, in spite of offering solid critiques of liberalism, Marxism, postmodernism, and postcolonialism have yet to provide alternative viable visions for building a just society. Thus, it is critical to rethink the tendency to discredit liberalism in culturally pluralistic societies. Drawing from Beauvoir’s ethical theory, in what follows, I attempt to explicate why and how a culturally responsive pedagogy should embrace ambiguities surrounding the liberal democratic ideals.

To a large extent, the concept of ambiguity is in conflict with an \textit{a priori} assumption of human rationality. Within the framework of political liberalism, the process of “reasoning” in the public domain should lead to the overlapping consensus regarding “political truth” if not “moral truth.” In other words, indeterminacy and uncertainties are not supposed to be the outcomes of public “reasoning.” Rather, the Rawlsian conception of “overlapping consensus” is reminiscent of Immanuel Kant’s “categorical imperative.” Furthermore, reasoning as a disembodied thinking process deliberately precludes personal interests and personal experiences from clouding reasonable and impartial judgment. Above all, the universalistic scope of public reasoning is predetermined to transcend cultural boundaries. However, as noted by Beauvoir, embodied human existence cannot be devoid of ambiguities.\(^{13}\) As a matter of fact, the ambiguous entanglement of mind/body, birth/death, individual/community signifies human existence. Thus, Sonia Kruks notes that “[I]f to be human is to be an ambiguous existent, then when ambiguity is foreclosed dehumanization or what Beauvoir more frequently calls oppression, takes place.”\(^{14}\)

As mentioned before, culturally responsive pedagogy including the advocacy of multicultural curricular reforms, to a certain degree, is based on an unambiguous recognition of the presumably organic connections between individuals and their “particular” cultures. In the same vein, diversity as an accreditation standard is also based on an assumption that the particularity of each given culture can be known. Thus, most accredited teacher education programs focus on raising teachers’ cultural awareness and transmitting a predetermined body of knowledge about the distinctive traits and values of distinguishable cultural, racial, and social class groups. However, transmitting a body of predetermined cultural knowledge ironically can reify and essentialize the perceived “cultural traits” of distinguishable diverse cultures at the margin and sustain the existing power structure. The recent publication \textit{The Triple Package: How Three Unlikely Traits Explain the Rise and Fall of Cultural Groups in America} by Amy Chua and Jed Rubenfeld highlights the tendency to hold cultural traits, rather than the existing social structure, accountable for individuals’ or groups’ rise and fall.\(^{15}\) The reification and essentialization of marginalized cultures can further sever the organic, dynamic, and interactive ties among various cultures. Beauvoir
points out that “it is not impersonal universal man who is the source of values, but the plurality of concrete, particular men projecting themselves toward their ends on the basis of situations whose particularity is as radical and as irreducible as subjectivity itself” (EA, 17). To Beauvoir, if “reasonableness” is the universal form of humanness, then reasonableness must be constituted through the particularity of an individual’s “lived experiences” in the cultural contexts in flux. Beauvoir wrote, “[T]he Stoics impugned the ties of family, friendship, nationality in order to recognize only the universal form of man. But, man is man only through situations whose singularity is precisely a universal fact” (EA, 144). Likewise, Paul Gilroy argues that African Americans’ “true self-understanding” is entangled with a “true understanding” of their collective diasporic “racial identity,” emerging “national” identity in the United States, and boundary-less Pan-African or even universalist human identity. Thus, we can only locate the “black essence” through “routes” rather than “roots.”

Although Beauvoir cast doubt on an a priori assumption of decontextualized reasonableness, her view on the singularity of an individual’s “lived experiences” does not reject reciprocity. In her words, “An ethics of ambiguity will be one which will refuse to deny a priori that separate existents can, at the same time, be found to each other, that their individual freedoms can forge laws valid for all” (EA, 18). Like Beauvoir, Edward Said argues, “conflicting cultures may actually coexist and interact fruitfully with each other.”

To reclaim marginalized cultures as reasonable cultures, culturally responsive pedagogy more or less includes a re-examination of the historical injustice endured by the marginalized group. However, oppression and resistance are mutually implicated in the process of colonization, as noted by postcolonial thinkers such as Arif Dirlik and Homi K. Bhabha. Thus, cultural assimilation can result in cultural hybridization rather than wholesale cultural imperialism. In the postcolonial era, the ongoing globalization especially heightens our awareness of the dynamic and interactive nature of cultural formation within the international communities. Consequently, hybridity embraces both anticolonial and anti-essentialist strategies in confronting and sustaining established hegemony. In effect, it is common for the marginalized people perceived as “others” to develop a Du Boisian “double consciousness” that compels one to look at “one’s self through the eyes of others, of measuring one’s soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity. One ever feels his twoness — an American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder.”

From this standpoint, the colonized are not passive and ignorant victims. Rather, the colonized, through the process of cultural hybridization, can develop epistemic privileges to attend to their complicity in the complex and complicated operation of oppressive systems. Thus, Maxine Greene, in line with Cornel West, argues that multicultural education must acknowledge the oppressed people’s distinctive cultures without highlighting their marginality in such a way as to further marginalize them. As discussed above, it is critical to re-examine the either-or bipolar schema ubiquitous in the multicultural education movement. In the context of teacher education in the
United States where white teachers constitute over eighty percent of K–12 teachers, unpacking in/visible “white privilege” remains as the popular pedagogical practice to bridge the cultural gaps between the white teachers and students of diversity. On the one hand, unpacking in/visible white privilege divulges the racism embedded in the existing social structure and daily cultural practices. On the other hand, this movement inadvertently compels white teachers to embody the universalistic conception of white privilege when the manifestation of white privilege varies from one individual to the other. Accentuating the universalistic white privilege also leads to skewed celebration of the perceived pluralistic cultures at the margin while isolating and upholding the dominant culture at the center. As a result, unpacking in/visible white privilege does not necessarily lead to reduction or eradication of the so-called white privilege. Rather, it can acknowledge, legitimize, and sustain white privilege.

In *The Second Sex*, Beauvoir wrote, “the body is not a thing, it is a situation; it is our grasp on the world and the outline for our projects.” Beauvoir’s recognition of the ambiguous co-existence of immanence and transcendence within one’s body sheds light on the cult of “transcendent” humanity. More specifically, the artificial separation between ethical autonomy and political autonomy corresponds with the belief in an embodied humanity in the private domain and a disembodied humanity in the public domain. But, it is a futile effort to endorse a universal human solidarity in the public domain when our bodily existence cannot be exclusively confined in the private domain. Beauvoir notes that “separation does not exclude relation, nor vice versa” (*EA*, 122). As a matter of fact, the constitution of an individual’s subjectivity, to a large extent, is based on an individual’s “relation to the world and other individuals” (*EA*, 156). Hence, circumscribing one’s ethical autonomy within the private domain is to deprive individuals of engaging in reciprocal interactions with others. Furthermore, one’s consecrating one’s ethical autonomy does not inevitably entail a reciprocal recognition of others’ ethical autonomy. Instead, it can lead to a further otherization of others’ ethical autonomy in their private domains. Above all, the otherization of others can further obscure differences among “others.” Without a genuine understanding of and interacting with the multiplicity of others, one also limits one’s ethical autonomy to preserve one’s given culture and to keep it intact in one’s private domain. Yet, the porous boundaries between the private and the public domains challenge one’s efforts to keep one’s culture intact. As a result, it seems “reasonable” to exercise one’s ethical autonomy and extol one’s “given” culture in the public domain that has become coterminous with one’s private domain. Hence, culturally responsive pedagogy must embrace ambiguous humanity in order to go beyond excluding exclusive and unreasonable doctrines in the public domain.

**Conclusion**

The changing demography of the United States has been the underlying motive for promoting culturally responsive pedagogy that aims to equip prospective citizens with necessary skills and knowledge to live in a culturally diverse society. At the same time, there have been some ongoing, fundamental, and persistent questions concerning the nature, aim, scope, content, and methods of multicultural education. In particular, there have been constant debates on the perplexing tension between
pursuing cultural unity and preserving diverse cultural traditions. This either-or bipolar perceptual framework undermines our ability to recognize that the formation of “cultural unity” and “cultural diversity” is always historicized. Instead, embracing ambiguities surrounding the liberal democratic ideal could engender more dynamic and reciprocal interactions between individuals and between cultures.

1. In this paper, “culturally responsive pedagogy” refers to teachers “using cultural referents to impart knowledge, skills, and attitudes,” as defined by Gloria Ladson-Billings. Admittedly, I overgeneralize varied theories and practices of culturally responsive pedagogy that share a common focus on incorporating students’ cultural references into teaching and curricular development. For a more detailed discussion about the early advocacy of this approach, please see Gloria Ladson-Billings, “Reading Between the Lines and Beyond the Pages: A Culturally Relevant Approach to Literacy Teaching,” *Theory Into Practice* 31, no. 4 (1992): 312–20.

2. John Rawls, *Political Liberalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 58. This work will be cited as PL in the text for all subsequent references.


18. Ibid.


