

## What Does it Mean to Transform Education?

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What if educational transformation were called for? What is meant by transformation? Will any of the array of images evoked by this word suffice as a way of conceptualizing educational change? In worrying with the word “transformation,” I want to move beyond its ordinary dictionary meaning — to change the “shape or form” of something, its “character, condition, function, nature” — and think of transformation in the hard or technical sense.<sup>1</sup> This necessitates probing what cannot fully count as transformation before I am in a position to suggest what it might be and how it might work in educational practice. In the confines of this essay, I can neither defend the assumption that deep educational change is justified nor provide a satisfactory exposition of how education might be transformed. I simply hope that one might find the notion of educational transformation sufficiently problematical, interesting, or tantalizing to follow me further.

### IMAGES OF TRANSFORMATION

Transformation may be thought of as *modification*, the reorganization of some elements or properties short of changing a thing’s central condition or function. After the reorganization, the thing remains essentially the same; it is merely reshaped in certain respects to enable it to survive better in its environment. For example, school, referring literally to the place where general education is conducted, may take a number of specific forms and still retain its traditional function whereby wisdom is passed on from one generation to the next. It may therefore be modified in one respect or another without challenging its traditional roles as means for transmitting knowledge or socializing the young. Rather than a fundamental rethinking of the nature and place of schools in contemporary society, the reorganization suggested by certain late twentieth-century writers does not necessitate a fundamental rethinking of the nature and place of schools in contemporary society but merely suggests modifying traditional aspects of school organization, be it curriculum, instruction, administration, teaching, or learning.<sup>2</sup> Similarly, late twentieth-century educational reform movements such as Goals 2000 or the national standards and testing movements do not fundamentally challenge the notion of schools and schooling but work within institutions that remain more-or-less the same after the reforms have taken place.<sup>3</sup>

While it offers a way of negotiating change to accommodate to particular situations without fundamentally altering the tradition itself, modification contributes to continuity and societal stability by making it unnecessary to continually reinvent the wheel and rethink an entire institution every time environmental circumstances change. However, when the situation changes dramatically, it may also disguise the appearance of change when more fundamental change is called for. Modification may excuse unwillingness or inability to invest resources in discovering whether or not the institution has outlived its usefulness or needs to be fundamentally changed or reinvented. History is rife with evidence of civilizations

that ceased to be because they could not or would not reinvent education when circumstances necessitated.<sup>4</sup> Nor is its definition as clear-cut as some might believe; its edges are fuzzier than may be apparent at first glance. One might envisage modification continuing to a point over time where a thing's identity is lost and the original object is no longer recognizable, for example, when fact and fiction are blurred, or the cat is modified until it becomes a crow.

Another prospect is *accommodation*, in which one thing conforms to another. Just as the chameleon changes to fit its environment, so social systems adapt to their environments.<sup>5</sup> If they are unwilling to accommodate, they may eventually become incapable of change and fossilized—literally set in stone. Accommodation suggests a willingness to compromise, to let go of things that are regarded as nonessential, and even to change those things regarded as distinctive or fundamental in order to ensure the survival of the social system. Among its advantages, accommodation emphasizes the importance of realism and adaptability, taking into account changing practical realities and being willing to adapt beliefs and values to particular situations. It highlights the integral interrelationship between the social system and its environment; particular ideas and practices are not held in isolation but rub up against others and conform to these others. And it points to the complexity of decision-making and the practical difficulties involved in solving the many intractable problems of human society.

On the other hand, analogies between the social system and biological and psychological accommodative phenomena can only be carried so far and ultimately break down. Accommodation may place undue weight on the environment in which the social system operates and leaves aside notions such as the social construction of knowledge in which norms are forged by or within the social system rather than externally given or universally construed principles. The term suggests that the social system compromises with aspects of its environment and adapts to these perceived conditions because it takes the external claims on it to be normative; it substitutes other external values for its own and ends up exchanging one limited perspective for another. When compromise is the price for accommodation the institution may lose more than it gains in the process of change; compromise is not always good, nor is it always possible, especially when one value-set contradicts another.

Yet another concept, *integration*, is employed in Charlene Morton's figurative description of an "add and stir" approach to music education curriculum where elements are combined in a mix that is sufficiently accommodating to enable them to coexist reasonably satisfactorily, but where one does not threaten the existence of another.<sup>6</sup> For example, it is possible to forge musical curricula in which male and female, or popular and classical music perspectives are included but where one does not challenge or confront the validity or sufficiency of the other. Among its advantages, integration suggests the importance of reciprocity and mutuality in allowing each perspective to coexist without enforcing assimilation or threatening the viability of the other. By combining ingredients, a richer mixture may be created than might exist in the absence of one or other element. And stirring perspectives

suggests a movement toward some sort of blend of ingredients. For example, in Morton's "add and stir" music curricula, music of women and men is included, although each is examined from the perspective of traditional criteria.

However, while the range of perspectives may be broadened by integration, underlying beliefs, values, and enterprises may be fundamentally unchallenged by the inclusion of divergent perspectives. In the case of the "add and stir" music curriculum, for example, historical perspectives on music developed principally by white, Western males may remain preeminent in examining women's contributions to music. Music by women and popular music may not be taken as seriously as the music of men or classical music and the appearance of inclusivity and equality may be a facade.<sup>7</sup> Instead of a genuine dialectic, in which masculine and feminine, popular and classical perspectives are in tension, the one challenging, acting as a foil to, or criticizing the other, patriarchal and classical values may remain preeminent, and constitute the principal means whereby all musics are adjudicated. Learners' beliefs and practices are not necessarily confronted or challenged, and education may remain, for them, an academic exercise rather than a life-changing experience. Like modification, change of this sort may be superficial rather than deep, apparent more than real.

A further possibility is *assimilation*, in which one thing overpowers and absorbs another.<sup>8</sup> For example, the more powerful social system absorbs or takes another into itself such that the less powerful other loses its independence and becomes a part of the more potent entity. In this case, the structures and functions of the more powerful entity may remain essentially as they were before it took place, whereas the weaker may lose its separate identity and become inextricably attached to the stronger. Cultural assimilation is illustrated historically by the Roman Empire's appropriation of Greek culture at the same time as it overcame Greek political power, and the subsequent assimilation and subjugation of other cultures by the Holy Roman Empire, British Empire and United States of America while maintaining their respective languages, religions, and artistic heritages. Indeed, imperialism and colonization depend on an asymmetrical relationship between powerful and weak, conqueror and conquered, oppressor and oppressed.

Assimilation enables newcomers to a social system to be incorporated as members and it allows the young to be socialized and enculturated. Just as the Romans benefited from Greek culture, or the British colonies benefited from a system of public administration, governance, and justice, so Mexican immigrants benefit from the health and educational services of the United States. Nor is this relationship a one-way street. The Greeks benefited from Roman law and defense, British culture was infused with colonial influences, and United States culture was enriched by Mexican influences. Paulo Freire reads the asymmetrical power relationship inherent to assimilation as paternalistic and oppressive, in that the more powerful person or system can dictate to the less powerful other, thereby removing the opportunity for the other's freedom of choice.<sup>9</sup> Even in situations that seem quite benign, for example, in the case of the benevolent despot who has the interests of his subjects at heart, rules them wisely, and shows them mercy and charity, the dictator

restricts their freedoms and otherwise imposes his will upon them. I am sympathetic to Freire's enterprise, however, there is a sense in which differences in power are an inescapable part of the human condition, but the situation is more complex than when he envisions, especially in today's multicultural societies. It seems that in every society, irrespective of the particular political arrangements, be they democratic or totalitarian, some individuals, groups, and institutions, by dint of their nature or environment are better off and more powerful than others. Not only is there no one view of what is oppressive, but whether or not one has the choice to assimilate or be assimilated may make a difference in how assimilation is viewed and whether or not it is indeed oppressive.

Alternatively, transformation may be thought of as *inversion*, in which the order of things is turned upside down. For example, some feminist aestheticians wish to replace patriarchal values with matriarchal values as the preeminent artistic values.<sup>10</sup> A sea-change of this magnitude suggests profound changes in the individual or social system. Many benefits may flow from such a reversal of values including opportunities for many of the people to participate in self-government and exercise greater personal choice and individual responsibility than in an autocracy. Likewise, if a patriarchal aesthetic were to be replaced by a matriarchal system, artistic life may benefit from the greater informality, inclusiveness, participation, and interrelatedness with life that a matriarchal system might offer.

Notwithstanding its potential benefits, inversion may be restrictive or may not necessarily broaden perspectives; it simply replaces one limited view for another and relies upon an hierarchical arrangement of values that privileges some and tolerates, marginalizes or repudiates others. Regarding its restrictiveness or narrowness, it is likely, for example, that replacing a patriarchy with a matriarchy will not necessarily improve the situation for everyone given that its values may represent the perspectives of half of the population. Patriarchy and matriarchy each have their limitations, albeit different, and neither perspective is sufficiently broad to benefit all humankind. Regarding its hierarchical assumptions, inversion carries the baggage of privileging some at the expense of others, of turning things upside down so that what was at the top is now at the bottom or vice versa. Despite this change in position, the thing itself remains essentially the same. For example, seeing that matriarchy and patriarchy are both concerned fundamentally with power, inversion simply affects who has it and whose perspectives will be preeminent — those of men or women. So inversion does not satisfy as the grounds for transformation.

Another possibility is *synthesis*, or the blending or melding of opposites, fusing thesis and antithesis into a new entity, an idea that has been attractive to educational philosophers such as John Dewey and his followers. The paradoxical nature of synthesis and the underlying tension between thesis and antithesis imply the possibility of an even larger idea, concept, or thing that might encompass both, where the underlying paradoxes and dialectics can be resolved or accommodated in some way and aspects of the two can be melded. Synthesis accomplishes a resolution to conflict or tension by offering a new and different alternative; its underlying metaphor of contest suggests that when the struggle between dialectics is solved,

peace and tranquility will follow; and its reliance on polarities rather than dichotomies offers the prospect of “soft boundaries” between things in conflict that complicates and enriches the resulting synthesis.<sup>11</sup>

Although Susanne Langer acknowledges that categories are not closed systems and that any category “may spring a leak,” she rightly worries that synthesis may become an excuse for sloppy philosophical thinking, where things that should be clarified are not because one rests in the hope that somehow the notion of synthesis will do the trick, and apparent paradoxes may arise in the first place because fine and careful distinctions have not been made.<sup>12</sup> There are other difficulties besides a potential lack of philosophical rigor. Resolving thesis and antithesis into synthesis presupposes the logical possibility and practicality of their accommodation with reference to some broader, more inclusive, even universal principle(s) presently hidden from view. One of the contributions of feminist thought, among other post-modern discourses, is the argument that it is reductionistic to assume that universal principles govern all human conduct in every particular situation, or that each dichotomy is resolvable into a polarity constituting the logical grounds for synthesis. It is simplistic to regard every theoretical synthesis as being practically feasible, witness the complexity and intractability of ethical, political, religious, and linguistic, among other cultural and social dilemmas, throughout history. Aside from the conceptual difficulties of melding polarities and discontinuities, there are a host of practical issues surrounding their implementation, for example, the difficulties in forging and maintaining consistent educational policy in contemporary society.

Another interesting possibility is *transfiguration*, or the experience whereby the holy person or mythical figure changes into another order or state of being, implying more generally, a change in an entity’s shape or form. For example, in Jewish tradition, Moses was transfigured when he received commandments from God; in Christian tradition, Jesus was transfigured before his crucifixion; in Kaluli myth, a male ancestor was transfigured into a *muni* bird, and so on. Transfiguration indicates a profound and internal change, a heightened state of consciousness and physical being that may or may not be accompanied by, or result in, a permanent change in form or shape. This notion is potentially rich. It denotes a profoundly internal change within the individual that can be detected readily by others, suggests a change that begins with the individual’s experience and radiates outwards to be caught by others, focuses on a convictional moment of insight that dramatically changes those who witness or hear about it, and devolves around a charismatic figure whose profound change acts as a catalyst to inspire commitment on the part of his or her disciples. It is the stuff of myth and story that seeps out from an event involving a few people into the larger society. And it provides the impetus for a ground swell of social change that bubbles up from below rather than being imposed from above.

Emphasizing the dramatic element of personal transformation, however, negates that change which seems to creep inexorably onward, gradually reshaping personal and social life. Centering on a charismatic figure or event, and relying on the osmotic effect of this personal drama on others, like the outward ripple of waves, takes insufficient regard of the power of institutions, their resistance to change, and

the fact that the force of a transfigurative moment may be blunted by those who stand to lose by a change in the status quo. That transfiguration may be momentary pays insufficient regard to the importance of continuing reinforcement and support throughout subsequent life. One may look back to a dramatic experience in the past as a source of inspiration for present living; however, unless this is fed in the present, its impact gradually dims. Given that educational changes often transpire over the course of decades, even centuries, transfiguration seems too limited in scope and too transitory an experience to sustain educational transformation alone over the long term.

Similarly, the idea of *conversion* is employed in religious understanding to denote an inward change in conviction in which one intellectual perspective or world view replaces another. Like transfiguration, it highlights the nature of personal experience and its contribution to social change. Rather than focusing on an ecstatic or dramatic experience that is visible to others, conversion concerns the nature of knowledge and truth claims. One's conviction goes beyond reason; it is felt rather than simply thought about, emotional and physical as well as rational, intuitive or imaginative. It is a profoundly spiritual experience approaching the overlay of corporeal, emotional and cognitive elements captured differently in Langer's conception of "feeling," Israel Scheffler's notion of "cognitive emotion," and Iris Yob's idea of "emotional cognition."<sup>13</sup> The advent or settling of this conviction may be dramatic (as in James Loder's example of Paul's conversion to Christianity) or evolutionary (as in Loder's view of stages of faith development). For Loder, such transformative convictions have several characteristics: they occur within the context of environment, entail a sense of selfhood, include a sense of "void" or of not being, and involve a sense of "new" being, of beginning again.<sup>14</sup> Whatever their particularities, these transformative convictions deal with such fundamental questions of existence as "Who am I?" "Where did I come from?" "Where am I going?" "What is the significance of my life?" As such, they are potentially life-changing events.

The idea of conversion offers a great deal to educational transformation. Like transfiguration, it highlights the importance of individual experience as a prelude to communal and societal transformation. Focusing as it does on conviction rather than the appearance of something extraordinary or magical in transfiguration, conversion highlights the importance of mind and body in the educational process, of an holistic experience or feeling that goes beyond reason to invoke imagination, intuition, emotion, and bodily sensation. Seeing that conversion represents a more-or-less permanent change in one's state of mind or body that affects the way one thinks about oneself, the world, or whatever lies beyond, it suggests something more than a transitory altered state of consciousness, or reliance on miracles or other extraordinary events. As such, it offers a continuing basis on which transformation might be accomplished. However, it does not contain mechanisms to ensure social in addition to individual change. Like transfiguration, its reliance upon changes in personal experience in order to achieve societal transformation is probably too optimistic regarding the willingness of people to change individually or collectively. In including intuition, imagination, emotion, and physical sensation, it may also

downplay reason as the basis for discourse and judgment. Notions of embodiment of knowledge, imagination, intuitive thought, the interplay of emotion and intellect, while drawing attention to holistic and diverse ways of knowing, and although constituting various sorts of rationality, also potentially overlook the contributions of logical discourse to human knowledge. The impact of some postmodern thought has been to undermine the importance of logical and propositional thought in favor of more holistic perspectives and procedural understandings. While some of these insights have enriched and challenged our understanding of human rationality, reason construed as logical and propositional thought also offers a legitimate and important way by which humans think about themselves, the world around them, and whatever lies beyond.

#### A DIALECTICAL VIEW

Each of the foregoing images of transformation is insightful yet flawed in one way or another, and none suffices as a satisfactory conception of transformation. My own dialectical view sees “this is with that” such that various elements and perspectives are in tension with each other, one or another coming to the fore at a particular time and place as actors might move about on a stage.<sup>15</sup> Among these dialectics, transformation occurs from the outside in and from the inside out provoked by an internal willingness to change and an external pressure to change. It is accommodative and revolutionary, an individual and collective enterprise, form and function, superficial appearance and deep structural change, hierarchical and egalitarian, subversive and conservative, centered on a transformational moment and decentered from it, active and passive, dynamic process and state of being. These dialectics are not easily reconciled and the paradoxes they raise contribute to the theoretical and practical complexities of educational transformation.

Rather than a static event that occurs at a particular time and is immediately and virtually complete, transformation is in the process of becoming; it possesses a quality of livingness and vitality. Irrespective of whether it appears to be climatic in the sense that there seems to be a central moment, a single experience that stands apart from or above the ordinary, or imperceptible in the sense that it is difficult to tell exactly when and where a change occurred, the experience of transformation is felt as a living, vital thing. As such, it seems to rise and fall against the backdrop of ordinary experience, and yet afterwards, it is clear that a profound change has occurred. Its dynamic quality makes it difficult to observe because in its unfolding there may be no single defining moment in the dynamic process of change. It seems to carry the seeds of change within itself and it takes time to evolve. Even where the social system responds to its changing environment, the impetus for change comes from within as well as without; it is not only enforced from the outside but evolves from within the social system. There is a willingness and ability to be transformed on the part of the system itself, quite apart from any external pressure to do so, and this internal volition to change energizes and enables the transformative process. While there are limits to the degree to which an analogy with the physical world may be pressed, a social system’s evolution may also reflect the impact of physical and human catastrophes, and the particular political, economic, religious, artistic and other policies that shape social and cultural environments in which it exists. This

evolutionary quality suggests that transformation is profoundly internal not only to the social system taken as a whole but to the particular individuals who comprise it, that is, the transformation of a social system cannot occur in the absence of the transformation of the individuals who comprise it; it involves a deep and abiding commitment to different shared purposes and a real change of heart and mind on their part.

Transformation is metamorphic in the sense of transmutation and transfiguration. It goes beyond accommodation, assimilation, or modification to a radical and fundamental reshaping of the social system and the individuals within it and entails a change in the state or the stuff of the social system, its core values, beliefs, and mores, even its *raison d'être*. Figuratively, its very genes — the gut of its makeup, guiding principles, and blueprint for the future — are altered; it exists for new purposes, in a different state than before the transformation occurred. The transfigurations of its founding mothers and fathers, the visions of its heroes, and the insights of its prophets and seers are sources of inspiration to its members as it undergoes this profound change, faces in a different direction, and pursues its new goals in a fresh way.

Extending across the entire social system and impacting every aspect of the group's function and operation, transformation is systemic. Assimilation, integration, synthesis, inversion, modification and accommodation are essential in order to find a reciprocity between differing individual and collective beliefs, values, and mores. Assimilation involves the willingness of members to accept beliefs and practices that are different from one's personal wishes in order to share membership of the group; seeing that people within a group differ, some assimilation is desirable if a group is to work cohesively and effectively as a single unit. Integration suggests that members are willing to respect the views of different others and allow them to coexist in the group without pressuring them to change; this mutual tolerance allows the group to experience unity of purpose while at the same time recognizing that unity does not equate with homogeneity of procedure. Synthesis invokes the idea that polar opposites in the system may be fused or melded in some respects to produce a different perspective than either polarity taken alone; it also suggests the idea of finding a path midway between extreme positions, reminiscent of the balance implicit in Aristotle's "golden mean." Inversion highlights the fact that transformation is a mixed blessing, that there are those who stand to lose, as well as those who stand to gain from systemic change. Modification entails structural changes in the appearance of the system to those within as well as without it; transformation not only involves substantive change but the appearance of substantive change. And accommodation suggests that the system must respond to practical realities in the phenomenal world, and this recognition may help preserve it against unrealistic and impractical strategies, and temper the radical and impetuous elements within the system.

As a "way of seeing and feeling things as they compose an integral whole," in which "old and familiar things are made new in experience," imagination constitutes a central mechanism by which transformation works.<sup>16</sup> Before one can accomplish

systemic change, one must first imagine how things could be different and how such change might be accomplished. Freire rightly observes that people only hope when there is a fleshed out dream or vision to hold onto, and transformation relies upon the presence of hope and faith in its realization.<sup>17</sup> Imagination enables the articulating of a vision. It makes it possible for people to hope for something that is intellectually satisfying and emotionally compelling, about which they hold conviction as well as passion, and it motivates them to press toward this goal. It is spiritual in its involvement of a deep sense of “otherness,” mystery, awe, and reverence in the face of the fragility and shortness of human life, the inevitability of death, and the possibility of new beginnings full of promise; it is felt cognitively, emotionally, even physically.<sup>18</sup> Indeed, its spiritual quality comes closest to the notion of conversion in the sense that one’s life is reoriented due to a change of attitudes, beliefs, and habits. This sense of mystery, reverence, and awe seems akin to Loder’s observation that a convictional change such as occurs in conversion necessitates the individual coming directly into contact with the central questions of life, with her or his mortality, and the importance of the present as a moment to be treasured and used wisely.<sup>19</sup>

Moreover, transformation works through the power of demonstration as the force of its example motivates other witnesses to seek it for themselves.<sup>20</sup> Being “caught,” like osmosis, more than didactically taught, captures the ancient idea of breathing knowledge and vitality into another person.<sup>21</sup> An exemplar serves as a source of motivation for others to acquire the means to possess it whether by copying it, or in creating something like it, based on it, or going beyond it. The very fact that ideas are embodied or expressed in practical or physical ways causes others to want to possess not only the activity but the idea associated with it. Through this mechanism, transformation spreads between and among individuals and groups. True, the task of practical implementation is political, messier and more ambiguous than its theoretical ideal might suggest. Unexpected consequences flow from human action, alternative visions compete for the public’s attention, vested interests jockey for power and prestige, and the task of realizing an idea is a daunting one, even more problematical at a time when institutional power is pervasive and ordinary individuals must join together if they are to be heard in public spaces.

In sum, this dialectical view broadens as it also makes problematic the conception of educational transformation. While such an approach may be useful in understanding the nature of social undertakings such as education, it may be less successful in excluding what does not count as transformation. Moreover, a nest of related questions remain unanswered: How broadly should this notion of transformation apply? What values are implicit in this view of transformation? What are the ends towards which education should be transformed? Notwithstanding these detractions, with a more philosophically robust if also problematical notion of transformation, one is now in a better position to evaluate its usefulness both as an idea and as a descriptor for educational change.

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1. *Oxford Illustrated Dictionary*, ed. J. Coulson et al. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962), 880.

2. Mortimer Adler, *Reforming Education: The Opening of the American Mind* (New York: Macmillan, 1977); Mortimer Adler, et. al., *The Paideia Program: An Educational Syllabus* (New York: Macmillan, 1984); Roland S. Barth, *Run School Run* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980); Jerome S. Bruner, *The Culture of Education* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996); Elliot Eisner, *Cognition and Curriculum Reconsidered* (New York: Teachers College Press, 1994); John I. Goodlad, *A Place Called School: Prospects for the Future* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1984); and Theodore R.Sizer, *Horace's Compromise: The Dilemma of the American High School* (Boston: Houghtlin Mifflin, 1984).
3. *America 2000: An Educational Strategy: Sourcebook* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Education, 1991); *National Standards for Arts Education: What Every Young American Should Know and Be Able to Do in the Arts*, ed. Michael Blakeslee (Reston VA: Music Educators National Conference, 1994).
4. Edward D. Myers, *Education in the Perspective of History*, with a concluding chapter by Arnold Toynbee (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1968).
5. For Jean Piaget, *The Origins of Intelligence in Children*, trans., Margaret Cook (New York: International Universities Press, 1952), 416, accommodation denotes the organism's active and differentiated responses to the environment and constitutes an adaptive, biological, psychological, and evolutionary mechanism. See also Jean Piaget, *Behavior and Evolution*, trans., Donald Nicholson-Smith (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978); and Jean Piaget, *Adaptation and Intelligence: Organic Selection and Phenocopy*, trans., Stewart Eames (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980). This process of accommodating to the environment is governed by accommodation norms, see Jean Piaget, *The Grasp of Consciousness: Action and Concept*, trans. Susan Wedgwood (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977), 351.
6. Charlene Morton, "Feminist Theory and the Displaced Music Curriculum: Beyond the 'Add and Stir' Projects," *Philosophy of Music Education Review* 2, no. 2 (1994): 106-21.
7. Lucy Green, *Music on Deaf Ears: Musical Meaning, Ideology and Education* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988), chap. 6.
8. Piaget's notion of assimilation is "correlative" with that of accommodation, see Piaget, *Origins of Intelligence in Children*, 416. Assimilation denotes the process whereby organizing structures are intellectually constructed, for example, during the sensorimotor developmental phase of intelligence the young child learns to classify and manipulate materials in her or his environment. Indeed, for Piaget, intelligence is "an organizing activity" in which some things are subsumed in others. See Jean Piaget, *The Child and Reality*, trans. Arnold Rosin (New York: Grossman Publishers, 1973), 82, 407-19.
9. Paulo Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, trans., Myra Bergman Ramos (New York: Continuum, 1990), ch. 4.
10. Heide Göttner-Abendroth, "Nine Principles of a Matriarchal Aesthetic," in *Feminist Aesthetics*, ed. Gisela Ecker, trans. Harriet Anderson (Boston: Beacon Press, 1985), 81-94.
11. Claire Detels, *Soft Boundaries: Re-Visioning the Arts and Aesthetics in American Education* (Westport, CT: Bergin and Garvey, 1999).
12. Susanne K. Langer, *Feeling and Form: A Theory of Art Developed from Philosophy in a New Key* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1953), chap. 2. Support for the concept of "soft boundaries" can be found in Susanne K. Langer, *Practice of Philosophy* (New York: Henry Holt, 1930). See Mary J. Reichling, "A Woman Ahead of Her Time: The Langer Legacy," *Philosophy of Music Education Review* 6, no. 1 (1998): 17-18.
13. Langer, *Feeling and Form*, chap. 3; Israel Scheffler, *In Praise of the Cognitive Emotions and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Education* (New York: Routledge, 1991), 3-17; Iris M. Yob, "The Cognitive Emotions and Emotional Cognitions," in *Reason and Education: Essays in Honor of Israel Scheffler*, ed. Harvey Siegel (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997), 43-57.
14. James E. Loder, *The Transforming Moment: Understanding Convictional Experiences* (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1981), chap. 3.
15. For a discussion and criticism of this dialectical approach, see Estelle R. Jorgensen, "Justifying Music in General Education: Belief in Search of Reason," and Iris M. Yob, "Can the Justification of Music Education be Justified?" in *Philosophy of Education 1996*, ed. Frank Margonis (Urbana, IL: Philosophy of Education Society, 1997), 228-40.

16. John Dewey, *Art as Experience* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1934), 267.

17. Paulo Freire, *Pedagogy of Hope: Reliving Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, notes and introduction by Ana Maria Araújo Freire, trans. Robert R. Barr (New York: Continuum, 1994). In his *Pedagogy of the Heart*, notes by Ana Maria Araújo Freire, trans. Donaldo Macedo and Alexandre Oliveira (New York: Continuum, 1997), 101-07, Paulo Freire links faith and hope in the context of a religious persuasion.

18. This spiritual quality is captured in Freire, *Pedagogy of the Heart*.

19. The focus on imminence and transcendence of the present moment in Parker J. Palmer, *Let Your Life Speak: Listening for the Voice of Vocation* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2000) echoes a persistent concern among educational philosophers. See, for example, Alfred North Whitehead, *The Aims of Education and Other Essays* (New York: Macmillan, 1929), 14.

20. Estelle R. Jorgensen, "Engineering Change in Music Education: A Model of the Political Process Underlying the Boston School Music Movement," *Journal of Research in Music Education* 31 (1983): 67-75.

21. In music, this idea comes across in sources as diverse as Aboriginal songmen facing their pupils and breathing a song into them, see A.P. Elkin, "Arnhem Land Music," *Oceania* 24, no. 2 (1953): 81-109 and Hildegard of Bingen who, in her letters refers to song as the breath of God, see *Hildegard of Bingen's Book of Divine Works with Letters and Songs*, ed. Matthew Fox (Santa Fe, NM: Bear and Co., 1987), letter 41, 354-59.