

A Humean Model of Democratic Reasonableness

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In order better to “see” justice, Plato famously suggests in the *Republic* that we first step back in order to consider it writ large in a community as a whole. Having thus gained this larger scale understanding, it may be easier to identify it on the smaller scale, to find the just person.

It’s not impossible, then, that justice might exist on a larger scale in the larger entity and be easier to discern. So, if you have no objection, why don’t we start by trying to see what justice is like in communities? And then we can examine individuals too, to see if the larger entity is reflected in the features of the smaller entity (368d-369a).

For the present argument, I propose the same heuristic device, only in reverse. As a model for understanding the motivational requirements of democratic education, I want to explore elements of David Hume’s moral psychology, specifically his internalist doctrine of how the passions and reason are related. Humean internalism, I will argue, provides a compelling model for how a universalizing force (such as reason) may shape, structure, and discipline particularizing forces (such as the various passions) without in any simple sense dominating or, certainly, extinguishing them. Hume’s account of how reason is both a “slave” to the passions yet also an instrument for altering them shows how trans-spherical norms of universal rights can be both subservient to and also, in a sense that is crucial for liberals, boundary-keepers and interveners with regard to the various social spheres. Alongside other key democratic institutions, an education system of necessity sits astride this problematic. To maintain legitimacy, it must configure itself in ways that correspond to the larger social “settlement” in this regard; in doing so, a system of education always maintains a distinctive fingerprint of obligation.

For Hume, the received rationalist picture that morality involves a struggle between reason and the passions, one that should be resolved in favor of the former, is false. Humean moral psychology admits of no such struggle because reason is incapable of providing *by itself* a motivation for moral action. If reason is incapable of providing such a motivation, then *a fortiori* it cannot be party to such a motivational struggle. As John Rawls explains Hume’s position, “Nothing can oppose a passion except a contrary passion; and no passion, or impulse, can arise from reason alone. Thus there is no struggle between reason and the passions.”² Human beings are moved by passions to which, ultimately, reason is instrumental and hence subordinate. Thus Hume’s famous line that “Reason is and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any office than to serve and obey them.”³ Reason may generate well-formed and universally applicable propositions about moral principles, but what it can never do is by itself motivate an actual human being either to *care* about those principles or the other human beings toward whom those principles are directed. Bernard Williams vividly illustrates this point when he describes the task of talking a suicidal “amoralist” into caring about something. Williams speculates quite plausibly that rational argumentation in the

“*Q. E. D.*” sense will be of little assistance in such a situation. “We might indeed ‘give him a reason’ in the sense of finding something that he is prepared to care about, but that is not inducing him to care by reason, and it is very doubtful whether there could be any such thing. What he needs is help, or hope, not reasonings.”⁴ The best one might do is *point out* that-about-which and those-for-whom the suicidal person cares — hoping against hope that those bonds of care are still there, however obscured they may have become. If the bonds of care are altogether absent — by definition pathologically so — then all hope of persuasion would be gone. For good or ill, premising our moral choices is some thing (or set of things) that is irreducibly nonrational. Hume amplifies this point in another oft-quoted passage, where he explains that “the understanding can neither justify nor condemn” a passion. “‘Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger.”⁵

This is the sense in which Hume’s psychologicist account of moral motivation may be labeled an “internalist” one: moral motivation arises not from generalizable laws of rationality (for example, following Kant, deontological principles that guide all rational creatures insofar as they are rational) but rather from the passions qua the set of already existing motivations that an individual has, from whatever ultimately naturalizable source.⁶ Internalism is roughly the idea that if something is to count as a reason *X* for person *Y*, *X* has to “link up” with *Y*’s already existing set of motivations. Given Hume’s assumption that our passions are necessary conditions for our being moved, his account is an internalist one (*LH*, 28).⁷ Hume would not say, for example, that *Y* has reason to do some action *Z* in any other sense than that *Y* has *her own reason X* for doing *Z*. (Alternatively, an “externalist” analysis might hold that there is some categorical sense in which *Y* does or does not *have reason* for doing *Z*, that is, in the normative sense of having a *good* reason.) If moral motivation is explained causally, this means that the passions are always at the end of any chain of reasoning meaning to explain moral action. And given that the relevant category (that is, the passions) admits of variety, there are irreducibly plural sources for moral motivation. As Rawls puts it, “there are many possible stopping points given by the passions. The aims of the passions are many, and there is no single end, not even that of aiming at pleasure and avoiding pain” (*LH*, 32). In all of their monstrous and wonderful variety, the passions provide the “stopping points” for our furthest and deepest “why’s.”

What is more, according to Hume, where rationalist philosophers and many ordinary people err is in confusing reason with what he calls the “calm” passions, as against those that are “violent.” When, considered from my own point of view, someone reacts to a situation disproportionately, I might stress the importance of “being reasonable” to that person in order to calm him down. Despite the colloquial use of the term “reasonable” here, Hume thinks that what is most likely being appealed to in the situation is not reason but one of the calmer passions. Say I am a police officer and I want to shoot a suspect who has just insulted me. My fellow officers implore me to be reasonable, perhaps expressing in whatever language sentiments like “it’s not worth it,” “you can’t just kill someone like that,” “you’ll ruin your life,” or “think of your family.” Let us say that I do “see reason” and calm down,

avoiding the murder. One might be tempted to say that I stood down from the shooting because I was motivated by reason not to do it. But Hume would say that this kind of talk obscures what has really happened. A better explanation involves looking at the situation as one in which the calm passions have, happily in this case, triumphed over the more violent passions. The latter might include a sense of being disrespected, a “hot” desire for revenge, perhaps even sadism. The former, however, might include (corresponding to my colleagues’ exhortations) calmer, more durable passions such as long-term self-preservation, a “natural” benevolence toward other human beings (for example, as the fog of the violent passions dissipates I begin to “remember” the humanity of the prisoner) or, even more “naturally,” a concern and love for my own family (for example, my children will be fatherless if I am jailed for the crime). Hume does not see how an unadulterated “reason” could, by itself, enter into this picture; what we have here instead are certain passions jockeying for motivational status with others. Properly understood, the more “reasonable” course of action is the one motivated by the calmer passions which, although they may often seem nearly dormant in everyday situations, are capable when called upon of overpowering their more effervescent violent counterparts.

Reason still has a central role for Hume, however. Despite the “slave of the passions” remark, he is no simple irrationalist. Of critical importance to the present inquiry is how central a role reason still has. Hume presents a kind of moral-developmental account in which the acquisition of moral virtue requires not (crucially) the obliteration, shoving aside, or any other sort of demotion of the passions, but rather the *cultivation* of them, a “corrected sympathy,” leading in the best case to a “progress of sentiments.”⁸ Although reason cannot itself provide motivational impetus (that is, it can neither snuff out the passions nor, given Hume’s internalism, introduce *ex nihilo* any new ones), it can often perform crucial deliberative work on passions both calm and violent. This process of moral deliberation may happen in a number of different ways.⁹ First, reason may *indirectly* augment, diminish, or catalyze the replacement of our passions by supplying and helping us to organize relevant information concerning them. So, for example, my craving for the pasta primavera before me may vanish or turn into revulsion when I realize that it has been poisoned. This new information, placed by reason into a syllogism involving me getting sick or dying upon eating the pasta, helps reconfigure my passions accordingly. My love of pasta primavera (perhaps playing the role of a violent passion) is not extinguished, but is instead temporarily displaced — through information and logic — by my greater, though usually calmer, passion to avoid dying.

Similarly, there may be passions that have been cultivated that are at bottom actually instrumental to greater and more durable passions, where new information and logic may be effective. For example, my wife has developed over many years a distaste for certain types of fattier meats, things she loved as a girl but later realized that she could not continue eating while also maintaining her health. One might call this a kind of asceticism but for the fact that she actually does — now — find the meats repugnant. (She is convincing on this point: do not try telling her that she *really does* want to eat that cheeseburger, because she *really does not*.) In the

Humean manner, she has over time corrected her passions owing to her rational understanding of the health effects of certain foods (despite, I might add, the irrationality on this point of her husband, which I am sure does not make it any easier). However, by way of solidifying the point, one could imagine a future scenario, maybe one akin to Woody Allen's zany 1970s movie *Sleeper*, in which future scientists discover that steak and chocolate pudding are actually the best things for you, where my wife reverses course and recalibrates those same sentiments. The acquired revulsion would still have to be unlearned though, presumably, a revulsion to chocolate would be easier unlearned than learned. The point, of course, is that a passion that is instrumental to another greater one is vulnerable to correction by reason if it is revealed in actuality to be ineffective or counterproductive.

Reason may also *specify* the passions (*LH*, 33). My general hunger may find me looking about for fish and chips in particular, my desire to smoke for a pack of Marlborough reds, my impulse to take flight when I hear a noise may be specified into a specific desire to run up a tree to escape the menacing dogs I subsequently realize are making the noise, my love for children specified as a love for *this* child, and so on. Once again passions are corrected, this time by being brought into greater focus. Reason may also aid me in *scheduling* the attempted fulfillment of my passions: a smoke after dinner, a bottle of wine after work rather than before it, erotic involvements at appropriate times and places, and so on (*LH*, 33). In such instances I am employing reason as an engine of comparison among my passions in the ensemble, where I widen and narrow the scope of my passions as the situation dictates, allowing for the range of what I value. Since I value drinking wine yet also the work I do during the day, I should schedule those activities so that I can accomplish both. Remember that it is not *reason* that is telling me not to drink before work, but the enacted acknowledgment of my sentiments regarding my work.

Lastly, and most dramatically, I will from time to time need to *weight* my passions qua final ends (*LH*, 33). Though Hume certainly does think that some passions are more basic than others, he seems always to speak of even the most basic passions in the plural. He writes, for example, of the calmer set of desires (the ones so often mistaken for reason itself) that they

are of two kinds; either certain instincts originally implanted in our natures, such as benevolence and resentment, the love of life, and kindness toward children; or the general appetite to good, and aversion to evil, consider'd merely as such.¹⁰

If even our most basic set of passions admits of variety, then there is always the possibility of conflict among them. These are seen in the blessedly rare moments where we are confronted with a heart-rending choice between two courses of action either of which is "backed up" by an irreducibly powerful passion. Existentialists were always good at describing these. Sartre's example of the young man's agony over whether to stay and care for his aging mother or join the resistance against the Nazis comes to mind.¹¹ Hume would, I think, agree with the thesis Sartre means to support with the example, namely, that objective reason cannot provide some neutral set of rules, a decision procedure, through which we can solve such dilemmas. We

must, in a way, make a certain “leap of faith.” Reason can be effective for Hume, though, where there is some disparity between the horns of the dilemma, that is, at least some way to differentiate them by their “felt” weightiness. Though Hume may be somewhat optimistic on this score (in the sense that for him such conflicts seem largely resolvable), reason may with the aid of such dilemmas help us establish for ourselves what one might call, after the economists, a personal “preference schedule,” a “motivational set,” or, perhaps more poetically, what Max Scheler calls an *ordo amoris*, an ordering of our love.¹²

To engage in these kinds of moral deliberation is precisely to embark upon a progress of the sentiments, where reason facilitates the progress but never replaces the sentiments themselves. Ultimately, Hume has a much larger story to tell about how this progress leads us to embrace social conventions of justice (justice qua “artificial virtue,” that is, *au courant*, a “socially constructed” one) upon which all civilization depends and, ultimately, a shared sense of humanity where one’s narrow sense of self yields to a larger intersubjective moral identity. “I esteem the man whose self-love, by whatever means, is so directed as to give him a concern for others, and to render him serviceable to society.”¹³ As Annette Baier puts it,

Hume has a famously fluid concept of the self, and the fluid ego boundaries that allows work interestingly in his moral psychology. One could say that, on a Humean version of moral development, the main task is to work to a version of oneself and one’s own interests which both maximizes the richness of one’s potential satisfactions and minimizes the likely opposition one will encounter between one’s own and others’ partially overlapping interests.¹⁴

So all of Hume’s talk of the passions and reason emphatically does not entail any simple sort of egoism or moral solipsism, where I can never break out of the cage of my own narrowly defined interests. It might be said that in Humean moral psychology, my passions, my loves and fears, hopes and desires, are rather gateways or opportunities for me to grow toward my fellow human beings, the progress of such sentiments being motored by a fellow feeling, the basis for which is, fortunately, natural to the members of the species.¹⁵ In this way, the latter day Humean might say, in the manner of contemporary evolutionary psychology, that the moral — the whole amalgamated reason-passion package — is continuous with the psychological. This is not to take a position in any “nature vs. nurture” debate except to pay homage to the uncontroversial point that we are, all of us, some admixture of the two. Reason just *is* the arrangement and rearrangement our passions, and its exercise does not place us somehow above or beyond them. Whatever it is, reason is no set of wings with which to escape ourselves.

Given this Humean picture, then, the *dramatis personae* of my analogy between Humean moral psychology and democratic education policy are as follows: reason plays the role of democratic reasonableness and the passions play the many roles assigned to them by perfectionistic individuals and groups who are motivated toward civic commitment by deep and comprehensive conceptions of the good. These latter may certainly be altered by reason or reasonableness, but they do not in any clear sense *rest* upon them. We may reject a perfectionist’s comprehensive conception of the good for its lack of reasonableness, as in the case of abandoning

traditional religion because it posits metaphysical entities — God, angels, Hell — for which there is no rational justification. But this is destructive work, the specialty of reason's acid corrosiveness. When it comes instead to constructing houses of belief to inhabit, realms of final meaning that give us at least provisional answers to the greatest "whys" of life, order and otherwise make sense of whatever virtues we take as such and, in politics and education, decide what in fact is worthwhile to pass on to future generations, something much closer to the passions is at work. Often these are of the calmer variety, and as such sometimes disguise themselves as reason. Reasons may be plentiful along the way, but at the end of the motivational line there is always a sentiment, not bare reasoning. The simplest and most child-like "why?" always forces any reason, even a chain of them, behind and beyond itself. We may indeed often "have our reasons." But whether or not we have the reasons we have the passions.

I think that a simple acknowledgement, following Hume, of the dependency of our liberal democratic reasonableness upon the many passionate ways in which we come to *care* about being democratically reasonable can go a long way. Reasonableness, as circularly defined by Rawls and other political liberals, is essentially a marker of agreement with certain basic liberal *grundnorms* of human equality and freedom.¹⁶ A Taliban-like conception of the good that involved the thoroughgoing disenfranchisement of females would *ipso facto* be considered to be unreasonable, as would be some other statist dystopia that massively suppressed civil liberties. These are to be regarded as unreasonable views because they are illiberal. They are illiberal because they egregiously enough violate liberal norms of equality and liberty. What this definitional fiat tends to conceal, however, is the extent to which this democratic reasonableness concerning the basic terms of political cooperation is parasitic upon some commitment — or, more likely, in a heterogeneous society, a set of them — deep and abiding enough to motivate political action on behalf of equality and freedom in the first place. However complementary with whatever may be our human nature and however much they may be nurtured, such democratic commitments are neither hardwired, bred, nor merely conditioned in us. They are *historically* developed, human platforms of facticity upon which we build. But even though the basic democratic commitments are importantly "there" in the culture, it is internal to democracy's very meaning that our commitment to them must be to some appreciable degree conscious and reflective, not just aped. Learning democracy cannot be wholly like learning a mother tongue. It may have a "feel" to it, a "rhythm," even a "spirit" (for example, the "Spirit of '76"). There may be reinforcing songs and slogans. But it must also be *cognitively* appropriated, to some extent consciously "fit in" and made deliberately to cohere with one's other motivating beliefs, and ultimately one's comprehensive conception of the good, to the extent one has one. This is where we find the major premises for democracy's own moral arguments and justifications.

If it is to involve the *demos* actually ruling, democracy requires citizens who engage in, to use Amy Gutmann's phrase, "conscious social reproduction," rather than mere reflexive social reproduction, however desirable may be that which is

being reproduced.¹⁷ It is necessary to embrace the democratic terms of cooperation mindfully rather than merely go through their motions. One can all-too-easily imagine what this “merely” means because we so often live it, perhaps of necessity in a large and complex society: proceduralist zombies, we often mindlessly follow “the rules” of allegedly fair procedures that we simply find “always already there,” tacitly assuming they are there for good reason” — *someone’s* good reason. To a certain degree this everyday reflexive mindlessness is only practical (for example, following traffic rules), but it is certainly not sufficient if it characterizes the whole of our embrace of the terms of cooperation. Democracy needs people — for its own stability and also for its very identity — who follow the important rules not merely out of habit but because in some important sense they have *decided* to follow them.¹⁸ Any decent political education would concern itself centrally with this distinction. It is certainly good to develop participatory habits such as voting. But this surely is not good enough. There also has to be a moment of reflective appropriation where one has some more or less justifiable understanding of exactly why voting is civically vital. In a democracy, there is a strong imperative for us to have some degree of self-knowledge, the “conscious” part of Gutmann’s conscious social reproduction, such that we are doing what we do in a way that goes beyond simply being told to do so. One might call this democratic depth, where one is able deliberately to attach one’s democratic politics to whatever else it is one believes, most importantly one’s comprehensive conception of the good.¹⁹

So democratic education centrally involves a vital moral-psychological linking operation. It must effect a rendez-vous between the relatively thin and narrow political terms of cooperation (that are definitive of reasonableness) and the variously elaborated, thicker conceptions of the good that provide meaning and direction to individuals and their collectivities in a more thoroughgoing manner. Like any competent pedagogue, democratic education must take people as it finds them and then transform them, hermeneutically appropriating the horizons provided by both the comprehensive commitments and also the relatively autonomous political commitments (“relatively autonomous” because they admit of multiple supports). When confronted with adherents of a comprehensive conception that seems ostensibly hostile to democratic reasonableness, the democratic educator will therefore avoid a neocolonialist strategy of “conversion.” She will instead follow a more heremeneutic principle of charity that will assume until proven otherwise that the comprehensive conception in question is compatible with democracy. Now it may turn out that the charity was over-extended. There are comprehensive conceptions that are not only non-democratic but anti-democratic.²⁰ But, in all but the most extreme cases, one should probably always err on the side of continuing to extend the charity, the inherent illiberality of statist over-reach being an independent worry.²¹ Typically, in pursuing its linking strategy with anti-democratic-seeming groups, democratic education will seek alliance with the more liberal elements among the group’s adherents and help them make the case to their fellows. With its well-documented catalog of abuses (some of them severe and chauvinistic) as well as successes (some of them glorious), American and other immigrant-absorbing

democracies have long been engaging in this assimilative-educative dynamic. There are those who would see this assimilative linking process as worthy only of condemnation, emphasizing only the “trail of tears” abuses, those who would see democracy as hypocritical whenever it dares “touch” anyone else. To this point of view, it must be emphasized that democracy is not moral *laissez-faire*. Not everything goes. Though an abundance of caution must be used in making such a judgment, some things are indeed beyond democracy’s pale. One does stand “*somewhere* when one stands there.”

Like Humean rationality, at its best democratic reasonableness is itself transformed even as it transforms. For as it forges the linkages between the terms of cooperation and the many comprehensive conceptions, it inevitably alters its own self-understandings and practices. When confronted by, say, the comprehensive conception of a Martin Luther King, Jr., it may expand its own working notion of the circumference of reasonableness qua inclusion — even as it “assimilates” a previously disenfranchised group into the political process. So it is not just a one-way street, a civilizing mission against irrational elements of the population. Following Humean internalism, it is not a matter of replacing passions with reason, but allowing reason its place alongside the passions so it can then transform and be transformed by them. These transformations, these linkages are themselves the work of reason, not a reason that stands alone, but a reason that is conjunctive and disjunctive, that links comprehensive commitments to democratic politics and that de-links, where necessary, items within those very same categories. When the democrat asks the partisan of a particular comprehensive conception to “be reasonable,” she is not therefore asking him to *abandon* his comprehensive conception in favor of the nakedly reasonable. She is instead challenging him to explore ways to effect an acceptable linkage between the cherished comprehensive conception and the hoped-for democratic norms. It is in accepting this challenge that one begins to engage in democratic education. In a Deweyan vein, one might call it “growth,” where the process described by the linking operation is “*itself* the “reasonableness.” But democratic reasonableness does not itself provide motivation. Instead, it *brings motivation to bear* upon the set of reasonable terms of political cooperation, anchoring them in the only way that such anchoring can work, by grounding them in something exterior, the deeper and less movable the better.

This linkage is itself the work of reason. Analytic and synthetic, it is parasitic upon that which it analyzes and that which it synthesizes. It does not stand alone. It is a making consistent, a catalyst for the hoped-for coherence in the lives of individuals of their democratic politics with their various comprehensive conceptions of the good. This is really what democratic education writ large amounts to. From the point of view of intergenerational reproduction, it is a grand and hopefully virtuous circle of reasoning, a reflective equilibrium of sorts, with the emphasis on “reflective.” But the democratic commitments that define “the reasonable” ought not be misrecognized as Hume thought reason itself so often is. The commitments that define the scope of the reasonable are themselves passions, albeit calmer, better-anchored ones. And they are calmer and better anchored not because they are above and apart from the passions, but precisely because they are ensconced so well within

a healthily diverse range of them. It is almost like a cautious stock portfolio, where diversification and an eye toward the long range keeps one safe from the wilder ups and downs. But it is a matter of diversification, not divestment. The goal of democratic reasonableness is not to hunt down and eliminate the irrational. The goal is to stabilize democracy by making reasonableness a cherished part of peoples' lives, a necessary and durable component of their own self-understanding. I suspect that Hume, that passionate lover of moderation, has something like this in mind when he describes moral progress as a process of enlarging our sentiments such that we might come "to fix on some *steady* and *general* points of view."²² Likewise, democratic education should "fix on some steady and general" conception of democratic reasonableness as a central goal. But we arrive at that reasonableness only through the passionate self-conceptions and ultimate purposes that we ourselves continue to forge.

1. Plato, *Republic*, trans. Robin Waterfield (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 58 (translation altered by the author, "justice" for "morality").

2. John Rawls, *Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000), 29. For all subsequent references this text will be cited as *LH*.

3. David Hume, "Treatise, Book II, Section V," in *Hume: Moral and Political Philosophy*, ed. Henry D. Aiken (New York: Hafner Press, 1948), 25.

4. Bernard Williams, *Morality: An Introduction to Ethics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), 3.

5. Hume, *Treatise*, 2d ed., ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 416.

6. One should not take this label too far, though. As Dorothy Coleman rightly suggests, it would be anachronistic simply to ascribe to Hume a "position" in the contemporary "internalism-externalism" debate among philosophers. [Dorothy Coleman, "Hume's Internalism," *Hume Studies*, 18 (1992): 331-47]. In short, Hume is a naturalist who wants to give an account of how moral judgments are made. He does not undertake to justify morality as such, as he holds that certain end-of-the-line "sympathies" are definitive of humanity itself. He writes: "It is needless to push our researches so far as to ask, why we have humanity or fellow-feeling with others. It is sufficient, that this is experienced to be a principle of human nature"; Hume, *Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals* (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1983), 219-20n.

7. See also Coleman, "Hume's Internalism," 331.

8. Annette Baier helpfully develops this point from a "care" perspective in *Moral Prejudices: Essays on Ethics* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994), 64.

9. Here I follow Rawls's categorization; Rawls, *Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy*, 33.

10. Hume, *Treatise*, 417.

11. Jean-Paul Sartre, *Existentialism and Humanism* (London: Methuen, 1968), 35-37.

12. Max Scheler, *Selected Philosophical Essays*, trans. David Lachterman (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1973).

13. Hume, *Enquiry*, 297 and Baier, *Moral Prejudices*, 71.

14. Baier, *Moral Prejudices*, 70.

15. Only the basis seems given, however, in the form of certain intimate attachments such as to one's own children. It is a shaky naturalistic proposition that there is any natural sympathy for humanity as a whole.

16. "[T]he reasonable is viewed as a basic intuitive moral idea; it may be applied to persons, their decisions and actions, as well as to principles and standards, to comprehensive doctrines and to much else....What constraints, though, are reasonable? We say: those that arise from situating citizens'

representatives symmetrically when they are represented solely as free and equal, and not as belonging to this or that social class, or as possessing these or those native endowments, or this or that (comprehensive) conception of the good. While this conjecture may have an initial plausibility, only its detailed elaboration can show how far it is sound." John Rawls, *Justice as Fairness: A Restatement* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 82.

17. Amy Gutmann, *Democratic Education* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1987).

18. As a perhaps apocryphal counter-illustration, there is a story about Josef Stalin where he states that he does not want his political decisions to be agreed with because "agreement" would imply some deliberative contingency on the part of the would-be agreeer. Stalin had people who "agreed" with him shot.

19. This of course presupposes that one has a comprehensive conception. I explore this point in "Civic Friendship and Democratic Education," in *Education and Citizenship in Liberal Democratic Societies: Teaching for Cosmopolitan Values and Collective Identities*, ed. Walter Feinberg and Kevin McDonough, (Oxford University Press, forthcoming, 2003).

20. Walter Feinberg, "Dewey and Democracy at the Dawn of the Twenty-first Century," *Educational Theory* 42 (1982): 2.

21. For an analysis of such cases, see my "Fanaticism and Schooling in the Democratic State," *American Journal of Education* 106 (1998): 2.

22. Hume, *Treatise*, 581-82.